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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Open Letter to Rutskoy on Predraft Training

92UM0471A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 4, Jan 92 pp 6-7

[“Open Letter to the Vice President of the Russian Federation A.V. Rutskoy” from Yu. Ostrovskiy, military chief at the Moscow Chemical and Technological Technical School]

[Text] Dear Aleksandr Vladimirovich:

I fully understand the situation that has taken shape in the country, and I take into account your enormous work load and the numerous problems that you have to solve as vice president of Russia. Notwithstanding, I am sending this open letter. It is a question of initial military (for some reason we have in recent times been horribly afraid to utter this word) training for young men in schools, rural vocational and technical schools, and technical schools [tehnikums].

Relying on 20 years of experience in work as a military leader, and also on numerous letters from draftees and colleagues, I can assert that the basic military training carried out since 1971 in schools, rural vocational and technical schools, and tehnikums exerted a positive effect on young men's readiness for military service, and in general had a beneficial influence on the indoctrination process in these educational establishments.

However, the present situation that exists with respect to military training for young men of predraft and draft age does not stand up to criticism. Everything is leading to a situation in which through the efforts of certain figures from national education, very soon (and in some places it has already happened) initial military training will simply be moved outside the walls of general education schools, rural vocational and technical schools, and tehnikums.

Over the past five years attitudes toward this important discipline on the part of the RSFSR Ministry of Education and its administrations and departments at the local level have changed sharply for the worse. A powerful blow was struck by Order No. 62 of the RSFSR Ministry of Education, dated 17 October 1990. What, for example, is the value of paragraphs 1 and 2 in this document?

Paragraph 1 points out that “...henceforth, pending deletion of Article 17 in the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation (some dream of deleting this article of the law, but the question is: why, and for whom???) predraft training for young men will be carried out at training gatherings in defense-and-sports health camps (OSOL) during study time allotted for this training during the last two years of study at an educational establishment, consisting of six or seven hours training a day.”

Paragraph 2 states: “To permit the organization of young men of predraft age in an optional training course for students who express a desire to undergo training, during the course of the year.” Further, in accordance with an order issued on reducing the hours of the program for young men of predraft age, the existing training-material bases has been totally eliminated: “...Specific (???) equipment and weapons are to be transferred to the military registration offices or special sports organizations. Areas must be cleared (!!!) of militarized (???) training facilities and visual aids.”

Well, so why did those who drew up this order not say honestly and directly that studies for initial military training in schools, rural vocational and technical schools, and tehnikums is banned? Why was it necessary to provide “valuable” instructions like “punishment only, no excuses”?

Let us be candid. Conducting exercises in the OSOLs is pure profanation and deception! We have no such camps! Those who drew up the order were well aware of this. But they still signed it! Surely this was aimed at discriminating against the entire process of initial military training, and at creating artificial barriers, was it not?

Talk about the need for the OSOLs, and it was only talk, started six years ago. Draft documentation was drawn up, and that is where it ended. One OSOL cost about 50,000 to 60,000 rubles at 1987/1988 prices. The question is, what rayon executive committee, or prefecture, can permit itself such a thing, even more now when these figures have grown by a factor of 20? The OSOL has merely remained something on paper.

In this connection I make bold to ask the authors of the order where and how under today's conditions they are ordering that training take place, six or seven hours a day? For travel to a zone outside a city, and finding accommodations for students, and feeding them, and providing support for the training process require a technical base and funding for the labor of those who will conduct the training, and many other problems. It is easy to offer the invitation. But to do something?..

Every educational establishment has (at the very least) some kind of training-material base enabling initial military training to be conducted at a sufficiently high methodological level. They have been set up over the decades and solid funding was invested in them, along with the labor and enthusiasm of many military leaders and directors of educational establishments. I do not dispute that in some places they are far from perfect. But at least they are there! Now, with a single stroke of the pen they have ordered a hatchet job on them.

There is more. I cannot imagine how it is possible “to organize predraft training for young men as optional (???) for students who have expressed a desire to undergo training during the year.” Does optional mean not mandatory?! What kind of knowledge will that be?

With the "tacit" consent of the organs of national education, which have no interest in initial military training, sports equipment and training weapons have been removed from the schools, rural vocational and technical schools, and teknikums. For example, it has been suggested to us that the small-caliber rifles already taken from the balance of the equipment be transferred to sports clubs or sold. Sports clubs have no need of those rifles, and as for selling them... To whom, and how? An interesting question.

A paradoxical, even deplorable situation has arisen. There is such a thing as the new program for predraft training for young men (1990). It provides for rifle training. At the same time, there is not one single kind of training or sports weapon. A barrier, again? Yes, and how! We military leaders are being forced to engage in balancing acts, to counting everything on our fingers. Because of the lack of small-caliber rifles and air guns, and also of ammunition (bullets) for them, we have been forced to halt sporting rifle competitions, which have been and are of exceptional interest to young men.

Where is all this leading? To a situation in which the army must accept recruits (together with the cutbacks in the periods of active military service) who are totally untrained.

So was it really necessary to remove training and sporting arms from the schools, rural vocational and technical schools, and teknikums? Attempts are made to justify this decision by the situation associated with armed conflicts in certain parts of the country. But I do not think that sporting arms are being used there.

At the present stage, while the argument over the advisability of predraft training for young men continues, work in military-political indoctrination of youth has been significantly curtailed or totally halted. Moreover, we are simply afraid to talk about it. The impression is being created that one of the most important forms of work to indoctrinate students has lost its topicality, that there is no longer any need to shape in young people a spiritual readiness to accept trials, including in defense of the motherland.

Initial military training has been conducted since 1971 right down to the present day, with one program being replaced by another, which undoubtedly did exert an adverse effect on the quality of the training and indoctrination process. I believe, and this is by no means my opinion alone, that the most successful program was the one introduced in 1987, even though it needed certain amendments.

But what occurred in August 1990 exceeded all our worst expectations. Literally two or three days before the start of the new training year we, the military leaders, announced, at someone's bidding, that the content of the new program, would now be predraft training for young men. Sections dealing with civil defense and medical-sanitation training, which were to be studied by both young men and young women, were included.

I believe that this program was drawn up in haste, and so, in my opinion, has many defects. The hours to be spent on a number of subjects were sharply curtailed. Whereas the old program (1987) provided an opportunity for adequately detailed study of the history of the Russian army and Armed Forces, and their combat traditions, now this is not so. The structure and content of the program is too vague. The list of sections looks artificial.

Introduction of the new program of applied physical training is the purest deception. To reckon that an additional 20 hours of physical training, spread across two or three years, will lead to young people's physical development is simply naive. And what about initial military training here? It is most probable that there is an urgent need to alter the system of physical education in educational establishments in a radical way.

It has not been possible to affirm the new program in life since it has already in practice been abolished, not least because of the notorious Order No. 62.

I understand that simply to criticize shortcomings is not the best way to solve problems. I therefore offer my own proposals.

1. To impart legal status to initial military training as part of the Russian Federation law on military service. This will enable legislators to strengthen the importance of initial military training for young men in educational establishments within the system of national education, find employment in posts as military leaders and methodology experts for a considerable number of officers released in connection with the cutbacks in the Armed Forces, and provide timely training for young men, particularly on the moral plane, to defend not only their parents and families but also their motherland.

I do not know whether from his early years a small boy should be taught about Archimedes or Shalyapin... But a warrior-defender certain should! Let us recall history. Pythagoras was killed as a conquering soldier. And he was killed at the moment that mathematics and philosophy were about to make their greatest discovery. The question is: So where was the defending warrior? On whom did it most depend whether or not there would be a discovery. Pythagoras? The conquering soldier? Or the defending soldier?

2. First experimentally and then with a gradual switch to a permanent base, to make secondary schools into cadet corps, gymnasiums, and lyceums, with mandatory separate training for young men and young women, and the wearing of a school uniform. Thus we may revive the forgotten but extremely effective Russian structure of educational establishments and rid male schools of the female influence, which exerts a certain adverse effect on the indoctrination of young men. And of course, conditions will be better for the indoctrination of young men and instilling in them the high qualities of men who are the bearers of firm discipline.

In Japan, for example, they attach singular importance to discipline and organization in educational establishments. Here, unfortunately, school study is being transformed into some kind of "show." But life is not a holiday, and the school is designed to prepare young people for the future. This is why in our educational establishments it should be bright and happy, but always difficult. In order to strengthen the souls of young people, particularly young men, it is necessary to have order, strictness, and fairness.

3. On the basis of the schools, rural vocational and technical schools, and tekhnikums it is essential to revive the forgotten institution of scouting that was once so successful in Russia, giving it purpose and shaping in the rising generation (seven to 18 years) robust healthiness and high physical qualities.

4. It is advisable to have in each military district (on the base of the now reduced Armed Forces) a cadre training battalion (or regiment) where it would be possible to conduct retraining for officers and sergeants in the reserves and conduct field exercises, rather than creating expensive OSOLs.

5. On the basis of the rural vocational and technical schools and tekhnikums that have the necessary training-and-material base, to train junior specialists for the Armed Forces—chemical and dosimeter experts, radio operators, aircraft mechanics...

I would like, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, to draw your attention to these problems, which are so important for the motherland. Perhaps there is a need for an All-Russian conference on the status of initial military training for young men in schools, rural vocational and technical schools, and tekhnikums, and to outline specific measures to improve it. This discipline should maintain its status. While the people need an army they should insure that it has worthy recruits.

I am, most respectfully,

[Signed] Yu. Ostrovskiy
Military Chief at the Moscow Chemical and Technological Technical School

Servicemen's Union To Be Established

92UM0426A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Jan 92 p 1

[INTERFAX report: "The Servicemen Are Forming a Trade Union"]

[Text] The constituent conference of an independent trade union of servicemen will be held on 17 January in the settlement of Saltykovka near Moscow at the Institute for the Professional Improvement of Trade Union Cadres of the former USSR.

The objective of the conference is to unite primary organizations into a single trade union of servicemen independent of the former Ministry of Defense and the

General Staff. It is planned to adopt provisional regulations and a declaration of the rights of servicemen.

For now, it is not clear whether the new trade union will defend the interests of the servicemen of the entire former USSR or of Russia only.

Likely Content of Temporary Combined Arms Regulations

92UM0591A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "Mister? Comrade? Citizen?... Or About What the CIS Armed Forces Temporary Combined Arms Regulations Will Be Like"]

[Text] We assume that they must be new—both in spirit and in content. This has already become known after the latest session of the commission which has become involved with their development (Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Colonel-General Boris Pyankov headed it). We assume that the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief will put them into force in the next few months after the approval of the commander-in-chief directorate's collegiums if the Commonwealth heads of state give him that right on February 14 in Minsk. An appropriate draft decision has been prepared.

Just like 67 Years Ago

Today what we call a non-standard situation has developed in the army and the navy—the regulations that are in force are hopelessly obsolete and have long since stopped being published. Many units do not even have them.

The Ground Forces directorate has reported that work on preparing new regulations, which the troops acutely need, has been going on since 1985. During the first stage, their drafts were disseminated for study and verification in the troops (nearly 8,000 suggestions were received). Twice they have been reviewed at Ministry of Defense collegium sessions and they have been studied in the highest organs of state power. However, they have not been adopted as a result of the stormy processes that have occurred in society. The creators of the regulations themselves acknowledge that have not kept pace with the development of events. During the second stage (1989-1991), the draft regulations were published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and were widely discussed by army and navy society.

"As a result of the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and while considering the decisions made at Minsk," says Commission Secretary Colonel Vladimir Bakharev, "we propose that the Commander-in-Chief order the introduction of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces temporary combined arms regulations during the transition period. We have the experience of introducing temporary regulations in our Homeland. So, during the period of military

reform (1924-1925), an order of the country's Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] approved the Combined Arms Regulations. The RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army] Temporary Field Regulations appeared in 1936 with the emergence of the concept of "engagement in depth." Today it is precisely the case when it is rational to introduce temporary regulations without delay. In my opinion, a decision of the Commonwealth heads of state on this issue could be the legal basis for them. We assume that this will be a directive document. And later the regulations were developed based on existing law.

Well but how will the Commonwealth states, where they are creating their own armed forces, perceive the new regulations? Judging by the speech of Colonel-General Pyankov at the last meeting, the regulations are not being prepared specifically for the armies being created, by way of illustration, for the Ukrainian army. However, it has not been excluded that the regulations will be put into force by competent organs in some state. And later they can serve as the basis for developing their own regulations.

In connection with this, it is appropriate to say that the commission considered it inadvisable to include the texts of the military oaths in the regulations. It is more rational to place these texts (and they are already different in each state today) in servicemen's military folders. And then again, an understanding has been reached that a citizen of each state of the Commonwealth must swear loyalty to the Homeland, not upon arrival at the military unit, but in his homeland, before his fellow countrymen, relatives, and his contemporaries...

The Order of the Commander—Is Already not Law, But...

Yes, there is no "order of the commander"—the law for subordinates—provision in the draft temporary Interior Service Regulation, no, but the document will, of course, as before require that servicemen carry out an order without question, precisely, and within the prescribed period.

The commission told me these facts. Many conflicting proposals on the order arrived here during the discussion of the draft regulations. Doubts have been expressed in the legitimacy of the existence of wording for the "order of the commander—law for subordinates." They proposed returning to the provisions of the 1937 Regulations which directed us not to "carry out criminal orders." The issues have been debated in the press. The commission did not support the idea on including a provision on prohibiting obedience of criminal orders in the Regulation. The majority thought that this would create conditions when subordinates could subject to doubt any order of the commander. This will violate the basis of unconditional obedience as the fundamental principle of Armed Forces military structural development and their leadership and will increase the number of cases of disobedience in the army and navy.

While speaking at the session, Major-General V. Dayuba (Chief of the Administrative Directorate) proposed correlating the Regulation's provisions with the provisions of the draft Russian Federation Criminal Code which envisions an article on responsibility for carrying out criminal orders. And nevertheless, judging by the discussion, the commission was inclined toward the fact that the commander who issues the order must bear primary responsibility. It is intolerable to discuss the nature of an order in a combat situation. To act otherwise—means to create a paradoxical situation when those who do not carry out orders can become heroes. Deciding whether or not an order is legal—is a matter for a senior commander or the procuracy.

Now all provisions on the order, including from the Disciplinary Regulations, have been combined into a separate section of the Interior Service Regulation which, we think, is advisable. It reflects the interrelationship between servicemen unconditionally carrying out an order and initiative. The commander's responsibility for the order issued and for its consequences has been stressed.

"I Have the Honor"

Of course, the draft Temporary Interior Service Regulation does not only discuss the order. It begins with a "General Provisions" section where the definition of military service is given as a special type of state service and other provisions are clarified whose knowledge is the basis for servicemen carrying out their constitutional duties to defend the Homeland.

In the new chapter "Rights, Duties, and Responsibilities of Servicemen," a broad series of measures on the creation of a reliable mechanism of legal and social protection of people in shoulder boards is set forth for the first time. The principle of the rule-of-law state and the norms of international law have been laid at the foundation of social and legal guarantees. It was noted that servicemen are representatives of authority while executing the duties of military service.

Servicemen's obligations have been clarified and made more specific. It sets forth the rights, obligations and specific features of their conduct in the event of their capture by the enemy that correspond to international agreements.

It has been determined that military units and subunits while in formation greet, at the command of the CIS Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, the President and ministers of defense and all direct commanders and individuals designated for leadership by the conduct of an inspection of a military unit (subunit) of the state on whose territory the military unit is deployed. The V.I. Lenin Mausoleum greeting is considered to be inadvisable.

While discussing the draft Regulation, some commission members raised the issue of changing the word "comrade" when servicemen address each other while serving to some other word—"Mister" or "Citizen." The Commission decided to not make any changes here. And the motivation is as follows. In the S. Ozhegov Dictionary, it notes that comrade is a man that is close to someone on his commonality of interests of views, activities, and living conditions... All servicemen are united by a commonality of interests—military comradeship. Therefore, during the transition period, it is better to retain the address that is traditional. They also talked about how today's conscript contingent is not nearly of the "ruling" class.

It was proposed to replace the expression "I serve the Soviet Union" which has been utilized when replying to an expression of gratitude to the words: "I serve the Homeland."

The next detail. While considering that a contemporary officer is called upon to continue the best traditions of the army and navy, the section "On Military Courtesy and the Conduct of Servicemen" contains the following provision: "While conducting measures at an Officers' Assembly, during off-duty time and when not in formation, officers can address each other not only by their military ranks but also by their names and patronymics. In everyday life, they are authorized to use the affirmative expression "word of an officer" and when they say goodbye to each other, they are authorized to say "I have the honor" instead of "goodbye."

On military ranks. They propose eliminating the rank of Generalissimo, Marshal of Service, and Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union. They will introduce Marshal instead of Marshal of the Soviet Union. The unpopular rank among the troops of "private" [yefreytor] will be replaced with "senior soldier."

Who is the Commander?

The commander and all of his deputies—six people—were the direct commanders of all personnel in the current Regulation. At the same time, battalion commanders and commanders of branches of services and of some services were directly subordinate to the regimental commander. Friction arose among officers. Therefore, it has been proposed that only the commander and his first deputies will be the direct commanders of everyone, as it was during the Great Patriotic War and prior to 1960. The deputy commanders for weapons and rear services will be direct commanders for all regimental personnel with the exception of personnel who are directly subordinate to the commander. For the latter, the orders for technical (rear services) support are mandatory. The diagram will be the same in the battalion and company.

It was reported at the commission session that: 85 percent of the draft regulation discussion participants think that the deputy regimental (battalion, company) commanders for work with personnel must carry out their duties without administrative-command functions.

Therefore, it is inadvisable to make them responsible for the state of military discipline.

Colonel A. Zyskevich spoke at the session and he proposed: would it not be better to grant this category the appropriate rights and then a 50,000 person detachment of professional workers would emerge among commanders in the army and navy who would answer for the level of discipline and the political-moral state in military collectives. Is it not worthwhile to heed these words? Later the deputy commander for work with personnel will have to organize and conduct various measures and exercises and make decisions for the protection of the rights of servicemen and for insuring the safety of service which is unavoidably linked with issuing commands to appropriate officials.

On Incentives and Penalties

I will immediately point out that the structure of the Disciplinary Regulation has remained unchanged. But the primary provisions that define the essence of military discipline, the way to strengthen it and the appropriate directions of work of commanders have been subjected to significant reworking.

It has been planned so that the Commander's (Senior Commander's) activities will be assessed, not by the number of disciplinary penalties imposed but, by their precise compliance with the laws of the state on whose territory the unit is deployed and with military regulations, and total utilization of his disciplinary powers for fulfillment of official duties to establish order and to prevent violations of military discipline beforehand. It was stressed that no violator should avoid liability nor should any innocent person be punished. Finally, the regulation states that the commander (superior) bears no responsibility for crimes, incidents, or deeds committed by his subordinates if they are not a direct consequence of his activity or failure to take steps to prevent them.

Incentives will be used by a commander (superior) while considering unit and subunit public opinion. New types of incentives are being introduced. Soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and master sergeants, for example, can take advantage of additional leave from the unit location—up to a full day. Besides the mandatory leave that is prescribed for compulsory service personnel, they propose retaining short-term leave as an incentive for them.

On penalties. They propose the broad involvement of society, including the Officers' Assembly, for review and discussion of deeds of violators of military discipline to insure legality and to increase the legal knowledge and conscientious fulfillment of military duty by servicemen. I will point out that the commission considered it necessary not to employ arrest with detention at the stockade for officers since this does not promote the prestige of officers' service.

According to the new provisions of the Regulation, a military man can send suggestions, statements, and

complaints to the organs of military justice and to other organs of state power. A provision has been excluded that prohibits a serviceman from complaining about the severity of a disciplinary penalty even if the commander (superior) has not exceeded the disciplinary powers granted to him.

Acquaintance with the draft Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties and with the draft Drill Regulation provides the basis to say that significant changes are also provided for here.

Soldiers Desert from Chechen Military Units

*92UM0602A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 14 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondents A. Yevtushenko and O. Shapovalov: "There Continues To Be a Curfew in Groznyy"]

[Text] The following fact attests to an atmosphere of nervousness: more than 60 soldiers from among recently called-up Republic citizens left their units. Mothers of the new recruits led some of them home almost by the hand. Groznyy Television reminded them of the oath of allegiance given to the Chechen Republic and suggested that they return with their weapons for further performance of duty.

Today representatives of the indigenous nationality make up around 90 percent of the enlisted men in Army subunits stationed in Chechen. But the units continue to be commanded by the North Caucasus Military District command element. This army cannot be called a national army, but in fact it is also not a Russian army and not an army of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Despite the anxious situation, life continues. The Republic Parliament approved well-known dancer Makhmud Esembayev, who was invited to Groznyy from Moscow by President Dудayev, for the position of Minister of Culture.

CIS: POLICY

Shaposhnikov, Others Outline Views on Army

*PM1402215592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Feb 92 p 1*

[Special correspondents Colonel P. Chernenko and Captain Second Rank O. Odnokolenko report: "Minsk: A Military Alliance Is Possible. But What Kind of Military Alliance?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Literally a few minutes before the heads of state took their places in the conference hall, Colonel General Konstantin Morozov, Ukrainian defense minister, answered a number of questions from your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents. [passage omitted] In his opinion, the time when Moscow

could dictate its will to the others has passed. Pressure is being felt at these talks too. But as was stressed, that is not a path that can be crowned with success. The basis of agreement is mutual respect for one another's interests. And Ukraine's interests are well known; they are backed up by quite a solid economy and the will of the Ukrainian Government and the Ukrainian people.

These factors have undoubtedly played a far from insignificant role in the formation of the Ukrainian position. But it is equally obvious that not all the republics that were until recently in the Union are yet prepared to take upon themselves all the worries involved in maintaining their own army. It is quite possible—and this will become clear within a few hours—that they will try to form a kind of defense alliance together with Russia. For example, Eduard Simonyan, the Armenian president's deputy chief adviser on national security, stressed that their delegation is in favor of a transitional period which would make it possible for positions to be defined more clearly and mutually agreed decisions to be elaborated.

And there is plenty to decide. The situation has changed radically. Since there is no Union, the Armed Forces cannot exist in their previous form either. They must be reformed both in their structure and in their form of management. But time is needed for such work, and the main thing is coordination and mutual understanding. Of course, E. Simonyan noted frankly, it is possible to try and nationalize overnight units of the 7th Army stationed in Armenia. But, as was noted, that is not the way out of the situation; it is time to learn to solve problems in a civilized way. That is the frame of mind in which the Armenian delegation will sit down at the negotiating table.

As expected, Russia's course of forming joint Armed Forces was primarily supported by the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. Lieutenant General Sagadat Nurmagambetov, chairman of the Kazakh State Committee for Defense, noted *inter alia*: "Kazakhstan supports unified Armed Forces. It advocates their unified supply and the unified training of cadres. It supports the idea that recruitment to the army should be territorial and ex-territorial, particularly in the strategic forces."

It is hard to say, in the time before the issue goes to press, what will happen today and how the meeting will proceed. But it is probably already clear to everyone that it is time to put an end to the situation whereby the Army is in a state of suspense, so to speak. Servicemen should be able to feel confident about their future.

Colonel General Petr Chaus, Republic of Belarus acting defense minister, expressed the belief that it will not prove possible to reach an agreement on the joint Armed Forces at this meeting. Some kind of military alliance is possible in principle, he believes. But it is obvious that Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova will go their own way. Some already have their own army *de facto*, for example Ukraine, while others envisage a transitional period of two or three years for this purpose, for instance

Belarus. These are the aspects on which we must reach agreement, the Belarussian spokesman believes.

We managed to ask Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces, several questions actually in the conference hall.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is there any hope of reaching an agreement on joint Armed Forces?

[Shaposhnikov] Yes, there is. And this hope is justifiable. Let me tell you, the defense ministers of the CIS member states have already agreed on certain things in the past few days. We have reached mutual understanding on at least 13 documents. And that is the basis of my hopes.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] So you are in an optimistic frame of mind?

[Shaposhnikov] I simply have to be an optimist. [Shaposhnikov ends]

Now, as we transmit this report, the meeting of the heads of state is continuing. To the accompaniment of the rain that has unexpectedly started to descend on Minsk.

Yazov on Problems of Dividing Armed Forces

92UM0565A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 8 Feb 92 p 5

[Article by Dmitriy Yazov: "Troubles"]

[Text] Dear Editor-in-Chief,

Problems of defense and military development have always attracted the most persistent attention of our people.

I don't think that the reasons for this require any explanation. But I do feel that I would not be exaggerating in saying that today, and once again for fully understandable reasons, these problems are literally at the epicenter of public consciousness.

Naturally they trouble me as well. As a person who devoted over 50 years to serving the fatherland, and as a participant of the Great Patriotic War, I reckon that it would be wrong on my part not to try to express my opinion on these matters, and share my thoughts on this urgent topic.

Therefore, despite my present situation (since August 1991), of which you are aware, I would like to ask you to publish the thoughts offered here.

My hope is that politicians, military servicemen and lay readers will find something useful in them. I would also like to ask you to consider that I did not have the opportunity to verify the necessary facts, and that I am recalling them from memory.

According to a declaration of the heads of the republics of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, the members of the

Commonwealth intend to pursue a course toward firmer international peace and security. They guarantee fulfillment of international obligations they inherited from treaties and agreements of the former USSR, and they are working toward unified control of nuclear weapons and their nonproliferation.

The Alma-Ata declaration also asserts that states of the Commonwealth guarantee fulfillment, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, of international obligations inherited from the treaties and agreements of the former USSR.

As we know, members of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe have signed a conventional arms reduction treaty. According to this treaty, which was signed in Paris, the European part of the former Union is divided into four zones—northern, central, southern and rear. Quantitative and qualitative parameters of the presence of weapons that are to remain after fulfillment of the treaty are determined for each zone. Naturally in the course of negotiations during drafting of the treaty, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other state organs guided themselves by the interests of the entire country, and they based themselves on considerations of its integrity and indivisibility. Where strike groupings would be located and what kind they would be were determined in accordance with this. Thus, of the 13,150 tanks and other weapons that our country could have maintained in its European part, a minimum quantity fell within the northern and southern zones, while the bulk remained in the central zone—that is, in Belarus, the Ukraine and the Baltic republics.

As we know, the Baltic states, which left the USSR and do not align themselves with the CIS, are demanding the immediate withdrawal of all forces from their territories. As they see it, the army must leave all weapons, military equipment and military facilities behind.

The following question begs itself: How will the Baltic states fulfill the Paris treaty, and how do European countries that signed this treaty feel about their position?

It would also be proper to consider from this point of view the decisions of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova to maintain their own armed forces of a quantitative makeup determined by these republics.

Logic would suggest that the Commonwealth of Independent States must have the mechanisms and structure by which to fulfill treaty obligations. It seems to me that this is something the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Council of Ministers of Defense of the Commonwealth States need to get involved in.

The declaration on the creation of the CIS discusses keeping its military strategic space under a unified command. In correspondence with this, it would obviously be suitable to create an agency such as the Warsaw Pact or NATO headquarters within the Commonwealth.

But the ultimate question is this: What do unified strategic forces and "unified control" mean in a situation of total sovereignty? Therefore, before dividing the armed forces and have them swear their allegiance, we should draft, or instruct the Council of Defense Ministers or some other agency to develop and introduce, proposals on these extremely complex matters.

One other fundamental question: What are strategic nuclear forces? Take reconnaissance resources for example. They are located along almost the entire perimeter of the former Union. If we do not include them, as well as communication resources and space-based elements in the strategic nuclear forces, they would practically be unable to function. And what about the SPRN [Missile Attack Warning System] stations on the territory of the Ukraine, which has declared its desire to be a nuclear-free country? Formation and operation of strategic nuclear forces are obviously unimaginable in the absence of a representative agency that could resolve the issues that arise.

The Alma-Ata declaration states that strengthening the presently existing deep historical roots of relations of friendship, good will and mutually beneficial cooperation reflects the fundamental interests of the people, and serves the cause of peace and security. Security.... If this term is in the declaration, then the question that arises is this: Does the CIS need a general military doctrine, a general military policy?

There are two sides to military doctrine existing as a system of views on protection of one's states—political and technical. And so, will there be a general military doctrine for the CIS, or will each state develop its own doctrine? It is easiest of all today to assert that no one is intending to attack us. This is true. But it is also true that the USA is retaining its numerous bases on foreign territory. They are in Japan, in South Korea, in the Indian Ocean.... It would perhaps be easier to name regions where they are not. Nor does the USA intend to withdraw troops completely from Germany. There are bases in Italy, Greece and Turkey. Of course, if we yield to the illusion that no one will ever attack us, then there is no need for either doctrine or an army. However, we know that there are many desiring to make territorial claims upon us.

The reaction of the West to the situation in states of the former USSR compels us to ponder many things. We know for example the concern with which defense ministers meeting in London met a report of the Ukrainian government's decision to exclude forces stationed on its soil from the operational command and warning system, through which the armed forces are controlled. In the opinion of U.S. Minister of Defense R. Cheney, even the debate on the matter of controlling the Black Sea Fleet may at a certain stage transform into a conflict, meaning that countries of the West must prepare for all surprises.

And consider the attention that is being devoted in the West to our tactical nuclear weapons.

This persistent attention of the West toward the problems of the commonwealth's armed forces, and this sharp reaction to friction in this area are further substantial arguments in favor of the existence of an overall agency that would support the security interests of the Commonwealth of Independent States. I am certain that this agency will help to raise the authority both of the commonwealth as a whole and of each state taken separately.

Can a president or even a defense minister really understand all of the subtleties of the organizational structure of air defense forces? The air defense forces, you see, are not just an individual military unit but an entire SYSTEM, deployed in front and in depth; it possesses several echelons of reconnaissance and warning resources and weapon systems that interact with air defense and army aviation. This system is controlled from a single command post, and major formations are stationed on the territory of several republics. How are they to be divided up? How are they to be privatized?

The NATO countries have created a unified air defense system, and America and Canada have done the same, while we go chopping things up, all for the sake of sovereignty!

To chop things up without thinking things out is to place many tens of thousands of officers and their families at the brink of irreversible harm.

I would like to mention one generally positive fact: At the level of ministers and of representatives concerned with state defense issues, agreement was reached on a number of documents at the working level. They include an agreement among the states on defense issues in the period of transition, and a document on the status of the commonwealth's combined armed forces located on territory of the states. It seemed as if agreement concerning the need for a transition from unified armed forces to combined armed forces was near. But it soon became obvious that this variant did not suit many states either. Why? It is a complex problem. Some states want their own armed forces to resolve problems within the republic, while others want to use them to resolve interrepublic territorial problems. Still others wish to extract certain economic benefits.

But we cannot forget that the army has always been organized on the basis of one-man command. Without it, there can be no army. There is but one solution. As long as Russia has been recognized by the world community to be the successor to the former Union, it should consequently be the heir of its armed forces. In any case, it is important to follow this principle: Do not dismantle the old before creating the new. Unfortunately, the principle of tearing things apart still prevails.

Withdrawal of troops from Germany and Poland was planned in 1990 within the framework of the Union, withdrawal from the Baltics has now been added to that, and what about tomorrow? The plan needs to be reviewed immediately with regard for the plans of the

independent states: What sort of armed forces, types of weapons, control systems and so on do they intend to have? In this connection we will need to quickly analyze not only the progress in building military posts, maintenance depots and airfields. Life requires us to immediately determine the future places of deployment of units withdrawn to Russian territory, and plan their reorganization or inactivation.

We already know today that some of the states intend to sell part of the military equipment being reduced in accordance with the Paris agreements on the world market. I am certain that the military equipment must be retained. The aspiration of certain leaders of sovereign states to sell and barter everything, including military equipment, may cost us dearly. All the more so because cases are known where equipment is sold at cut-rate prices, as second-grade scrap metal.

I must say something about the possible negative military strategic consequences of the Union's disintegration. If we were to look the truth in the eye, we would have to admit that the overall defensive potential of the commonwealth has already been weakened, and that the correlation of forces in the world is out of balance. Everything that the concept of "COMMONWEALTH" means is not being given priority. Emphasis on independence and sovereignty prevails. But as we know, independence does not deny the existence of COMMON INTEREST. For example, standardization of weapons, division of labor in defense sectors, and so on.

We are still totally unclear about the forms in which cooperation will continue in arms production. It must be planned, after all. One state could place orders with another. That means we need a coordinating agency here as well, one which would account for the presence of production equipment when distributing orders, planned repairs, and so on. For example all of the states possess aviation, but not all of the states possess aviation plants.

It might be argued that all of these issues will be resolved by the market. Perhaps, though in any case this will not happen in the very near future. But mobilization issues could hardly be resolved with the assistance of the market. Specialists understand that in the event of war, not only the army but the entire nation fights. Even the recent small war in the Persian Gulf zone forced the Americans to call up around 200,000 reservists, despite the fact that their army was two million strong. Just this fact alone provides the grounds for concluding that reliance upon a small army consisting only of professionals is unfounded. All the more so in application to Russia, with its enormous territory, a significant part of which certain neighbors covet, as was mentioned earlier.

Many are talking about a mercenary army today. But they frequently fail to note that such armies exist for the moment only in America and England. It may be that specialists of a high class should be hired for service, but we cannot allow the people and the economy to find

themselves unprepared for a common misfortune—that is, a major war, which cannot be excluded as yet. Therefore I cannot agree with those who suggest doing away with universal compulsory military service. We could perhaps reduce the time of service to a year or a year and a half, but whatever we do, we must be ready to defend the motherland. The assertion is often heard today that the army must be above politics. And this is in conditions under which the society is politicized to the extreme. I think that this is a policy of hiding one's head in the sand. It is impossible to educate a soldier, a defender of the fatherland, without having an army with a clearly determined mission. I am certain that there is much that is borrowed and speculative in talk of depoliticizing the army. One question that arises, for example, is why those who oppose politicization of the army do not oppose taking of an oath by servicemen who have already sworn allegiance. Isn't this politics?

The 5 August 1991 issue of THE TIMES wrote: "The USSR has conceded so much, and the USA has responded to this with so little that it can be said that Gorbachev's revolution is history's greatest bargain-basement sale. Prices are always low in such markets." There is the danger that the "independent" states will not only sell combat equipment and weapons located on their territory at cut rates, but that they will simply let it go for a song. And isn't this politics?

As we say today, politics are the art of the possible. It may be that a highly gifted, talented diplomat may gain some ground in some separately considered situation. But when it comes to the state, and to entire peoples inhabiting it, the thesis of the "art of the possible" sounds naive.

Here, for example, is how U.S. President Bush assesses our "art of the possible": "...the Soviet Union no longer exists. This is a victory of democracy and freedom. This is a victory of moral forces, of our values. Every American can be proud of this victory—from the millions of American men and women who served our country in the armed forces, to the millions of Americans who supported their country and strengthened its defenses through the period of government by nine presidents."

Isn't this politics?

War has always been the continuation of policy. And victory without war is also the victory of policy. Bush goes on to say: "Despite the potential for instability and chaos, this event (the USSR's disintegration.—Author) is clearly in our national interest." So it seems that our disintegration, our grief, our misfortune is something good to someone else. Isn't this politics?

The population of our republic is politicized today as never before, especially at the national level. Everyone is creating his own army, self-defense attachments and irregulars. Is this all really being done as something not political? I am certain that we need concrete, purposeful work directed at instilling patriotism and internationalism, perhaps more than ever before. It may seem

strange to some that I am talking about internationalism and patriotism in the presence of a Commonwealth of Independent States. But don't we have spiritual values that are a part of a common invaluable heritage of ours?

Could we possibly hope that a soldier would be faithful to duty and to his oath if he has not been educated to be respectful of the personality, the individual, the traditions of different peoples and history? One of the most glorious and heroic pages in this history was the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The 50th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow was recently celebrated. And there are new, important dates ahead. But let's take a look at how the mass media feel about them. It is distressing to realize that more can be heard on the television today about the new millionaires than about the famous defenders of the fatherland. By the way, some of these millionaires have already skipped the country, sweeping away the traces of their criminal activity on native soil.

The country is going the way of capitalistic relations. But initial capital is often accrued and created by means of deceit, plunder and thievery. Economic and spiritual ties between different regions have been broken, and each region is striving to solve its problems at the expense of neighbors. Production is decreasing catastrophically, and plants, factories and mines are being shut down. Economic life is withering away. Unfortunately, the price liberalization that certain politicians saw to be a panacea for all woes has not yet inspired the hopes of our people for rebirth, for a return to a normal life. The responsibility of all states of the commonwealth to preserve the army, its experience and its traditions is especially great under these conditions.

As I conclude, I must express my feelings about Russia's latest initiatives in arms limitation and reduction. On the whole, there can be no doubt regarding the correctness of the course toward reduction, and subsequently the elimination of nuclear weapons and other resources of mass destruction. It would clearly be premature to offer some conclusive opinion about these initiatives. However, the impression is being created that the USA is not taking adequate steps in this aspect, that the American administration's position is one of obtaining one-sided advantages and of relinquishing the principle of parity, as had been manifested even before. "Not a single country in the world can be compared with ours in combat capabilities," said the U.S. defense minister. "And we intend to maintain this superiority in the future...."

As we can see, the intentions are more than definite. I think that the danger posed to our people in the future by such superiority and the conclusions that should be reached from this are clear to everyone.

These thoughts were forwarded to the editor's office by Counselor D. T. Yazov. They are printed in condensed form.

The author asked for his honorarium to be donated to the fund for assistance to families of servicemen who died in interethnic conflicts.

Replacement of Army Political Organs with Personnel Officers

92UM0426B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with military sociologist Yuriy Deryugin by Aleksandr Putko; date and place not given: "Who Will Come To Replace the Commissar. Military Schools and Academies Should Train Psychologists"]

[Text] As early as within a week of the failure of the coup, the Minister of Defense of the Union signed Order No. 418 on the abolition of military-political organs in the USSR Armed Forces. The institution of military commissars collapsed. It was resolved to create in its stead the USSR Ministry of Defense Commission for Work With the Personnel. The commission headed by General Dmitriy Volkogonov began to develop the concept and structure of the new establishment. It appeared that the first real step of military reform was about to be taken. However, four months have passed since...

Military sociologist Yuriy Deryugin reflects on this.

[Putko] Yuriy Ivanovich, you worked in the Main Military-Political Directorate for many years; you were among those who initiated the creation of a sociological service in the army. As you see it, why did the reform of political organs grind to a halt?

[Deryugin] I have doubts about the very concept which provides the foundation for creating so-called organs for work with personnel. Incidentally I will note that it was developed hastily without consultations with broad circles of specialists. Many of its provisions were proposed by the leadership of the former Main Military-Political Directorate. Hence their general strategy: to preserve the backbone and cadres of the old structures, of course, under a new name. This is precisely how the issue was raised: Where are we to put political officers who are let go?

It was resolved to introduce a new position: assistant to the company commander for work with personnel. That is to say, instead of the former deputy commander for political affairs, a similar ideologist-educator, a "kindly adviser," to be sure, with fewer rights, was to appear. Nothing of the kind exists in any civilized country of the world.

[Putko] However, let us try to put ourselves in the shoes of previous deputy commanders for political affairs—lieutenants, senior lieutenants, captains. There are tens of thousands of them. They have graduated from military political schools, served diligently, and started families. Where are they to go now? Perhaps from the humanitarian point of view, the introduction of the new position...

[Deryugin] What kind of humanism are you talking about! Their prospects for advancement are none. In addition, replenishment will come from schools and academies. The new, better skilled cadres will unavoidably crowd out the hastily retrained political officers.

[Putko] Perhaps in this case it would be worthwhile to reassigned former deputy commanders for political affairs who wish to remain in the service to regular command positions with the troops. After a short retraining, they could become good platoon and company commanders, all the more so because, at present, a great many of these positions are vacant. The institution of assistant educators should be altogether eliminated. Incidentally this will make it possible to reduce a segment of defense expenditures.

[Deryugin] Of course! Unit commanders should work with personnel. A 19-year-old young man with an already formed character and a certain complex of knowledge should no longer be educated (we have been through that already!) but rather trained and made into a professional soldier. He should study a course of military history, master elementary legal knowledge with regard to military service and fundamentals of military ethics. Who should provide instruction? A commander who has received appropriate training in school. For example, this is what is done in the U.S. Armed Forces.

Of course, the curricula of schools will have to be revised.

[Putko] However, what about sociologists, lawyers, and psychologists in this case? After all, as you developed a concept of military reform, you maintained that we cannot do without them in a modern army.

[Deryugin] I still believe so. Specialists of this nature are badly needed, but at a higher level. For example, it would be worthwhile to introduce the position of social worker in battalions. He is not an educator or commander, but rather a researcher who prepares recommendations for the commander. The sphere of his responsibilities is as follows: interpersonal relations among servicemen, their social orientation, social therapy (combating non-regulation relations, preventing the incidence of suicide, and resolving conflict situations). Former political officers are not up to this. According to calculations by our scientists, the optimal ratio is one social worker per 300 servicemen. That is to say, social workers are needed at precisely the battalion level.

A specialist-psychologist should work in a regiment which has more than 1,000 personnel. His task would be to analyze the psychological status of servicemen and to detect those who need special assistance.

Preparing the personnel for operations under extreme conditions is yet another task of military psychologists. In the army, the psychologists teach the techniques of self-suggestion and ensure psychological relaxation.

I propose that regiments have culture and information centers headed by a chief officer. He should be in charge of a small staff of civilian employees: heads of amateur arts, librarians, video library personnel, and educators who would help soldiers prepare for admission to colleges.

[Putko] It appears that we have sorted things out as far as regiments are concerned. What if we go higher, to the level of divisions, large units in which there are thousands of personnel?

[Deryugin] A sociologist is necessary at that level, a scientist who engages in research work with regard to large masses of people and provides recommendations. At this level, certain regularities may be sought, and processes underway in a modern army may be generalized.

Ukraine Delegates Muzzled at Assembly

92UM0527A Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
25 Jan 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Anatolyevich Ivanov, delegate from Kiev Military District to the All-Army conference, by Valentina Bondarenko, under the "Absolutely Not Secret" rubric; place and date not given: "Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov: 'No Assemblies Whatever Have a Right To Dictate Policy'"]

[Text] Calls are usually made to the editorial office in agitated voices, as if calling for an ambulance or the militia. But fewer calls for help are made now (it is possible, readers have stopped believing in the power of the press), but intensely excited people look for an interlocutor, more likely, a listener. The call from Piryatin of Poltava Oblast at first was not very different from the usual agitated monologues. Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov, having arrived from Moscow, talked with indignation about the spectacle that was played in the Kremlin. Yes, the discussion was about the all-Army conference to which he happened to be a delegate from Kiev Military District.

"But will you not be afraid to repeat all of this for our readers?" I asked him.

"I have to be in Kiev tomorrow, and I definitely will drop in at the editorial office."

I will present my conversation with Viktor Anatolyevich Ivanov, a Russian by nationality, and an officer who took the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine, almost without abridgment.

[Bondarenko] Viktor Anatolyevich, what was the composition of the delegation from the KVO [Kiev Military District]?

[Ivanov] Fifty-four persons flew to Moscow, although 72 delegates were expected, but the rest decided not to participate in the assembly. I, and I think the rest of the delegates also, went for one purpose—to report to colleagues from other districts the true state of affairs in the

armed forces of Ukraine. So that they would learn the truth firsthand and not use the purposeful disinformation in the central press and on radio and television.

[Bondarenko] Did the Commander of Chichevatov District share your views?

[Ivanov] He was not interested in our views. It would seem that the delegates, elected by officers' assemblies, could have told a lot to the commander of the district on the state of local affairs, but he did not find the time to meet with us. He flew to Moscow on a separate aircraft, and he especially did not communicate with us in Moscow.

[Bondarenko] Viktor Anatolyevich, what is the explanation for the intense excitement of the assembly, the inexplicable nervousness, and the unwarranted aggressiveness of the delegates who came, it would seem, to discuss important problems?

[Ivanov] You know, this nervousness was skillfully supercharged and incited. I will tell you about that which the media failed to mention. After all, just before the Kremlin assembly, several assemblies were held by the services of the armed forces. This can be called nothing other than a massive artillery preparation before the attack. We, the representatives of the Ground Forces, for example, were assembled by Colonel General Semenov. I will note in passing that all of this occurred exactly at those hours that the heads of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] were meeting. And so, the deputy mayor of Moscow, Yu. Luzhkov, and G. Popov, the mayor himself, spoke to us. Why was it specifically them? I do not know.

But I would like to dwell in a little more detail on Gavriil Popov's speech. First, it was revealed immediately that the all-Army assembly will play a positive role in preserving the unified armed forces and to "force Ukraine to alter its decision." Further, the mayor of Moscow generally ventured the statement that "Ukraine needs its own army only to...seize nuclear weapons."

I am military and not a politician, but, in my opinion, politicians should be more circumspect in making such statements. And be responsible for them. But we later understood that everything that was said was not accidental.

Officers were given three minutes each for speeches. Three persons from Kiev District spoke from the floor. Each of them began his speech with the words that an absolute majority of our officers agree with the decision of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. But at this point you could hear loud exclamations: "Traitor," and the people were not allowed even to finish a sentence.

As a result, it was decided to submit the demand of the Ground Forces to the heads of the CIS states to maintain unified armed forces and to propose in the Kremlin tomorrow that all the presidents appear. The Kremlin

assembly will spend whatever time will be necessary for the acceptance by the heads of the states of the decisions demanded by the officers.

[Bondarenko] In my opinion, in a word, this can be called—blackmail...

[Ivanov] The blackmail attempt is evident. And it was directed personally against President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk. He did right by not coming. Leonid Makarovich is able to hold his own fittingly in any situation, but under such unprecedented pressure, and indeed right on the air, it would be difficult for him to defend his position. Moreover, no one in the Kremlin even intended to hear out this position.

[Bondarenko] This means that the "combative" mood of the officer conference was formed by the military command just before...

[Ivanov] And not only by the command, the workers of the former political organs also, and by someone else also... I will explain now what I have in mind. When we were driven to the Kremlin in the morning, we were let off at Manezhnaya Ploshchad, which was blocked with people. All of us walked through an agitated corridor of people from which some kinds of words were yelled, and slogans hit the eye. I recall only a few of them: "There are 5,000 of you, seize power, restore the USSR," "You are our last hope, arrest Yeltsin." Someone was sobbing hysterically and was stretching out his hands to us. Overall, the psychological pressure was powerful. Later, we were told that the rally was organized by the Russian Communist Party. Judging by everything, various leaflets and newspapers were distributed during intermissions on behalf of this same party.

[Bondarenko] Viktor Anatolyevich, why did the spectators not see the speakers from Kiev Military District?

[Ivanov] Well, to start with, the delegation of the Ukrainian districts and the Transcaucasus Military District (probably, as the most unreliable) were seated in the balcony, from where it was not easy to get to the microphone. Second, not one of my comrades agreed to come to the microphone with a speech prepared by the leaders of the former political organs. We composed our own personal speeches, but we were not given the floor, and, in the third intermission, I approached Major General Stolyarov, the assembly chairman. He leafed through his lists, and I saw that the Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa military districts were crossed out. No one intended to listen to us. And they did not want to hear the truth about what was going on in Ukraine. This way it was easier to arouse the people.

[Bondarenko] How did you feel, Viktor Anatolyevich; did the attitude of the officers toward the events occurring in the independent states change after the assembly?

[Ivanov] It seems to me that it did. In any case, the delegation from Kiev Military District reinforced its opinion that we did everything properly. The USSR

ceased to exist, and it broke down into free independent states that have the right to have their own armed forces. Ukraine availed itself of this right. This means we must swear allegiance to the people of the state where we intend to serve.

While before the beginning of the assembly the following lines from an anonymous appeal, allegedly on behalf of the workers of Moscow, were perceived with anxiety (and there were thousands of such leaflets), after the assembly, they were perceived with disgust: "International financial capital, in a mad attempt at world supremacy, is destroying the Soviet Union with the hands of its pseudodemocratic lackeys. They want to corral you into musical comedy armies of district principalities, and to send you to fight against states that are defending their independence. The puppet presidents are attempting to send you against people who are protesting. Be loyal to your oath, so that you are not stricken by the shame and scorn of the people."

We do not have a right to make the malicious authors of such scribbling happy. They long for a civil war between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus... I have two children, and I want them to live in a peaceful, wealthy, and free state. That is why I took the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine.

Officer's Assembly Council Continues Work

92UM0492A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Lieutenant Colonels A. Dokuchayev and V. Zyubin: "Coordinating Council in Operation"]

[Text] On 31 January the Coordinating Council elected by the All-Army Officers Assembly continued its work in Moscow. Draft documents were finalized which are planned to be presented to the conference of heads of state on 14 February in Minsk.

"If the heads of the independent states agree on just 80 percent of the provisions contained in our package of documents, this will show a very great deal of support for our military servicemen of the Armed Forces during this difficult period," stated Captain 1st Rank A. Mochaykin, assistant commander of the Underwater Strategic Missile Cruiser Division of the Northern Fleet, in sharing his opinion with us. The most important thing, in his view, was that the officers more precisely defined their goals and tasks. At the outset, the diversity of opinion on fundamental questions was significant.

It would be difficult not to agree with this, observing the intense feeling which accompanied discussions and the introduction of corrections to the draft provisional regulations on the Coordinating Council prior to being adopted.

It is planned that the Coordinating Council will approve a declaration in its own name to be sent to the highest

organs of authority of the states of the Commonwealth. We will only be able to inform our readers as to who becomes chairman of the council in our next issue.

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Heavy Bomber Regiment Refuses Commonwealth Oath

92UM0593A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
16 Jan 92 p 1

[Appeal Adopted at the Order of Lenin, Red Banner Poltava-Berlin Heavy Bomber Aviation Regimental Officers' Assembly on January 8, 1992, location not given, under the rubric "Hear our Voice": "We Want to Delay Taking the CIS Oath"]

[Text] In the days when the troops, infused with glory and deployed on the territory of sovereign Ukraine, have the occasion to take the oath for the first time in the history of our state, they are attempting to force the text of the so-called oath for the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Strategic Deterrent Forces [SDF] personnel on the officers of our unit which, we think, is at variance with the law, is a collection of washed out sentences, and makes us dependent on random, rash decisions with which the history of recent days is saturated, and which contradicts the fact of the deployment of our unit on the territory of Ukraine and the responsibility and the defined specific features of our unit.

The CIS SDF leadership, in its turn, has not conducted any explanatory work whatsoever at units.

We want, through NARODNAYA ARMIYA newspaper, to appeal to the government of Ukraine and to the Ukrainian people: The aviators of the Order of Lenin, Red Banner Poltava-Berlin Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment are totally prepared to defend the borders of the CIS and sovereign Ukraine in accordance with the previously taken oath and will never permit the employment of the horrible weapons that have been entrusted to us against the people of Ukraine.

Military unit officers at a general officer's assembly have resolved to refrain from taking the military oath proposed for CIS strategic deterrent forces personnel as a result of the fact that the text of the CIS SDF oath has not been approved by the appropriate Commonwealth countries' legislative organs or by the Council of the Heads of the Independent States;

- they propose taking the oaths of various states in one unit that is part of the CIS SDF;
- there is no law that defines the composition, structure, tasks, and support of the CIS SDF that are deployed on the territories of the sovereign states;
- there is no status for a CIS SDF servicemen or law on officers' performance of duty;

- Armed Forces regulations has lost their legal force as a result of the disintegration of the USSR and new regulations have not been developed; and,
- the lack of any citizenship whatsoever for servicemen puts in doubt further guarantees of our social protection.

Adopted at the Regimental Officers' Assembly on January 8, 1992

Amur Missile Base Explosion Explained

92UM0472A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
22 Jan 92 p 6

[Article by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent Ye. Davydenko: "The Revenge of Enlisted Man Yevdomakha on Captain Ryflyak"]

[Text] This incident, which took place in the autumn of last year at a missile base in Seryshevskiy Rayon in Amur Oblast, caused a great deal of commotion. All the central newspapers, not to mention the local press, deemed it necessary to talk about what had happened.

This is what happened on that November night. At 0130 local time (1930 Moscow time) two surface-to-air missiles were fired from a flame-engulfed launch pad. The first flew for half a kilometer and fell into a field. The second smashed into a concrete post on the territory of the garrison and broke up, and fragments of the solid-fuel jet engine fell on some barracks. The soldiers, who were raised by the alarm, did not manage to get out. Sergeant Mamatumin Khodzhakulov was killed by the fragments. Ten soldiers were wounded, with varying degrees of seriousness.

In general, when missiles fly uncontrolled by man it is always fraught with unpredictable consequences. The warheads on those two missiles could have exploded, and other missiles may have been fired by the explosion, and then who knows where the fragments might have landed. But fortunately, at that time, in November, the interlock systems for the warheads on the missiles were operating.

The newspapers commented in every possible way on this unusual event in the life of the air defense troops.

Then the investigation of the incident started, and it was quite complicated for journalists to find the answers to these questions. Today, however, when the final period has been placed in the case of the fire, I can finally do this...

Kostya Yevdomakha was preparing for his "discharge day" very thoroughly. He had taken in his single-breasted jacket in a special way and had his trousers specially fitted, and had filled his "discharge" album. The Council of Ministers decree on the discharge to the reserve and the next draft had been published on 25 September. But none of the soldiers could honor it with the name "decree," but called it an "order," old style.

Each day Kostya tried to guess when he would finally be sent back to his native Vladivostok. But it was now two months past "discharge day" and but he was still doing service. And then, after Kostya's latest crazy stunt, Captain Ryflyak threatened that he would not be going home before 31 December.

In general Kostya could have quietly served until the new year. The service of enlisted man Kostya Yevdomakha was not particularly onerous. He did not carry out his duties in dirty conditions, he was a diesel mechanic and electrician. And he was still regarded as a "grandfather," that is, he had almost unlimited power in the barracks. He had three young men at his command, Yura Kozhevnikov, who at his first command would gather hemp from the brushwood around the point, Sashka Valeychik, whom from time to time he beat up "as a preventive measure," and his namesake Sarykov, who was called his "punch bag." All three were mortally afraid of Kostya, and so, he thought, would be loyal to him even unto death. In short, the conditions for Yevdomakha at the end of his service were quite tolerable and it would have been possible to wait calmly for the new year. But Kostya Yevdomakha was not the kind of man to forgive an insult. Captain Ryflyak still remembers him!

On day 50 following the "order" Kostya decided to set off his first firework.

Kostya met Valeychik, whom he had beaten up pretty badly the day before, in a drying room and set forth his plan in detail. Sashka, who was well aware of the weight of Yevdomakha's fists, offered no special resistance. He took matches and a pair of training shoes from Kostya and then entered the storehouse of the Granit subunit through a window. There he struck a match and after setting fire to the training shoes thrust them beneath the rear wheel of a mobile repair workshop.

Yevdomakha was already in bed when Valeychik reported that his mission had been accomplished. When the fire alarm went off, Kostya began to smile...

The duty officer, Captain Volkovets, ran over to the burning storehouse and was quite surprised: the bolt and seal were still intact, but tongues of flame were licking round the roof.

The next day in the unit they talked of nothing except yesterday's fire. Soon half the barracks knew whose hand had committed the deed. Someone had seen Valeychik returning the matches to Yevdomakha, and Sashka told someone, as a secret, about his nocturnal "feat," and finally, they found the training shoes, burned in the storehouse. But to everyone's amazement the command did not show any particular zeal in looking for the guilty parties. It was obvious that they had decided to "forget" the incident.

This was little to Kostya's liking because he had been counting on some fuss about the nocturnal happening. It was then that he decided to have a firework display on a

grander scale. He took three days to consider all the details of the plan and find someone to execute it. And so, he brought to the boiler house where Yevdomakha's loyal servants Kozhevnikov and Sarykov worked, his third, just as loyal—Valeychik. That night Valeychik was on duty, on patrol at the launch pad. Sashka put down his automatic and had a smoke, nor did he refuse the tea that was offered him. The feeling was that he intended to spend the rest of the cold night there. Seeing that the patrol was not guarding the missile, Sarykov emerged from the boiler house. Then he accurately carried out all of Yevdomakha's instructions.

On the previous afternoon Sarykov had hauled a bucket of gas oil to the launch shelter. He had agreed to meet Yevdomakha at the combat position. Thence the namesakes moved unhindered to the missiles, thanks to the absence of the patrol at that time. Yevdomakha poured the oil over the solid-fuel engine of one of the missiles and thrust the matches into Sarykov's hands. He lingered for about three minutes to give Yevdomakha time to get clear, then he set fire to a mitten, hurled an oil-impregnated jacket, and threw a match into the bucket...

Yevdomakha reckoned that there would then be a great commotion. Together with Sarykov he would run to "extinguish" the fire, and in order to mask himself, the "grandfather" had put on someone else's boots. Then during the confusion he managed to throw the other mittens into the stoke-hold. And when the alarm sounded, patrolman Valeychik was still warming himself in the boiler house.

But now Kostya could amuse his own self-esteem: the commotion over the fire was universal. The reporters turned up in countless numbers. And now the battery commander, Captain Ryflyak, could not protect himself against the unpleasantness. True, Kostya had in no way supposed that anyone would die as a result, or that so many of the lads would be wounded. But the deed was done...

The investigation was in the dark for an entire week as it worked through one scenario after another. Nevertheless, the most likely was that it was arson for revenge. The suspects included the warrant officers and officers who had been transferred to the reserves but continued to live with the unit. The investigators looked into the soldiers who were part of the spring draft, those who had not wanted to serve... It is difficult to say when the investigation would have moved along the right path if a week after the incident enlisted man Sarykov had not appeared in the office of the military prosecutor to announce that he had set fire to the missile.

So, once again we are dealing with the "grandfather" system, are we not? Yes, we are, but in a quite new guise. We have heard more than enough about the corrupt fate of soldiers and the tragedies played out in training camps, in the barracks, and on the weapons ranges. But this is the first time that we have had to talk about the kinds of consequences to which the "grandfather"

system leads. Now we can calculate to the ruble the damage sustained by the state from enlisted man Yevdomakha's revenge on Captain Ryflyak. Here is the accurate figure: The damage from the two fires amounted to the astronomical sum of 1,928,165 rubles. Thanks to enlisted man Yevdomakha, for three days there was a hole in the country's missile defenses!

Could this somehow have been avoided? Of course. The missiles would not have flown if a case had been opened not a day after the second fire but on the morning after the first. And we would to this day not have known about this missile launch point had it not been for Captain Ryflyak threatening to delay enlisted man's Yevdomakha's discharge to the reserves.

So, we are always wise after the event. But the way it turned out, we should draw the lessons from the tragedies with which the life of our army has become so rich in recent times.

The acts of the "heroes" in our story were assessed as follows by the tribunal: Yevdomakha, a prison term of nine years, Valeychik, six years, Sarykov four years. That is the "grandfather" system for you...

Agreement on Strategic Forces Noted

92UM0517A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Feb 92 p 1

[Report on interview with Lieutenant-General Ivan Bishan, head of a group of experts of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, by UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent N. Zaika; place and date not given: "Leader of Group of Experts of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Lays Out the Position of His State on Strategic Forces"]

[Text] "The position of Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet is clear and understood. We believe that it is necessary to allocate to strategic forces only that portion of the fleet which accomplishes the appropriate missions. All remaining fleet assets must be transferred to the naval forces of Ukraine," stated Lieutenant-General Ivan Bishan, head of a group of experts of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry for determination of the composition of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] strategic forces in the territory of the republic, in an interview given to this UKRINFORM correspondent. We intend to advance this point of view at the next meeting of experts in Minsk, the general noted. He expressed the hope that "a coordinated resolution on the Black Sea Fleet" would be presented on 14 February to the heads of state, under the condition that "Russia's position is not so rigid."

Following the signing of the agreement on strategic forces, the general recalled, three meetings of representatives of groups of experts were convened. The listing of basic strategic forces remaining on Ukrainian territory was successfully coordinated. These consist of strategic missile units and strategic aviation, as well as the systems and facilities providing servicing, maintenance, and

logistical support. Among them are several command and control subunits of the Chief of Space Assets and air defense, specifically radar sites which form part of the Missile Attack Warning System. While the main air defense units fall under the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Removal Process Described

92UM0573A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
28 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel Anatoliy Ivanovich Koryakin by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Shvyrev; place and date not given: "The Removal of Tactical Nuclear Weapons From the Territory of the Kiev Military District Is Going Ahead Strictly According to Schedule"]

[Text] Under the terms of the agreement signed by the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Minsk, the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine, and in particular from the storage bases in the Kiev Military District, for subsequent destruction, has started. This operation is being carried out by highly trained experts, with strict observance of safety measures. The first nuclear warheads from tactical missiles and nuclear artillery shells have already been dispatched to their designated point.

Our correspondent met with Colonel A. Koryakin, chief of staff of Missile and Artillery Troops of the Kiev Military District, and asked him to respond to some questions concerning the removal of nuclear weapons from district territory.

[Shvyrev] Anatoliy Ivanovich, there is obviously no need to show how crucial and complex the operation to remove nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition is. A great deal must be considered and provided for here. So my first question is this: What has been done in the area of training people and preparing equipment, and indeed, the nuclear weapons themselves, before shipment?

[Koryakin] There is no doubt that the removal of the nuclear weapons is a far from simple task. It requires first and foremost the experts' compliance with the strictest safety measures, and precise and agreed actions at all stages of execution. Proceeding from this, an enormous complex of measures was carried out whose main purpose was to check the readiness of servicemen to work with nuclear weapons, and their ability to cope without error with their duties. As a result, people who understand each other just from the uttering of a single syllable were selected for the packaging and shipments of the articles. And as the last days and weeks have shown, everyone who has been involved in dispatching the first batch of nuclear warheads has demonstrated a high level of professional technique.

In parallel with the check and the training for personnel, work has been done to bring nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition to a lower degree of readiness, ensuring their safety during shipment. All measures planned for this were also carried out in a good-quality manner and according to schedule.

[Shvyrev] If it is not a secret, what kind of transport is being used to ship the nuclear warheads?

[Koryakin] They are being removed from the territory of the Kiev Military District exclusively by rail, and none of our soldiers is being used to accompany them. Others are carrying out that mission.

[Shvyrev] From the reportage shown on Ukrainian television, many of our readers have calculated that nuclear warheads are being held directly in the combat units and subunits. Is this in fact so?

[Koryakin] No, of course not. The nuclear warheads from tactical missiles and nuclear artillery ammunition are located at storage bases where strict conditions of temperature, humidity, cleanliness, and much else are maintained. Experts who, apart from anything else, are engaged in servicing the warheads and doing scheduled work on them, are monitoring all this.

In the nature of a digression, among people who have nothing to do with nuclear weapons the opinion prevails that a person can come into contact with nuclear weapons only when wearing special protective gear. This is not at all the case. Nuclear weapons are so safe in terms of health that our servicemen work with them in ordinary coats.

[Shvyrev] Anatoliy Ivanovich, let us imagine the day when all nuclear weapons have been removed from the territory of the district. What will then happen to the people, many of whom have been serving and working at the bases for some years? Will they be discharged from the Army?

[Koryakin] Today, this question is not being raised. Although without shifts and changes in the staffing structure, we shall, of course, not be able to get by without some cutbacks. And we are preparing for that. At the same time, the complete removal of the nuclear weapons will still not entail elimination of the storage bases. They will remain, since today it is not only nuclear warheads that are stored in them but also the missiles, which, as is known, are not going to be destroyed. Eventually they will be fitted with conventional warheads, and these also need unremitting attention from people. It will therefore not be sensible to dispense with the services of those who are today serving at the bases, even less to waste money on training new specialists. So that the problem of the further use of highly trained military personnel who have an excellent knowledge of their business is easily solved.

[Shvyrev] So it turns out that the fate of the missile complexes now located at combat units and subunits will also be resolved positively, is this not so?

[Koryakin] Quite correct. Let me clarify just one point. Among the missile troops in the district, along with the models of new equipment there is also equipment that has reached the end of its service life, or, to put it another way, is obsolete. Use of the latter involves enormous material expenses to maintain, repair, and operate it. Accordingly, these old kinds of missile complexes will be withdrawn from service and written off.

[Shvyrev] A final question. Anatoliy Ivanovich, are any difficulties arising with respect to coordinating the removal of nuclear weapons from district territory, and what is the schedule for completing the operation?

[Koryakin] From the first days of the removal of nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition all work has been done strictly on schedule, without any complications. Personally, I see this first and foremost in the in-depth understanding and elevated sense of responsibility on the part of the people who have been assigned to carry out this historic task. I also apply these words fully to the officers in the district headquarters of the missile forces and artillery—lieutenant colonels V. Reznikov, V. Anufriev, N. Khakimov, and many others.

As far as dates are concerned, the last nuclear warhead is scheduled to leave district territory by 1 July this year. And there can be no doubt about the reality of this.

[Shvyrev] Thank you for the interview, and permit me on your behalf to assure NARODNAYA ARMIYA readers that throughout the entire period of removal of the nuclear weapons they will constantly be receiving interesting information.

[Koryakin] We are not about to keep any secrets from the newspaper's readers. We promise to provide regular information on all the measures being carried out and show everything to the people for whose sake we are taking the first steps toward a nuclear-free Ukraine.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Response to Amelko Critique of Carrier Construction

92UM0563A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 12, Dec 91 pp 6-12

[Article by Captain 1st Rank D. Khudyakov, doctor of technical sciences, professor: "On Concepts on the Question of Creating Our Own Aircraft-carrying Cruisers"]

[Text] Lately an opinion has been expressed more and more persistently in the press and in statements of a number of state and public figures as to the inadvisability of our building aircraft-carrying cruisers.

While discussions on this matter previously were conducted chiefly in the midst of military specialists and in the country's military-political leadership circles, people today are almost uninterested in their opinion. Enemies of creating aircraft-carrying cruisers are coming out with their own views before the public at large and are influencing the shaping of corresponding public opinion by substantiating their conclusions one-sidedly. They advance what are at first glance fully reasonable arguments, and specifically that aircraft-carrying cruisers on the one hand are the most costly ships of the Navy and on the other hand the inadvisability of creating them seemingly is becoming especially obvious in light of our present defensive military doctrine.

The article by Admiral (Retired) N. N. Amelko¹ also belongs to this category of writings. Being Deputy Chief of the General Staff for the Navy, he took part in a discussion of the question at hand at the highest level in the relatively recent past.

At that time (approximately ten years ago) a decision was made on further construction and development of aircraft-carrying cruisers. It did not coincide with the opinion of Amelko and a number of other General Staff leaders, including its Chief at that time, Marshal N. V. Ogarkov. And now today Admiral Amelko again decided to come forth with his opinion, but this time before the public at large.

The author of this essay did not hold such high positions as Admiral Amelko, who unquestionably possesses corresponding knowledge and great experience. But being a specialist in the sphere of military shipbuilding and in particular in the sphere of comprehensive substantiation and optimization of specifications and performance characteristics of the ship being created based on operational-tactical, technical and economic criteria, I deem it possible and necessary to express my considerations and arguments on the substance of the content of the aforementioned article, especially as these considerations and arguments do not belong just to me. They are an expression of the collective thinking of many specialists in the sphere of naval science and military shipbuilding.

A few words about the history of the matter. The point of view about poor effectiveness and inadvisability (including for economic considerations) of creating large surface ships, including aircraft carriers, became officially accepted here immediately after the death of I. V. Stalin, who, as we know, "had a weakness for large surface ships (battleships and heavy cruisers)." The new point of view was actively supported and implemented in the military sphere by Marshal G. K. Zhukov and among the country's political leadership by N. S. Khrushchev.

The basis for this was a calculation exclusively on war using nuclear missiles and other kinds of nuclear weapons and an orientation on fighting a war with decisive goals, with U.S. involvement.

Corresponding concepts and views were reflected in a concentrated form in the military-theoretical work "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy], created by a group of authors under the direction of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy.² It is natural that a group of supporters of these concepts and views, mentioned by Amelko in his article, formed on the General Staff and in the Ministry of Defense leadership. The one-sidedness of the above military-political line is obvious today. Amelko also speaks about this in connection with the scrapping of our gun-firing cruisers.

For the sake of fairness it should be said that discussions on the role of large surface ships, including aircraft carriers, in the age of nuclear missile weapons also were being carried on abroad at that time, but people there rather quickly concluded that even under present conditions aircraft carriers remain the nucleus of a navy's surface forces. Large surface ships also retain their role when armed with missile weapons. Therefore "Iowa"-Class battleships were not written off for scrapping and today they are again in commission. Armed with Tomahawk strategic missiles and having great survivability with respect to non-nuclear (conventional) weapons, these ships again are a serious military force.

Given the above, let us shift to examining the concepts presented in Amelko's article.

Let us begin with a brief survey of the history of creation of aircraft carriers. This type of ship appeared and was formalized abroad in the period between World Wars I and II not as a component of principal fleet striking forces, which heavy gun-firing ships were at that time, but exclusively as a means of air defense and of conducting reconnaissance in support of line forces during their operations outside the range of land-based fighter and reconnaissance aircraft.

In a briefing in 1928 for the USSR Revolutionary Military Council entitled "On the Importance and Missions of Naval Forces in the Country's Armed Forces System," M. N. Tukhachevskiy noted:

"Security of the line fleet against air attack must be assigned to specialized vessels which carry the following:

"a. Aircraft which can scramble at any moment to repel enemy attacks;

"b. Antiaircraft guns with automatic control; these same guns must have the capability of firing against fast targets."

It should be emphasized here that those who ignored or underestimated the threat to surface ships of any types from enemy aircraft paid severely during World War II. The most vivid example of this is the sinking of the British battleship the Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse by Japanese aircraft in the Gulf of Siam in 1941; they were attempting to oppose a Japanese landing without their own air cover. And we had similar sad experience during the war. In October 1943 German

aircraft sank three of our ships in the Black Sea (the leader Kharkov and the destroyers Bespochchadnyy and Sposobnyy) which were carrying out a hit-and-run raid against an area of the Crimean coast. We also suffered heavy losses because of the absence of fighter cover on the Hogland reach during the Tallinn transit in 1941.

How can we not emphasize here an important detail in the quote from Tukhachevskiy's briefing cited above? It speaks about aircraft "which can be scrambled at any moment"; this essentially can be ensured with aircraft based in sufficient proximity to the ships being protected, i.e., best of all on aircraft carriers. The fact is, specifically those aircraft carriers were planned for creation both in our prewar shipbuilding program as well as in the German Navy under the familiar prewar Plan "Z" ("Graf Zeppelin"-Class aircraft carriers).

We naturally are not considering here the particular instances of conducting combat operations directly in the coastal zone, where air cover of ships is provided by land-based aircraft.

A substantial change in the concept of creating and employing aircraft carriers occurred during World War II. They turned from ships "for combat support only (air defense, reconnaissance and, during the war, also ASW)" into the principal striking force of the fleets of Japan, the United States and Great Britain. The multipurpose carrier, which concentrated great offensive and just as great defensive capabilities in herself, became the basic class of these ships.

It is common knowledge that after the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Navy developed on the basis of the concept of employing submarines of different types and naval missile-armed aircraft for accomplishing missions of warfare against enemy ship groupings (chiefly against carrier battle groups, which represent the greatest danger to our territory, at least in a non-nuclear war). A certain role also is set aside here for guided missile surface ships armed with antiship missiles. It was proposed to achieve the greatest success in accomplishing the above mission only by the operations of all three naval arms mentioned—submarines, missile-armed aircraft and surface ships—coordinated in time and place.

From an organizational standpoint, even today that method of operations requires the formation of mixed task forces, the command of which should be exercised from one of the ships of such forces. For example, it is also required to use formations of mixed forces for antisubmarine operations against missile submarines which have missile launch areas at a significant distance from our shores.³

It is true that there were and presently are weighty economic and military-geographic reasons for a concept which does not involve attack carriers. The path of creating an "American" class of aircraft carriers "symmetrical" with the United States is inadvisable for us for these reasons. At the same time, it does not seem

possible to entirely reject the use of aircraft carriers under present conditions, at the very least for three basic considerations.

First of all, today it is almost obvious that groupings of mixed forces cannot act effectively without fighter air cover, and this goes not only for surface ships, but also (strange as it will seem to the uninitiated reader) to a considerable extent for nuclear-powered submarines, inasmuch as modern land-based and ship-based ASW aircraft have sufficiently great capabilities for hunting and killing submarines, including nuclear submarines, and the aircraft must be opposed. In addition, fighter cover is needed both by missile-armed aircraft in closing to within missile launch range of ships being attacked as well as by ASW aircraft hunting enemy submarines.

Secondly, effective cover of our forces by land-based fighter aircraft is essentially unfeasible in combat deployment areas of carrier and missile operations groups as well as of enemy submarines armed with strategic cruise missiles.

Thirdly and finally, it is extremely necessary to detect enemy strike aircraft and strategic cruise missiles flying to targets on our territory in support of the country's Air Defense Forces back in the period of their flight over the sea for vectoring friendly fighters to them and activating the full might of air defense for repelling the strike. This can be done most effectively by using ship-based fighter aircraft in combination with airborne early warning aircraft (also including ship-based airborne early warning aircraft).

It distinctly follows from the three principal considerations cited above "why" we need carriers and "what kind" we need, including also within the framework of a defensive military doctrine, on which Amelko is placing emphasis today.

Our aircraft carriers must give mixed fleet forces combat stability above all against offensive air weapons and also conduct ASW combat operations, particularly using ASW helicopters. Such ships can be called antiair/ASW carriers. They have no aircraft for strikes against the shore.

Our heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza N. G. Kuznetsov as well as the Varyag, a ship of this class already launched and being fitted out, and, finally, the nuclear-powered ship Ulyanovsk, which has been laid down, are just such ships. And this by no means is an attempt to "build a fleet from the American model," as Amelko believes.

We will not discuss a purely terminological question of whether or not these are aircraft carriers or heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers, as we are accustomed to call them, especially since, if we delve deeply into the history of the appearance of the term "cruiser" in the surface ship classification system, then cruisers in the initial sense strictly speaking already have ceased to exist.

In light of the above arguments, Admiral V. N. Ponikarovskiy, who is criticized by Amelko, is very close to the truth in saying that "rejection of carriers is possible only with a rejection of the Navy," although his assertion does appear too categorical.⁴

Unquestionably, Admiral Amelko knows full well everything that was said above, including about the role of aircraft in a modern war at sea. But judging from his article, it turns out that even under present conditions he is again proposing (as during the Great Patriotic War) to be oriented only toward conducting what are on the whole passive, defensive operations in the immediate proximity of friendly shores under cover of land-based fighter aircraft, assuming that the enemy will enter our coastal maritime zone with his principal striking forces with the beginning of military operations. But he will not do this, inasmuch as he can accomplish his attack missions outside it, and so we will have to go meet him. And if we do this without air cover, we are inevitably awaited by heavy losses, which Ponikarovskiy speaks about in his article in referring to corresponding studies.

True, in confirmation of his viewpoint Amelko speaks of the negative results of studies substantiating the advisability of creating heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers, which were briefed to the CinC Navy by Vice-Admiral V. S. Babiy, who at that time was chief of the Scientific Research Institute. But here it should be explained that, first of all, not all studies are always unerring. Secondly, a very appreciable pressure from enemies of carriers who held rather high positions and probably a similar opposite pressure from supporters of carriers always existed in the question at hand.

But in the final account, speaking of the first of the points mentioned above, as a sphere of scientific and practical activity, operations research provides only recommendations for decisionmaking by leadership entities. Corresponding conclusions following from the theoretical calculations depend substantially on initial data, including, for example, on an operational-tactical model of ship employment. This already is the sphere of military science, particularly of operational art and tactics, and also of the general concept for creation of a ship, and the military leader has the right to intervene in this part. For example, there will be one set of conclusions if we consider the idea of the direct opposition of a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser and an American multipurpose carrier, and conclusions will be different if we consider an operation to defeat a carrier group by a grouping of mixed forces in which a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser is operating.

It appears doubtful that S. G. Gorshkov uttered the phrase quoted by Amelko, "You counted wrong. Go count all over again with your scientists," without any commentary or reasons for his disagreement. I believed and do believe that results of studies on the military-economic advisability of any ship must be refuted objectively, "with pencil in hand," as the saying goes.

Scientific studies show that on an operational-strategic plane a concept excluding carriers of any classes signifies for us a return not even to prewar years, when the shipbuilding program provided for aircraft carriers for security of the fleet's line forces, but to the era of the initial stage of building our fleet in the first years of Soviet power.

The important thing here is not the very fact of returning to already familiar concepts, but that they are being proposed without any kind of substantiations except a saving of defense expenditures.

A number of other assertions and arguments by Amelko also are bewildering (considering the competence of the author of the article in question).

For example, it is not clear what kind of high-seas battle of the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza N. G. Kuznetsov class heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (see Fig. 1 [figure not reproduced]) with an American carrier can be discussed if a battle as such directly between these ships is not even planned by any operational concepts. The heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser's cruise missiles are not intended for first strike against an enemy carrier from a carrier battle group. To the contrary, it is deemed advisable to deliver first strikes by missile submarines and missile-armed aircraft, and missiles of surface ships as well as torpedo ordnance of submarines are to be employed for exploiting success. Therefore Amelko's very thesis that a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser has no capabilities for using her cruise missiles to attack an American carrier is groundless.

The statement that we need only medium-displacement ASW surface ships (1,000-3,000 tons) also is unsubstantiated, for it is clear that ships with such a small displacement inevitably will have relatively weak armament both for the main purpose and as means of defense. In particular, the self-defense antiaircraft weapons accommodated on such ships will be able to shoot down only the enemy antiship missiles themselves, but aircraft carrying these missiles remain outside the reach of such weapons. Engaging these aircraft with ship weapons is a problem even for large-displacement ships, particularly guided missile cruisers. It is this circumstance that explains the need for fighter air cover of surface ships; by the way, the fighters can shoot down missiles as well.

Shooting down only missiles is a matter of little promise. It is the last line of defense. If we orient ourselves only on it, we can defend ourselves only for a short time due to the limited ammunition of antiaircraft weapons, even with their high effectiveness. It is necessary to down the aircraft, and before they reach their missile launch range. Today this mission can be effectively accomplished only by fighter aircraft.

Therefore, in emerging from under the cover of land-based fighter aircraft into areas where submarines with Tomahawk cruise missiles will be operating, the 1,000 to 3,000-ton ASW ships proposed by Amelko really will be destroyed by enemy aircraft operating from carriers or

from the territory of contiguous allied states, which we certainly do not have today.

A similar fate also will befall our land-based ASW aircraft if they are in the aforementioned areas alone without fighter cover. The very same also can be said about our ASW submarines, whose conditions of combat operations will be seriously complicated due to the opposition of ASW aircraft in areas where our fighter "umbrella" is absent.

In his article Amelko speaks positively about our Oscar-Class submarines, which really are a serious threat to enemy carriers. But independent employment of these submarines is not always sufficiently effective for the reasons already mentioned (reconnaissance, target designation, protection against enemy ASW aircraft).

Amelko speaks of the fact that "the sortie of a large ship both in the East and in the North requires a large number of escort ships. But in this case the escort assets and the carrier herself will be occupied not with engaging the enemy, but with their own defense."

It already was noted above that missions of warfare against enemy carrier battle groups and submarines are accomplished by a grouping of mixed forces having a carrier with her escort ships as the nucleus of their defense. But even defense as a form of combat operations envisages destruction of attacking enemy forces. In addition, in conducting ASW operations a carrier with escort ships also is accomplishing offensive missions. To the contrary, ships "freed" of escorting a carrier, let alone splintered into smaller groups, may not accomplish any missions at all.

Citing a trivial "argument" in his article to the effect that "our carriers are absolutely useless in the Baltic and Black seas," Amelko is battling nonexistent opponents, inasmuch as no one attempted to prove the reverse.

Special mention should be made of the construction of Ulyanovsk-Class nuclear-powered ships. In his article Amelko speaks only about their high cost, and with very great overstatement. For example, it is unknown where he got it that "one nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser cost billions, and the cost of a nuclear-powered carrier will be over ten billion"!?

These figures do not conform to reality, although they can be artificially substantiated if we include in the cost of these ships the expenses for developing and creating the antiship and antiair missiles, aircraft, radars and so on with which they are equipped and which also are used on ships of other types and in other naval arms, and not just in the Navy.

For the sake of fairness, in speaking of the cost of nuclear-powered surface ships there should at least have been mention of those advantages which nuclear power engineering gives these ships. For example, it frees them of the need for resupply of fuel at sea, and on carriers additionally permits having a large reserve of aviation

fuel, thereby increasing the duration of continuous combat operations by aircraft.

Ideally one would like to have a force capable of conducting rather lengthy combat operations with minimum resupply and minimum dependence on shore basing facilities, which during a war inevitably will be subjected to enemy attacks (and under present conditions precision weapon attacks against bases would be greatly more effective than was the case in the past war). Therefore, matters here are enormously more complicated than Amelko believes or than he only writes in his article in speaking of the fact that on learning of the construction of nuclear-powered carriers in the United States, D. F. Ustinov and Gorshkov initially were chagrined, and then followed the Americans out of prestige considerations. More weighty proof is needed for such accusations.

We should dwell especially on the history of assault-ASW helicopter carriers, of which Amelko was an active supporter. These ships more correctly should have been called ASW-assault carriers, inasmuch as their basic purpose was ASW. They were proposed as an alternative to the "Kiev"-class aircraft-carrying cruisers being built at that time.

The idea was to create helicopter carriers based on an Atlantika-class civilian vessel with horizontal cargo processing (RO-RO), which at that time was in series construction. It was expected that such a ship would have relatively low cost and possess a military-economic advantage over aircraft-carrying cruisers. A preliminary design of a helicopter carrier conditionally named Khalzan (see Fig. 2 [figure not reproduced]) was developed in 1978 and an engineering design was drawn up in 1980.

To comprehensively evaluate this design, a Leningrad planning-design bureau simultaneously was assigned to perform design studies of a helicopter carrier of another design based on equipment and engineering solutions contained in the fourth Kiev-Class ship.

In the decisionmaking stage both designs as well as a characterization of the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser herself were comprehensively compared, and this comparison clearly did not favor the Khalzan. It should be noted especially that this ship, with a twin-shaft gas-turbine propulsion plant, had considerable noise, which was of substantial significance for hunting submarines with the helicopters accommodated on her. The fact is, it is known that the greater a ship's noisiness, the greater the distance from her that helicopters must search in order to preclude the possibility of a submarine getting out of the search zone. And in turn, the greater the distance from the ship, the less time helicopters will "work" in the search zone. Therefore, the Khalzan's search productivity proved to be substantially less (by almost fivefold) than for the alternative ships.

Another essential point reducing the Khalzan's effectiveness was the absence aboard of Yak-41 aircraft and airborne early warning helicopters used to support the

combat stability of an ASW force grouping against offensive air weapons. They were provided on ships of the alternative designs.

The ships' survivability also was subjected to comparison. Amelko writes in this connection that allegedly "USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member Rear Admiral Simko (as a matter of fact he means N. S. Solomenko, now a USSR Academy of Sciences academician) proved by his calculations that the survivability of our heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers is below that of the proposed assault-ASW helicopter carrier." But this does not conform to reality. In his finding on this matter dated 22 April 1981, compiled on the instructions of Amelko (let us recall that Amelko then was Deputy Chief of the General Staff), Solomenko concluded only that "the levels of these ships' watertight integrity and blast resistance (during nuclear bursts) essentially are identical." With respect to survivability when hit by a Harpoon antiship missile or Mk 48 torpedoes and with respect to underwater noise, Solomenko's finding confirmed the advantage of a helicopter carrier based on a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser. Solomenko also confirmed this advantage with respect to a more general criterion—combat stability to the effect of offensive air weapons (missiles) and underwater ordnance (torpedoes). That the Khalzan's survivability is lower can be judged if only from the fact that her propulsion plant was accommodated in one watertight compartment with no separation by a longitudinal bulkhead. Even one missile or torpedo hit in this compartment would have deprived the ship of way, i.e., of combat effectiveness. Therefore, Solomenko's general conclusion also was that "the design of the special-construction ship (based on the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser) is preferable compared to the Khalzan's design." Calculations showed once and for all that in the military-economic sense the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser is preferable to a helicopter carrier on her base and especially to the Khalzan. But as before, Amelko does not agree with any of this. Moreover, he asserts that Rear-Admiral Solomenko was discharged from the Armed Forces allegedly for supporting the opinion of the inadvisability of creating ASW helicopter carriers, but this does not conform to reality. He remained on active military duty and retired only in 1988 in accordance with his own desire.

In ending the story of the ASW helicopter carriers, which Amelko mentioned only in passing as an example of the voluntaristic decision of Gorshkov and I. S. Belousov, it should be said that in principle there were no objections to creating these ships, only not at the expense of removing from construction the next heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser planned for construction at the Black Sea Shipyard in the one and only building berth in which it was possible to build all these ships.

The experience of using civilian shipbuilding engineering for creating military ships also exists abroad. In particular, during 1961-1970 the United States built two Iwo Jima-class amphibious assault ships with a displacement

of around 18,000 tons, created on the basis of the hull and single-shaft steam turbine propulsion plant of fast Mariner-class dry cargo ships. But here it must be borne in mind that parameters such as ship noise are not of such fundamental importance for amphibious assault ships as for ships with ASW helicopters.

Speaking of our Kiev-class aircraft-carrying cruisers, which have ASW as their primary purpose, the British Invincible is the ship-analogue abroad; like our ships, she has a mixed air fleet of Sea King ASW helicopters and Sea Harrier V/STOL aircraft.

Again, Ustinov, Gorshkov and Belousov can be accused "of all mortal sins," but here it is necessary to proceed from objective facts and weighty proofs. Amelko's article contains no such facts and proofs. Such expressions as "idle talk," "takes care of," "old thinking," "adventure" and so on do not add facts and proofs.

In the concluding section of the article, entitled "Then Just What Should Be Done?" Amelko reduces all necessary measures only to organizing an analytical center of military programs and sophisticated arms. But in fact just where are the constructive proposals? What is proposed to be done with the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Varyag" standing at the yard quay and with the hull of the Ulyanovsk standing in the building berth? Judging from the tone of the article, is it really proposed to scrap them? This truly will be not economy, but ruin, even purely economic ruin, not to mention military damage. If that happens, this "deed" probably will "eclipse" the cutting up in 1953 of three Project 82 heavy cruisers laid down in 1952 and the cutting up of Project 68bis gun-firing light cruisers, including completely built ones. At least there were ideologized military substantiations along with the saving, but there are not even such substantiations applied to the Varyag and Ulyanovsk.

One more question for Amelko: what is to be done with the Sovremennyy-class destroyers and Neustrashimyy-class patrol ships being built, which have a displacement greater than 1,000-3,000 tons? There are many such specific questions.

To decide questions of substantiating military programs, there are no objections to the thesis of bringing in "specialists, even those in retirement—they possess great life experience and their thoughts and opinions can be useful," as Amelko correctly writes. Many such specialists work productively in scientific research establishments and educational institutions. But as preparation for appearances before the public at large, I would like specialists who are in retirement and who have great life experience to have their thoughts and opinions approved in the environment of other specialists, their colleagues (even if they do not possess such great life experience), not to mention proving the correctness of their viewpoints and concepts "with pencil in hand," figuratively speaking.

At the conclusion of this critical essay I would like to speak about the political responsibility of hierarchical

levels and persons who today are entrusted with deciding questions of the minimally necessary or reasonable defensive sufficiency both for the Armed Forces as a whole as well as for the Navy in particular.

First of all, today the doors are opening wide for the import of foreign capital into our country. Under these conditions the country's defensive capability must ensure that situation where economic assistance and cooperation do not turn initially into economic and then also political diktat, fraught in the final account with war.

Secondly, in deciding questions of the Navy's qualitative and quantitative makeup, it is necessary to take into account that even in a war without use of nuclear weapons, essentially only those ships in the Navy's makeup before it begins will be able to wage war at sea. The possibilities of augmenting the ship order of battle during the war always have been insignificant in connection with the long duration of the cycle of building ships of the main types. But these possibilities almost are precluded today in connection with the creation of more effective means of destroying ground targets (in the given instance, shipyards; moreover, shipyards on the shore of our seas and not in the depth of the territory). It is impossible to count even on augmenting the fleet by fitting out ships, as well as on a spurt in their construction in periods of an aggravation of the foreign military-political situation.

As a Navy representative, the author of this essay can be accused of having narrowly departmental interests, but the arguments cited above about the danger of reducing the ship order of battle and ship construction rates are an objective reality and very essential. Matters would be much simpler if we were in the place of the United States, possessing a considerable superiority in naval forces, or if an agreement were to be reached on a mutual reduction of naval forces on a parity basis. But for now we are planning to reduce unilaterally and judging, for example, from responses of Admiral Carlisle Trost to questions of the journal MORSKOY SBORNIK,⁵ the Americans are preaching the theory of domination in seas and oceans "to defend against threats to democracy and our (i.e., American—Trost is quoted) political and economic interests world wide." This idea continues to rule the minds of American admirals and those whose interests, including economic interests, they defend.

Footnotes

1. N. N. Amelko, "All Quiet in the Navy," YURIDICHESKAYA GAZETA, No 6, 1991, pp 12-14.
2. "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy], 2nd ed., edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963.
3. The term "grouping of mixed forces" is more often used at the present time.

4. V. N. Ponikarovskiy, "Do We Need Aircraft-carrying Cruisers?", VOYENNAYA MYS, No 8, 1990, pp 39-41.

5. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 9, 1989.

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Other Fleets Comment on Black Sea Dispute

92UM0523A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 3,
15-21 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Koshcheyev from the Black Sea Fleet, Larisa Usova from the Baltic Sea Fleet, and Natalya Barabash from the Pacific Ocean Fleet, under the rubric: "Drama on the Sevastopol Roadstead": "Who Will Get the Flag of Saint Andrew? Submarines in Ukraine's Steppes"]

[Text]

The Black Sea Fleet

A Sevastopol Garrison Delegates Officers' Assembly of unit and ship commanders occurred at Sevastopol where Black Sea Fleet Commander Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov spoke. He noted that the Black Sea Fleet is in the most complicated conditions and on the cutting edge of all events right now, but nevertheless, despite the situation that has developed, the fleet is under control, combat capable, and subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet Chernavin.

"I, as the Commander," said Igor Vladimirovich, "have consulted the Military Council and received unanimous support for my decision to remain loyal to that oath which I swore to the Homeland. I once again stress that the fleet is indivisible and an integral part of the Soviet Navy. The Black Sea Fleet has always manned the forces of the Mediterranean squadron that has deterred the American 6th Fleet, that is much larger than our fleet, in the Mediterranean Sea.

"We think," stressed the Commander, "that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet will approach the solution of our problem in a well thought-out and consistent manner. Common sense is required to not rush events."

An appeal to fleet personnel and to the heads of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] governments was adopted at the assembly.

Vladimir Koshcheyev

The Baltic Fleet.

The Saint Petersburg Naval Corps is preparing to mark the 300th Anniversary of the Russian Regular Navy in 1996. Will the Black Sea Fleet seamen sit beside us at the holiday table?

Vice-Admiral Valentin Selivanov, Commander of the "northern capital's" naval base, has called everything that is occurring a "bad dream." From his point of view, the statement of the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk on the

resubordination of the Black Sea Fleet to republic structures is not only a unilateral violation of the Minsk agreements but also a fatal error, whose consequences may be serious both for Russia and for Ukraine. Essentially, a wedge is being driven into the good neighbor relations of the two republics. In the past, Valentin Selivanov served in the Black Sea as Fleet Chief of Staff and he knows the mood of the seamen well. Do the majority of them share the position of their Commander-in-Chief or will the army once again, without being asked, be forced to serve the interests of the politicians? By placing the choice before Black Sea Fleet seamen—whom will you serve—Selivanov thinks that the leadership of Ukraine is actually provoking a social upheaval in the fleet. Thus, one more step is being taken toward the final disintegration of the Armed Forces and irreparable damage is being inflicted on the defense capability of all Commonwealth states.

Is Kravchuk just trying to strengthen his own statehood? Saint Petersburg Gorsoviet [City Council] Deputy, Captain 2nd Rank Vadim Messoylidi, a Rear Services and Transportation Military Academy expert on the history of military art, sees an economic calculation in this.

"If Ukraine's demands are fulfilled, it will receive, free of charge, an excellent naval base that has been created on the southern borders through our common efforts over the course of nearly three centuries," thinks Vadim Messoylidi. "The Russian Navy was created in 1696 and has only existed in the Black Sea since 1783. Also, a powerful ship repair facility with centers in Nikolayev, Kherson, Sevastopol, and two naval schools are being passed to Ukraine."

The 13th session of the Saint Petersburg Gorsoviet adopted an appeal to Russian President Yeltsin and Ukrainian president Kravchuk as a result of the situation that has developed. The deputies are demanding the "prevention of the transformation of seamen into hostages of the political situation that has developed and to preserve the unity of the Navy within the framework of the Commonwealth." And Saint Petersburg Vice Mayor Rear-Admiral Vyacheslav Shcherbakov has sent a personal telegram to the Commander and crew of the Black Sea Fleet ship Leningrad with an appeal to the Black Sea Fleet seamen to remain loyal to their oath.

Larisa Usova

The Pacific Ocean Fleet

The report that the old anecdote is coming true and that it looks like submarines will soon become the property of the steppes of Ukraine caused a commotion in the Pacific Ocean Fleet.

The seamen have turned out to be in solidarity with the Black Sea Fleet seamen-soldiers who do not desire to transfer to the jurisdiction of Ukraine and, at officers' assemblies that occurred at units and on ships, they resolved: the fleet must be indivisible! Some of the speakers expressed a readiness to give refuge to that

portion of Black Sea Fleet seamen who decide to "sail over" to Russia—rumors about this redeployment began to circulate in the air.

Indeed, Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral of the Fleet G. Khvatov dispelled the rumors: "Right now I cannot say anything definitely or give any kind of predictions: the situation is changing by the hour. Although if the conflict is not resolved, a 'great resettlement of peoples' will certainly begin. Already today nearly 1,000 people have refused to take the oath to Ukraine and therefore they will need to be relocated... Nearly 15 percent Ukrainians serve in the Pacific Ocean Fleet—what, do they also need to be sent back to their homeland? And, if not, can a citizen of one state take an oath to another state? There are many questions. A complicated situation has emerged. I would like least of all for the army to be drawn into political games. It must be involved with its primary task and not serve as a trump card to satisfy someone's ambitions. In the current situation, I see the manifestation of not so much patriotism as nationalism and maybe also purposeful work for the destruction of the already existing structures.

"On the other hand, no one is objecting to Ukraine having its own navy. But—here I agree with Admiral Chernavin: 'This must be a navy to defend the borders of the economic zone and to combat smuggling. I think that the Black Sea Fleet command authority is ready to examine just what forces and units to transfer to Ukraine, but here common sense must prevail: enormous cruisers and nuclear warheads are obviously not needed to fulfill these missions.'"

Admiral Khvatov also did not support the haste with which Ukraine led soldiers to the oath: in the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief's opinion, an oath is a matter of conscience and you can only take it once. Pacific Ocean Fleet command authority representatives pointed out that they are relying on an All-Army Officers' Assembly decision that was made on January 18.

So, we can understand the fears of the Pacific Fleet seamen. Of late, conversations about the creation of the Far Eastern Republic are increasingly loudly being heard in Primorye. Who knows, will this republic not also demand that the Armed Forces on the territory be transferred to its jurisdiction?

Natalya Barabash

Black Sea Commanders Threaten Servicemen Who Take Ukrainian Oath

92UM0601A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
31 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Major S. Nagoryanskiy under rubric "Urgently Into the Issue!": "Mutiny Aboard Ship? No, in the 'Big' Corridors"]

[Text] What? An oath of allegiance to Ukraine was taken in the offshore defense force brigade?.. Mutiny! That is how the Black Sea Fleet staff assessed what happened

that day and urgently set off to suppress brigade commander Captain 2nd Rank Yu. Shalyt and the other "mutineers."

A couple of words about preceding events. The brigade commander issued an order on swearing in his subordinates based on legislative measures adopted by the Ukraine Supreme Soviet. The day before, they chatted with each one and drew up lists. Despite fears, more seamen than expected expressed themselves for swearing allegiance to the people of a sovereign power. And all of them—70 percent of officers and warrant officers and around 40 percent of first-term personnel—solemnly took the oath, some right aboard ship and some ashore. The ceremony ended by 10 o'clock in the morning. Inasmuch as the day was declared a holiday, people were released.

But around noon the holiday was disrupted by the urgent arrival in the brigade of First Deputy CinC Black Sea Fleet Vice Admiral Larionov, Naval Base Commander Vice Admiral A. Frolov (the offshore defense brigade is part of the base), as well as Fleet staff officers.

To begin with, Captain 2nd Rank Shalyt and other headquarters officers were called "on the carpet." That evening the others were assembled. Everyone who dared go against the will of the Fleet command and took an oath to the people of Ukraine got it, and they got it like real mutineers. The brigade commander was confined to the ship without the right of going ashore, so he would not agitate anyone any more! Several officers were relieved of their positions, including brigade chief of staff Captain 2nd Rank N. Zhibarev, deputy chief of staff Captain 2nd Rank S. Shatnyy, and Captain-Lieutenant S. Kononov, the assistant commander for working with personnel.

Nearer midnight the officers were called out one by one for the "flogging." Some were intimidated; some were promised something. For example, ship commander Captain 3rd Rank K. Khachaturov was given an ultimatum: either write a request for discharge to the reserve (the officer is only 31) or renounce the oath. They tried to take a cunning approach to Captain 3rd Rank S. Matveyev as well. If you renounce the oath, they said, we will forgive you everything...

To the honor of the naval officers, they did not bite at the cheap promises and remained faithful to the oath they had taken. We will give the names of a few more of them. They are Captain 3rd Rank S. Prosyannik, commander of an ASW ship division (also relieved of position), Captain 3rd Rank A. Kuklenko, commander of an element of harbor minesweepers, Captain-Lieutenant O. Grebenyuk, a minesweeper commander, Major V. Ustimenko, a shore base commander, as well as warrant officers O. Antonov and A. Solop.

Just from the names the reader can judge that not just Ukrainians swore an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. There were many Russians. Armenian Captain

3rd Rank K. Khachaturov, Uzbek Senior Lieutenant S. Primov and Georgian Lieutenant Lordkipanidze also took the solemn oath.

There were also many representatives of various regions of the former Union among the seamen: from Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Komi as well as the Transcaucasus. Few of the latter took an oath to Ukraine, but no one regarded this as an extraordinary occurrence. But others began to approach the commanders after the bulk of the seamen took the solemn oath.

The percentage of those who were ready to take the oath could have been considerably higher. What hampered them? Largely it was an information blockade. In Yevpatoriya, where the brigade is stationed, you will not find a trace of a Republic newspaper, and they aren't very spoiled with central ones, either. Unfortunately, NARODNAYA ARMIYA also does not come. Therefore the seamen heard about those laws and draft laws concerning military matters only with half an ear.

Let us return to the reprisal against the "mutineers." It lasted until approximately one in the morning. A bit earlier, at around midnight, they asked for... lists of those next in line for apartments. The officers exchanged glances: the command previously had feared to speak out loud about this subject so as not to cause questions. There were many in the Fleet, including in this brigade, without a roof over their heads. Obviously the vice admirals and those with them decided to play the apartment card in the situation at hand. If you took the oath to Ukraine, you will not see an apartment, and if you did not, you can count on it.

Vice Admiral Frolov announced two days off for the officers in order to placate the recalcitrants. An unheard-of "liberality" for the present times!

They say that one should sleep on it, but this does not go for what came after the punitive night. Can the decision by Vice Admiral Larionov to regard the oath as invalid really be called, pardon me, wise? He said approximately the following: Consider that you did not take the oath, but were taking a public opinion survey. Moreover, in the opinion of the first deputy CinC, the ceremony organizers showed poor concern about conducting it: there was no band, no passing in review. Very persuasive arguments in favor of a "wise" decision!

Our correspondent was told all this story by its immediate participants, Captain 2nd Rank Shatnyy, Captain 3rd Rank O. Ilenko, Senior Warrant Officer L. Paliy and Senior Warrant Officer N. Manenko. After the visit from the "big" corridors, they understood that things could assume a most unexpected turn if the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense was not informed about it. Inasmuch as it was practically impossible to contact the Ministry by telephone and a letter might not get there (the world is not without good people...), the seamen decided to travel urgently to Kiev in a car of one of the seamen. They covered around 850 km at high cruising

speed, to use their language, so they not only do not fear the ocean waves, but also the innumerable pits and bumps of our roads.

By the time of the seamen's departure for the capital they knew nothing of the fate of their brigade commander. It was only known that he had not yet returned from Sevastopol, to which Yuriy Vladimirovich had been taken.

We will inform our readers without fail about how all this will end.

So can what happened be called a mutiny? If a mutiny is going on somewhere, it probably is in those same "big" corridors, by casting doubt on the legality of measures adopted by Ukraine on questions of military organizational development.

Costs of New Flag, Fleet Elements Enumerated

92UM0522A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 92
Morning Edition p 8

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: St. Andrew Flags to Fly This Summer"]

[Text] A decree issued by the president of Russia calls for replacing the Soviet flag flown by naval craft of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] with the historic Flag of Saint Andrew. Seamen however are in no hurry to comply with this decree. The Main Staff of the Navy has set up a special commission, which is in the process of writing new regulations on naval flags, including introduction and display of the latter.

What is the story behind this? Captain 1st Rank Valeriy Moiseyenko, a senior level officer in Navy Main Staff, provides the following explanation.

The fact is that a ship sailing in international waters must show that it represents a definite country; it must display—as stated in legal documents—the "flag of her country." She must exhibit the proper naval symbol: a jack, personal flag, a pennant. In the case of our Navy, the decision has been made to reinstate the historic Flag of Saint Andrew, which was flown by Russian ships from 1712 to 1917.

The flag's design is well-known. It consists of two crossed light blue bars on a white background, symbolizing the X-shaped cross on which tradition has it that Saint Andrew, one of the Apostles of the Christian Church, was crucified. The number of flags required; the design of personal flags of officials: the president of the Russian Federation, Commonwealth Armed Forces commander-in-chief, the commander of the Navy, commanders of large units and squadrons, Guards flags and pennants; the rules governing display of the flags; these are all questions that will be resolved by the commission.

Calculation of how many new flags will be required by the Navy is not particularly difficult. Our Navy consists

of 59 strategic missile-armed submarines; 163 multi-purpose submarines, of which 88 are nuclear-powered; 151 surface combatants possessing a displacement greater than 1,200 tonnes. Included in the latter figure are 17 cruisers, including five aircraft-carrying cruisers, 87 destroyers, large antisubmarine vessels and escort ships. There are also 331 patrol vessels, 298 various small combatants, 1,638 fixed-wing aircraft and 561 helicopters. Also to be counted here are auxiliaries and service craft, which also fly the naval flag.

The above elements are organized into four fleets, 70 large strategic formations and forces, which also possess their own flags. Naval manpower amounts to 442,000 men; of this amount, 29,000 are shore defense troops and naval infantry. There are in addition to that the naval academy and 10 naval schools, with each one possessing its own flag.

By adding the above figures, it can be seen that the Navy requirement is for about 2,000 new Saint Andrew Flags to be supplied at the same time, for not a single small combatant, tugboat, small boat, or any other watercraft can do without a flag.

What will be the cost of flag replacement? Once again the answer is not hard to find. There are six basic flag sizes. The largest is the cruiser size (185 X 277 centimeters, costing 4,800 in 1991 rubles), and the smallest is for small boats, measuring 30 X 45 centimeters and costing 250 rubles. The intermediate size (for destroyers) measures 115 X 172 centimeters and costs 1,950 rubles.

According to Admiral Vitaliy Zaytsev, who is chief of the Main Directorate for Operations and Repair of the Navy, which includes the Boatswain's Service that is involved with complete replacement of flags, which are made of English wool fabric, the total cost will amount to 118 million rubles. Initial supply of the flags in the amount of two per ship will come to 23 million rubles. However, the money has not yet been made available.

On top of the above, there is only one factory in the country making the flags, and that is the Vladimir Fine Textiles Factory. It will be four or five months before it can produce the first thousand flags. In this regard, specialists in the Navy Main Staff feel that the first Flags of Saint Andrew will not be flown aboard our warships until the summer of this year, possibly on Navy Day, which is celebrated on the last Sunday of July.

Dutch Firm Drops Effort to Raise Komsomolets

92UM0523B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 5 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Sergey Doronin: "Naturally, It Would be Better to Raise the 'Komsomolets' from the Bottom of the Sea. But Who Will Give Us the Money?"]

[Text] The loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets in April 1989 is from the category of those tragedies whose consequences are difficult to predict. For this

reason alone there is no 100 percent guarantee in the future reliability of the reactor protective system of the submarine that is lying at a depth of 1,685 meters.

For some reason conversations are flaring up from time to time about its damage and the leak of radioactivity that has begun. And here is the very latest "news": the Dutch have refused to participate in raising the nuclear submarine...

Like many others, this news turned out to be no more than a rumor. Reserve Admiral Vladimir Samoylov, former Leningrad naval base commander and currently Rubin Maritime Equipment Central Design Bureau associate, confirmed this in a conversation with a RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent:

"Well, leakage is actually occurring. We have not made a secret of this fact. Representatives of our delegation announced this in October 1991 at an international conference in Norway.

Water and soil samples and samples of sea fauna taken at the site of the catastrophe, after their detailed study, have shown that the level of radioactivity is many times lower than the permissible figure. The cause of the leakage is not damage or destruction of the reactor. It is simply that the second loop ventilation system remained open at the moment of the submarine's loss.

I can state quite responsibly: there is no danger to the environment.

As for the participation of the Dutch firm... Our partners are not finding reasons to reject the salvage operation. And they are even insisting on the most rapid initiation of the operation.

The difficulty is financing the project. Today the Russian government does not have the required \$200-250 million. We cannot get it anywhere. By the way, the President of Russia has been informed about all of our problems. We are relying on his understanding and assistance.

Northern Fleet Experiences Fuel Shortage

PM1702132992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Feb 92 p 1

[Report by Captain Third Rank V. Gundarov: "A Crisis Is a Crisis, but Service Is Service"]

[Text] The ships of the Northern Fleet are continuing to serve and to fulfill their missions in accordance with the plans for combat training at sea. Although it cannot be said that the energy crisis has completely bypassed the fleet.

"When we planned to use the ships last year for 1992 we considered difficulties with fuel stocks and energy resources and the fact that the fleet would be allocated considerably fewer funds for ship repair and the restoration of the ships' technical readiness. That is why we

paid more attention to the base training of sailors, which makes it possible to save service life. For us that is the main thing," explained Vice-Admiral O. Yerofeyev, chief of staff of the Northern Fleet.

According to Vice-Admiral B. Poroshin, chief of the fleet's combat training directorate, the sailors may soon feel a fuel shortage.

[Gundarov] One wonders whether the sailors of the United States or the other NATO countries have this problem? To judge by the fact that NATO ships have not left the Barents Sea, they are short of fuel...

"Every day we are discovering foreign submarines which are continuing to patrol our zone. And in a few days we expect the return here of the Norwegian surveillance ship Marjatta which is well known to the entire fleet personnel," Vice Admiral Yerofeyev announced.

In this situation the Northern Fleet sailors, despite all the economic and social difficulties, have to find opportunities for the satisfactory fulfillment of their official duty.

Submarine Collision off Kola Peninsula

92UM0610A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Feb 92 First Edition p 6

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank V. Gundarov under rubric "Details for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Was There a Second Submarine?"]

[Text] A nuclear attack submarine commanded by Capt 2nd Rank Igor Lokot collided with an unidentified object at a depth of 22 m at 2016 hours on 11 February 1992 while coming to the surface in friendly territorial waters not far from the entrance to Kola Bay. The submarine received slight damages to her sail. The nuclear propulsion plant and other equipment and gear are serviceable. None of the crew members were injured.

Central Television reported this on the evening of 14 February with a reference to the Northern Fleet press center.

I was aboard the nuclear submarine, moored at one of the berths in Severomorsk.

Here is what Capt 2nd Rank Lokot told me:

"The crew was being tested on the second ship-type training task. The submarine was on the combat training range at a depth of 22.8 m. There was a collision at approximately 15 m while coming to the surface and the sail was damaged as a result.

"According to the sonarman's report, there were several fishing vessels on the range at the moment of the collision. Not one confirmed the fact of a collision when queried by radio."

Considering the depth, the nuclear submarine commander presumes that this was some sunken object, and based on the nature and degree of damage to the sail, it was equal in displacement to the nuclear submarine herself.

And finally the last detail of substance. The submarine's hull, like that of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets of sorrowful repute, is made of titanium, an unusually strong metal. Igor Grigoryevich is 99 percent certain that his ship collided with a foreign submarine. "If that is so, I most likely did heavy damage to her weaker metal hull," said the commander.

The large ASW ship Simferopol departed for the site of the collision and a helicopter flew all over the collision area.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Firm To Build Military Housing

92UM0472B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Jan 92 p 3

[Colonel V. Streletsov report: "Interlesbirzha Will Help Us. Meanwhile an Apartment House Is Being Built for the Military People Gratis"]

[Text] The recently created Interlesbirzha has initiated active cooperation with the Army. A military-industrial section has been set up under the exchange, designed to ensure a flow of goods and services into the market from enterprises of the military-industrial complex. The 50 brokers in this section are also helping the Army to sell equipment for the forestry industry. An exchange academy will soon be opening, whose students will be officers in the reserve.

But the big news is that during conversation with your correspondent, Interlesbirzha's vice president and chief engineer, Vladimir Krylov, reported that the exchange is now building gratis an 86-apartment apartment house for servicemen. And in the area of Krasnoye Selo an entire settlement is being organized, made up of 1,000 cottages, half of which, according to Krylov, the exchange intends to offer former servicemen.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Pullout from Baltics To Begin in February

92UM0536A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Yelena Visens and Yuriy Zubkov: "Troop Pullout Starts in February: Russian Delegation Visited Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn"]

[Text] Vilnius was the first city to be visited by a state delegation of the Russian Federation headed by Sergey Shakhryay, deputy chairman of the government of the Russian Federation and state adviser on legal policy.

As a result of the negotiations with the state delegation of the Lithuanian Republic, headed by Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, an agreement was reached on specific dates for the pullout from the republic of troops that have been transferred to Russia—the "successor" to the former Union. The troop withdrawal will start in February of this year. Thus, Lithuania continues to hold the position of the "first of the Baltic republics" (the first to declare its independence, the first to experience all of the "charm" of such a move, and the first to incur human sacrifices for its independence).

The joint communique signed on the results of the negotiations notes the need to conduct special negotiations on Russia's transfer to Lithuania of "a specific amount and types of weapons, military equipment, and munitions to equip subunits of the Lithuanian Republic's national defense."

On 10 February expert groups of Russia and Lithuania will get down to work on a specific agreement on the troop pullout.

On 1 February, negotiations were held in Riga between state delegations of the Russian Federation and the Latvian Republic on the start of the pullout of Soviet troops located on the territory of Latvia.

During the meeting, which, in the words of Sergey Shakhryay, head of the Russian delegation, can be considered the beginning of large-scale intergovernmental negotiations, an agreement was reached on the start of the withdrawal of armed forces from the territory of Latvia as early as March.

It was also contemplated settling questions of the social protection of military pensioners who live in Latvia. As Sergey Shakhryay explained, all the material costs in this matter are being assumed by the Russian Federation.

The leaders of the delegation noted that at the present time the parties have not yet reached agreement on the question of the future of military property.

As a result of the meeting an agreement was also reached on the opening of a Russian Federation embassy in Riga.

The Russian embassy will occupy the building in which the USSR embassy was located before 1940.

The fear that the negotiations between Russia and Estonia on questions concerning the temporary stay and withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet Union would not lead to concrete results were justified. While a specific agreement was reached on the withdrawal of which units and when in the Russian delegation's negotiations with the Lithuanian and Latvian colleagues, in the case of Estonia only consultations were held. Neither an official communique nor specific decisions were adopted. This is explained in many ways by the recent governmental crisis that transpired in the republic, which led to a change in government.

As is known, on 23 January the Estonian parliament passed a resolution on the nationalization of all movable property and real estate of the Armed Forces of the former USSR, including military equipment, weapons, and structures situated on the territory of the Estonian Republic. Undoubtedly, the question of the future of this property, which for obvious reasons Russia does not want to leave entirely to Estonia, while realizing, however, that some of it will have to be given, does nothing to facilitate the progress of negotiations. The problem of the social protection of servicemen who fall under the jurisdiction of Russia, and also the problem of the protection of the western borders, are paramount for Estonia's eastern neighbors.

In the near future the parties will establish expert groups to prepare a draft agreement on military questions. A meeting of the state delegations of Russia and Estonia is tentatively scheduled for the end of February, beginning of March.

UKRAINE

Kasatonov Refuses Ukraine Fleet Budget Allocation

92UM0539A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report under the rubric: "Opposition Demands Commanders' Resignation"]

[Text] Kiev—The People's Council, the democratic deputies association in the republic parliament, has appealed to the President of Ukraine demanding the resignation of the commanders of the Black Sea Fleet and the Kiev and Odessa Military Districts—Admiral Igor Kasatonov, and colonels-general Viktor Chechavatov and Ivan Morozov. Its statement was made public on Ukraine Radio by Ukraine People's Deputy Nikolay Porovskiy.

It becomes obvious, the statement says, that under the cover of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] certain forces are attempting to implement a plan to reanimate the Russian empire. The state guarantees the

military and their families social and legal protection, housing, and proper pay only in the circumstances of complete subordination of the Armed Forces to the Supreme Soviet and the president of Ukraine. However, contrary to the decisions of the Commonwealth of Independent States—the Alma-Ata and Minsk agreements—the commanders of the military districts and the fleet, as well as some other high-ranking military personnel, are trying to oppose this process. They are actively conducting a great-power, anti-Ukraine policy. The position of these commanders stands in the way of implementation of the Ukrainian laws on social protection of the military and improvement of their families' living standards.

The demonstrative refusal by the Black Sea Fleet command to accept 350 million rubles allocated by the government of Ukraine for fleet maintenance and raising military pay represents shameful politicking and an attempt to increase tensions, the statement reads. The President of Ukraine must undertake decisive measures aimed at accelerating the formation of the Ukraine Armed Forces.

With the purpose described in the statement, a picketing of the Kiev Military District staff headquarters has been started at Ukraine Rukh's initiative, which will continue until the demands of the People's Council are met. We were told that a small group of demonstrators here are carrying posters saying: "Checheyev Forbids the Taking of the Oath" and "He Who Has Not Taken the Oath Is an Occupier."

Col-Gen V. Checheyev, Commander of the Kiev Military District, has left for Moscow to participate in the All-Army Officers' Assembly. According to reliable sources, Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk and Ukraine Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov will participate in the assembly.

Morozov Meets With Polish Security Representative

92UM0576B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Jan 92 p 1

[Report from the Press Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense under the rubric "In the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine": "Neighborly Relations Are Developing"]

[Text] On 28 January Colonel-General K. Morozov, defense minister of the Ukraine, met with E. Makarezyk, first deputy minister of foreign affairs, and E. Milewski, state secretary of the Republic of Poland. In the discussion both sides expressed mutual interest in developing neighborly relations between the Ukraine and Poland. A number of military issues were also brought up. There was also discussion of problems of security and stability in the region and cooperation in this area.

Taking part in the meeting were E. Kazakiewicz, special envoy from the Republic of Poland to Kiev, and Colonel

V. Mulyava, chief of the Social and Psychological Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Defense Committee Chairman Durdinets Biographical Information

92UM0599A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
31 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed biographical information; uncaptioned photograph included]

[Text] Vasiliy Vasilyevich Durdinets was born in 1937 to a peasant family in the village of Romochevitsa, Mukachevskiy Rayon, Transcarpathian Oblast. He is Ukrainian. In 1960 he completed Lvov State University imeni I. Franko and is a lawyer by education.

He was in Komsomol work from 1960 and in party work from 1970. From 1978 through 1991 he was deputy minister and first deputy minister of internal affairs of Ukrainian SSR.

In February 1991 he was elected member of the Presidium and chairman of the Ukraine Supreme Council Permanent Commission for Defense and State Security.

He is a People's Deputy of Ukraine from Bobrinets Electoral District No 230, Kirovograd Oblast.

Ukraine Deputy Chief of Staff Interviewed

92UM0451A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
10 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Major-General Georgiy Vladimirovich Zhivitsa, First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Major G. Klyuchikov; place and date not given: "Professionalism Is the Main Criterion"]

[Text] Major-General Georgiy Vladimirovich Zhivitsa was born on 1 July 1937. In 1962 he graduated from the First Leningrad Artillery School. He began his service with the troops in the position of platoon commander. Subsequently, he commanded a company and was deputy battalion commander. In 1974, after graduating from the imeni M.V. Frunze Military Academy, he became a senior officer at the Operations Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces Staff. Upon graduating from the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff in 1978, he was appointed senior officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. After 1979 he became Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate and Chief of the Operations Directorate of the Staff of the Carpathian Military District. In 1983 he was assigned to special temporary duty abroad. From 1985 he was Chief of a Directorate and Deputy Chief of the Directorate of the Center for Operations and Strategic Research of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

By order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Major-General G. Zhivitsa has been appointed First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

[Klyuchikov] Georgiy Vladimirovich, could you please briefly discuss the future structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine?

[Zhivitsa] From the point of view of their structure, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will consist of Ground Troops, the Air Forces, the Air Defense Troops, and the Navy, which will be the combat services, directly subordinate formations and units, and military educational establishments. In other words, they will include the entire group of troops billeted in the territory of Ukraine, with the exception of strategic nuclear forces, which will have a temporary status. In keeping with the three nonnuclear principles proclaimed by Ukraine—not to use, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons—it is planned to eliminate nuclear weapons by shipping them out of our sovereign state and destroying them at special enterprises under strict control by Ukrainian specialists.

[Klyuchikov] Over what period of time is it planned to completely resubordinate military units deployed on the territory of Ukraine to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine?

[Zhivitsa] Such resubordination is out of the question. The point is that all military formations located on the territory of our sovereign state have already been subordinated to the minister of defense of Ukraine by a presidential ukase. An announcement to the effect that the USSR has ceased to exist as a subject of international law confirmed the lawfulness of this step. By now, the legal aspect of the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been fully established; arrangements for the transformation of all troops into a qualitatively new entity have been worked out.

A reform has begun as a result of which military formations will be transformed into the Armed Forces of Ukraine in keeping with a concept confirmed by the Supreme Soviet.

[Klyuchikov] Will servicemen belonging to the Union of Officers of Ukraine, of Ukrainian nationality, and in possession of housing enjoy any advantage in enlistment in the Armed Forces of Ukraine?

[Zhivitsa] Enlistment in the Armed Forces is performed on a voluntary basis, individually or within the composition of units deployed in the territory of Ukraine. However, this process should not by any means provide a pretext for persecution on the basis of political views or a universal verification of loyalty. In the process, all servicemen who are to enlist in the Armed Forces of Ukraine should take an oath adopted by the Supreme Soviet.

The personal professionalism of servicemen and their readiness and desire to serve Ukraine are the main "advantage" which will be taken into account.

[Klyuchikov] Will officers discharged to the reserves in conjunction with reductions in the USSR Armed Forces be accepted to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine?

[Zhivitsa] This is not ruled out. However, the approach is going to vary in each specific case. Favorable results hinge to a large degree on how urgent the need is for specialists in a given field.

[Klyuchikov] How will reserve officers, whose knowledge and experience could yet be useful to Ukraine, be used?

[Zhivitsa] They will be used as highly trained specialists, including in the Ministry of Defense, working in various executive positions, from adviser-instructors to heads of various subdivisions.

[Klyuchikov] What are the requirements for officers assigned for service with the Main Staff of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine?

[Zhivitsa] Supreme professional training of specialists, and personal ethics which are above reproach, fortified by the ideological conviction that our cause is right, are the main criteria for selecting cadres. The age of an officer is also taken into account. I believe that this approach will make it possible for us to concentrate in the Main Staff the healthiest and most creative forces which will make it possible to successfully form the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

[Klyuchikov] Is it planned to introduce new uniforms and national symbols?

[Zhivitsa] Certainly. After the Supreme Soviet confirms new state symbols for Ukraine we will seriously consider the issue of introducing new uniforms, insignia, and Combat Colors. Some work on this is already in progress. A competition for the best version of military uniforms, sponsored by the Ministry of Defense, is being held. The results of the competition will be released in early 1992.

[Klyuchikov] Will disciplinary battalions remain on the territory of Ukraine?

[Zhivitsa] No, there will be no disciplinary battalions on the territory of Ukraine. It is planned to disband all disciplinary battalions after a thorough study and analysis of this problem by a special commission of the Ministry of Defense and the Procuracy of Ukraine. In the process, many servicemen may be covered by an amnesty; depending on the gravity of the crimes committed, other convicts may be transferred to correctional facilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.

[Klyuchikov] Here is my final question: Does the Main Staff intend to move to another building which is more suitable for the peculiarities of its operation?

[Zhivitsa] Yes, it does. The current building is absolutely unsuitable for commanding and controlling the troops. Not only does it lack reliable communications, but to this day we have not succeeded in enforcing admittance strictly on the basis of passes because other organizations and national economy departments are located in the same building along with the Ministry of Defense.

This is why the Operations Group of the Main Staff, in particular, will be located in the building of the Headquarters of the Kiev Military District in order to organize direct command and control of the troops deployed on the territory of Ukraine.

Ukrainian Officer Group Appeals to Black Sea Fleet

*92UM0509A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA
in Ukrainian 25 Jan 92 p 1*

[Appeal of the Sevastopol Organization of Ukrainian Officers Union to Black Sea Fleet Admirals, Generals, Officers, Warrant Officers, Senior NCO's and Sergeants, Sailors and Soldiers]

[Text] Having proclaimed the Ukraine Independence Act on June 24, 1991, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet proclaimed the creation of Ukraine's own Armed Forces as a guarantor of Ukraine's independence.

On December 1, 1991, the Ukrainian people confirmed in a referendum the decision adopted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and expressed their will to live in an independent state and therefore to have their own Armed Forces.

According to these legal documents, creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has begun, on the basis of military districts and fleets located in its territory.

As of January 3, 1992, military units started administering the military oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people, thus confirming the eternal dream of the Ukrainian people to have their own Armed Forces.

Despite this, the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet has begun a savage campaign directed against the will of the Ukrainian people and resolutions of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and Defense Ministry. Having put his own chauvinistic and imperialistic goals and his personal convictions above the interests of the Ukrainian people and using his official position, he obstructs the act of taking the military oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people by military units, ships and formations, which are ready for this historic act.

Admirals, generals, officers, warrant officers and ensigns—75 percent of all Black Sea personnel—voted on December 1, 1991, for Ukraine's independence and hence for its Armed Forces.

We appeal to you to keep your composure and not to take part in steps aimed at kindling international hostility. Do not succumb to provocations by certain chauvinistic and imperialistic circles in the Fleet and the Crimea as a whole.

Ukraine, being a maritime state, will have its own naval forces, which will be a reliable guarantor of defending Ukraine's interests on the high sea.

Approved unanimously at a general meeting of the Sevastopol Organization of the Ukrainian Officers Union.

[Signed] Tenyukh Chairman, Sevastopol Organization of the Ukrainian Officers Union
01-18-92

Ukrainian Officer Union Executive Committee Meets

*92UM0576A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Jan 92 p 1*

[Report by Colonel V. Lazorkin, deputy of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies and deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Officers' Union, and Colonel V. Pilipchuk, member of the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Officers' Union: "Protect the Officers' Interests"]

[Text] A plenum of the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Officers' Union was held on 25 January. Lieutenant-General V. Durdinets, chairman of the Commission on Defense and State Security of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, presented a report on the military-political situation.

Plenum participants received the address by the head of the parliamentary commission with great attention and an understanding of the tasks we now face.

The position of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, the President of the Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine met with fervent support among the officers.

During the plenum a number of proposals and positions were expressed with respect to resolving immediate problems in the area of military development and social and legal protection for the servicemen.

Plenum participants received with great enthusiasm the establishment of the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine and the appointment of Colonel V. Martirosyan, leader of the Ukrainian Officers' Union, as chairman of the committee.

At the same time plenum participants expressed great concern about the cadre policy of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the fate of many thousands of Ukrainian servicemen serving outside the Ukraine. Cases were cited in which the interests of this group of servicemen were infringed upon, particularly in the Pacific and Northern fleets.

This shows that we face the urgent necessity of finding an inter-state solution to the problem and working out measures for implementing it.

The fact was stressed that the All-Army Officers' Assembly held in Moscow on 17 January avoided the constructive resolution of problems involved in the search for a practical decision on the future of the

servicemen. This revealed the uselessness and hopelessness of the undertaking in Moscow.

In our opinion there is presently no comprehensive solution to problems pertaining to the performance of military service by Ukrainian servicemen outside the Ukraine.

We are all well aware that the Ukraine cannot receive all the servicemen who want to transfer here and properly provide for them in a day. The problem is exacerbated by the impossibility of resolving the personnel issue of assigning the officers to corresponding positions due to the drastic increase in the number of servicemen wanting to return to the Ukraine over the needs of the Ukrainian armed forces for officers and possibilities for providing them with housing.

We must speak the truth in this matter, because hushing up the fact could evoke a spontaneous process of the return of servicemen to the Ukraine, which would further intensify social problems and deprive many families of their share.

This cannot be permitted. We must have an interstate agreement immediately for a comprehensive resolution of the matter of officers serving on the territory of the former Union and their ability legally to return to their homeland.

This agreement must stipulate the terms under which military service will continue to be performed, the citizenship of the officers, possible versions of their oath-taking, the terms for their retirement from the military service and their pensions, and guarantees by members of the former Union that this interstate agreement will be implemented. It must establish and guarantee all the essential conditions for normal, civilized military service for all military personnel serving outside the Ukraine.

In the Ukraine this has been done on a solid legal basis with the passage of a basic package of military legislation, which has met with understanding and support in the armed forces on the territory of the Ukraine. This is borne out by their taking of the military oath of loyalty to the Ukraine. The Ukraine has demonstrated with actions the seriousness of its intent to solve the military problems.

We would like the other members of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] to join this process.

Even a superficial study of the situation which has developed around the problem of the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimea shows the disinclination of certain forces of the former center to determine the fate of the servicemen in a civilized manner.

Suppression, biased coverage and sometimes even distortions of the Ukraine's military policy in the mass media is artificially heating up anti-Ukrainian sentiments, resulting in confrontation and exacerbating the situation. This is a false path leading to a dead end. Exploitation of the impoverished situation of the servicemen and their families on the territory of the former

Union as a playing card in the hands of irresponsible politicians is immoral and should be universally condemned.

Negotiations are the only proper way to resolve these problems, and the Ukraine has repeatedly insisted on this.

I would like to discuss in detail the system for protecting the interests of servicemen and their families outside the Ukraine.

A study of this category of servicemen tells us that the main and most numerous part of them consists of servicemen who have one to five years left until retirement. The interests of these servicemen demand that we establish proper conditions for them to continue and complete their service, provide pensions for them, have them accept citizenship and take the oath and serve under contract, and make it possible for them to return to their homeland.

A different approach is required for resolving problems pertaining to the continued service of the young officers and those with more than five years to retirement.

We need to reach agreement on the establishment of an interstate commission out of the former Main Personnel Directorate for their phased transfer to the armed forces of the Ukraine on a contractual basis and in competition with officers serving in the Ukraine, and the assignment of those who make it through the competition. Furthermore, in the area of training officers in the Ukraine we need to call for a reduction in the output of officers in certain fields in accordance with the number of officers returning to the Ukraine. Along with this we need to provide for the possibility of a direct exchange of officers from other states of the former Union, including their housing.

The interstate agreement should contain also a means of determining the future of cadets and other students at higher educational institutions who are citizens of the Ukraine. It will not be difficult for the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine to resolve this matter. I want particularly to stress the role of the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen in the resolution of these problems. They include job-placement and retraining for servicemen who have not made it through the competition and are discharged from the armed forces of the Ukraine, providing them with housing and pensions, as well as the resolution of other issues within the framework of current laws on social and legal protection.

These problems certainly require more detailed and specific elaboration. However, those engaged in their resolution must bear in mind that they are dealing with the specific individual and his problems, his trust and his belief that the matter of his fate will be successfully resolved.

Officer Union Official Views Developments in Ukraine Officer Union

92UM0576C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by A. Chip, member of the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Officers' Union: "The Union of Officers of Ukrainian Citizenship: What Should it Be Like?"]

[Text] Poltava—An article published in the newspaper gives the impression that the SOU [Ukrainian Officers' Union] was established "with functions not its own," that the regulations, the oath and sacred duty exist for every serviceman and not just members of the SOU. The focus is on Colonel Martirosyan, who "assigns it (the SOU) a special role in this matter."

Permit me to disagree! There have always been regulations and the oath, but this did not keep the servicemen from becoming hostages to the political ambitions of the ruling elite.

I do not deny that the sacred duty always existed for the children of blue-collar workers and peasants. Every "Afghaner" will confirm this. I spoke with an order-bearing officer who expressed one thought, typical of the army, about the existence of unofficial ways in its command personnel: "I fought in Afghanistan and entered into combat without fear, but here I am afraid to express my opinion about the Ukrainian armed forces." And is this the only thing the officers are afraid to speak of openly?

Today SOU representatives are working on new regulations which would precisely delineate between the sacred duty of every serviceman in the Ukrainian armed forces to protect the homeland and the execution of orders criminal to its people. One will not find today anything to compare with the extent of the work performed by the SOU to prevent a conflict in the army ranks over the national issue or to shape public opinion in the officers on the need to establish not just an army of the Ukraine but even the very state as a member of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent Nations].

Credit for the fact that they did not succeed in playing the national card in the Ukraine, as persistently urged from the center, goes not just to the Ukraine's leadership. The credit belongs to the democratic forces of all nationalities residing in the Ukraine, including a small portion for the SOU. The referendum confirmed the fact that the army and the people of the Ukraine are united in their aspirations to build their own independent state. It can be built while observing the sacred ties of friendship of all the Ukraine's peoples residing on its territory.

I will agree with the author of the article on the future of the Ukrainian Officers' Union as a public organization with all the rights of a professional union. This matter has already been discussed in the Executive Committee of the SOU and has its proponents. Today, however, at a

time of fundamental reforms in the economy and the army, a time when legislative authority has not gathered full strength, we need firm guarantees of the social and legal protection of servicemen on the part of the state. The Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen, which includes representatives of the SOU, was established for this purpose under the Cabinet of Ministers as proposed at the 2nd Congress of the Ukrainian Officers' Union.

Ukraine-Poland Plan Military Cooperation

92UM0541A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
17 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service: "Ukraine-Poland: Prospects for Military Cooperation Outlined"]

[Text] On 14 January of this year Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel General K. Morozov paid an official visit to the Republic of Poland at the invitation of that country's Minister of Defense.

There were meetings in Warsaw with Polish Defense Minister J. Parys and Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Skubiszewski, during which questions of cooperation between armies of the two neighboring states were discussed. Mutual information was exchanged about the state of affairs in their countries, and both sides outlined the range of problems which could be taken as a basis for finding mutual interests.

Colonel-General Morozov briefed the Polish side on progress in implementing the concept of defense and Ukrainian Armed Forces organizational development and set forth basic provisions of our military doctrine concerning mutual relations with neighboring friendly states, which include the Republic of Poland.

The information of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense was received with interest and understanding by the Polish side, after which Polish Defense Minister Parys declared that many questions arising in his country because of a lack of objective information from Ukraine now have been removed to a greater degree. It remains only to hope for productive, mutually advantageous cooperation.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel-General Morozov returned to Kiev that same day.

Commander Outlines Tasks, Organization of Border Troops

92UM0518A Kiev POGRANICHNIK UKRAINY in Russian 1 Jan 92 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Valeriy Aleksandrovich Gubenko, commander of the Ukrainian Border Troops, by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Klepikov, special correspondent for the journal VESTNIK GRANITSY: "Protecting the Interests of Ukraine"]

[Text] As we know, by decision of the Ukrainian Parliament, Border Troops formations and units stationed on the territory of Ukraine have been transferred to the jurisdiction of the independent republic. Lieutenant-General V.A. Gubenko, Commander of the Western Border District, has been appointed Chairman of the Committee for Border Security Affairs and Commander of the Ukrainian Border Troops.

Our correspondent interviewed the Commander of the Ukrainian Border Troops on New Year's Eve.

[Klepikov] Comrade Lieutenant-General, what missions will the troops entrusted to you perform?

[Gubenko] No matter what takes place within the country, no matter what political events occur, our mission remains clear and distinct: ensure the inviolability of the state border. If we fulfill this mission, that means we will fulfill our military and civic duty. I believe that the officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of the Ukrainian Border Troops understand this well.

How to fulfill this mission is another matter. For example, I am convinced that the trend of dividing the Border Troops by republics will make it possible to protect fully the interests of the sovereign republic.

I am not an advocate of division, nor am I an advocate of strict centralization. I favor a happy medium. I will explain why.

Look at how many problems are arising in the republics concerning border security; they must be resolved on the spot and in a timely manner. Let us assume there was an urgent need to open some small border crossing post, but we had to wait six months or even one year while the union government makes a decision on it. Did this really serve the interest of the matter, the interests of the local residents? The center's reaction to the valid needs and desires of the population of border regions for democratization of the border, as a rule, was also late. This alone is a serious argument in favor of republic border troops.

Let us continue. In the former Union, the republics were formally given rights of statehood. But what happened in actuality?

For example, a suitable treaty is concluded with Poland. Who concludes it? The ministries of foreign affairs of the Union and of the contiguous state. No one finds time to invite a representative of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the negotiations. It turns out that we had only a union border. The republics did not have state borders. They were only administrative borders. Is this normal?

We made a big mistake at one time. We once had the Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Moldavian border districts. But like everything, border security was centralized. What was the result of this? Over the years, the border population's displeasure came to a head when we closed

the border tightly. Residents of Ukraine, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary who were related and living literally hundreds of meters apart were unable to see one another for decades.

And we said: everything is for the good of man, in the name of man... Therefore, changes had to occur sooner or later. They were long overdue.

What is happening now is a normal process. And one should not make a tragedy of this. Once a republic has declared itself to be an independent state, it should have the basic attributes of statehood, first and foremost, a border and troops who guard it. This also applies to the borders with Belarus, Russia, and Moldova. How to mark these border and guard them is the prerogative of neighboring republics. They themselves will work it out among themselves.

It is quite logical that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed important laws "On the State Border of Ukraine" and "On Ukrainian Border Troops," which put everything in its place.

What follows this? Either ratification of existing treaties with contiguous states by the independent states themselves, or conclusion of new ones. My position is this: We need not create anything new, but should merely examine previous treaties, ratify them by each republic, and thus strengthen the borders of the independent state.

This must be done before Ukraine is recognized by other states. Did they recognize her in the former Union? They did. Whether or not, say, Romania wishes to recognize Ukraine, it must recognize the existing border with its neighbor, since this border is a reality.

[Klepikov] How do you assess the present situation on the western border?

[Gubenko] I would not say that it has seriously changed this year. The tendency of increasing the number of people and transports allowed to cross the western border manifested itself one-two years ago. It remains today. The situation here is the result of the expanding market relations and the emerging economic ties not only of the republics, enterprises, and organizations but also of private individuals.

The situation remains the most difficult and tense on international lines of communication. This is the main problem for the Ukrainian Border Troops.

The flow of people and transports, especially at simplified crossing posts, has increased to such an extent that the lines reach 10-15 km at some traffic control posts. People are forced to wait five-seven days for processing. A serious sanitation situation has taken shape at traffic control posts, customs houses, and in populated areas adjacent to them; epidemics have broken out in some places. It is not within our power or our jurisdiction to fundamentally change anything here. And local authorities are powerless. There is an influx of people from virtually all corners of the country; it is impossible to

control them. We simply do not have either sufficient finances or physical forces to bring about proper order in the near future. Although the republic government is taking certain steps, the customs agencies and Ministry of Internal Affairs are not idle, and we are also getting involved in this.

We have to go so far as to close individual crossing posts and declare a quarantine. But this is not saving the situation. Similar steps are being taken in Belarus and Moldova. And people are beginning to rush about the entire border.

As far as relations with border guards of contiguous states of Eastern Europe is concerned, traditions of good neighbor relations basically continue to develop: there is mutual understanding, mutual respect, and a readiness to come to one another's assistance. But the realities are such that additional difficulties are appearing both for us and for them. In conditions when the crossing points are literally clogged up, you find smart operators who look for unsanctioned methods of crossing the border. Hence the increase in the number of violations of the state border. Compared to 1990, there have been 10 times as many border violators arrested in the district's sector. This also says something about the imperfection of laws concerning border security; painstaking work is being done on this now.

Based on all this, the concept of guarding the foreign border will also be understandable.

[Klepikov] It is understandable with the foreign border. But Ukraine borders only East European countries. Should we expect the appearance of border posts on the borders with Belarus, Russia, and Moldova after the citizens of the republic said "yes" to Ukraine's independence during the referendum?

[Gubenko] Not under any circumstances. It is our firm conviction that there are no total measures with respect to establishing regime measures or erecting engineering and technical structures on the historic administrative borders with neighboring republics. For us it seems important only to provide assistance to customs houses, law enforcement agencies, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic in protecting the economic interests of Ukraine in conditions of market relations. But this is a temporary task—for the period of forming the market.

I am far from the idea that we will have to post security detachments here. True, there are rambunctious individuals who are ready to close tightly the borders with Russia, Belarus, and Moldova. But I speak out against this categorically at the Supreme Soviet and everywhere.

Imagine: There are more than 1,000 roads on the administrative borders with these republics. So, will we block them? Even if you permit such a thought, how many

forces and assets would it take? And then we are supposed to begin building market relations with our neighbors by fencing ourselves off from them; it is the same as building a house from the roof down.

Some control can be established on the main roads, but this is the government's prerogative. In our concept we are guided not only by rejecting rigidly controlled borders with neighboring republics, but we set the goal of further democratization of border protection with the countries of Eastern Europe. In time, we will also have to change the structure of the troops to take this into account.

[Klepikov] Comrade commander, what will be new in the organization and establishment of the troops?

[Gubenko] I believe that the existing structure as a whole can be blended in with the structure being developed for the State Committee for Border Security Affairs of Ukraine. The committee is a constituent part of the republic's Cabinet of Ministers. Naturally, the statute on the committee will give more attention to treaty, legal, finance, organizational-mobilization, material-technical, and to some degree personnel issues in relations with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and other departments.

I think we will create a sufficiently acceptable, flexible structure that ensures reliable protection of the state border.

[Klepikov] Are changes planned in the procedures for performance of military service by border guards?

[Gubenko] No. The statute on performance of military service is being reviewed, but for now we will merely have our own oath. It has been approved by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. In my opinion, it contains very profound words.

Personally, I am against alternative service. We have enough strong, healthy lads who volunteer to serve in the Border Troops.

[Klepikov] Valeriy Aleksandrovich, it seems problems will arise with training a permanent staff in the Border Troops?

[Gubenko] That is a difficult question. In Ukraine, officer positions are filled in this way: Those who themselves are from the republic by birth or have in-laws living here transfer here. It is not a matter of nationality; it is not important if this officer is Russian, Ukrainian, or Kazakh. People try to get here also because they want to be closer to their parents' home. More than 5,000 such officers are serving outside of the republic. Therefore, we have a large reserve. I think that in 10-15 years we will not have any problems with personnel.

On the other hand, there are officers who would like to leave Ukraine and serve in their own homeland. This is a natural process, and we will not impede it.

Grounds for a transfer to the west are: difficult family circumstances, serious illness of officers' family members. As we know, they were transferred almost always with a demotion. Now we are correcting this injustice and plan to raise the status of such officers one level higher and make it so they occupy positions not lower than the ones from which they were transferred to us.

Regarding training of personnel. At the republic's Supreme Soviet, I spoke out against creating our own border guard schools. They agreed with me. Let the officer candidates from Ukraine continue training; we will not recall anyone. This also applies to students of military academies. You see, in time they all will replenish our officer corps.

Thus, the future is such: it is advisable to train line officers and educators in already existing higher educational institutions and to train pilots, seamen, engineers, rear services and other specialists in Ukrainian military schools.

Categories in the selection and placement of personnel are clear: willingness and ability to guard the state border regardless of political changes.

[Klepikov] It is no secret to anyone that our sick economy has not had the best effect on the standard of living of officers, warrant officers, and their families and the social feeling of all personnel. Tell me, what can people hope for, and how will the laws of the market operate in the economic mechanism of the republic's Border Troops?

[Gubenko] There is no secret. Everything is rising in price; people are tired of searching for foodstuffs and industrial goods. The pay of officers, although increasing, remains low. There are delays in receiving what they are supposed to receive. In November, for example, people could not receive their money on time.

The government of Ukraine is trying to do everything it can to see that the border guards do not end up deprived. But we ourselves are not sitting idle either. We have procured for the winter a sufficient amount of potatoes and vegetables. We have additionally purchased and put into storage potatoes as "emergency rations" and will sell them to officers, warrant officers, workers, and employees in the spring.

We have undertaken to expand the subsidiary farming of units and subunits. All of its products will go only for the needs of the troops. We plan to purchase through small business in Germany equipment for our own meat plant. Commerce is increasingly becoming firmly established in our life, too.

We are successfully solving the problem of providing people with garden plots. Radical changes are also planned for housing. We are going to construction organizations and middlemen and actively erecting housing and office buildings using our own forces and our own building organization. If we accomplish everything we

are planning, I dare say that we will solve the housing problem in one and one-half to two years.

In general, I confess that I am happy with the professional mood of our servicemen.

Taking advantage of the occasion, I want to wish Happy New Year to the veterans of the Border Troops, officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers!

I wish you happiness and good fortune, comrades!

[Klepikov] Thank you for the interview. I wish success to you personally and to the border guards of Ukraine.

Ukrainian Law on Servicemen's Rights

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[Ukrainian Law on Servicemen's Rights: "Law of Ukraine on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Members of Their Families"]

[Text]

Law of the Ukraine On Social and Legal Protection for Military Servicemen and Their Family Members

Section I.

General Provisions

Article 1. Legislation on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members

Legislation on social and legal protection of servicemen and their family members consists of this law and other acts of Ukrainian legislation, and also Ukrainian Armed Forces military regulations.

Article 2. Prohibition of Restrictions of Servicemen's Rights

No one has the right to restrict the rights and freedoms of servicemen and their family members that have been defined in Ukrainian legislation.

Article 3. Individuals Classified as Servicemen

Individuals classified as servicemen are: officers, warrant officers, compulsory service or extended service personnel, and those on military service under contract with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian National Guard, Ukrainian Border Troops, Ukrainian National Security Service, Civil Defense Troops, and also other military formations created by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Strategic Deterrent Forces deployed on Ukrainian territory, female servicemen and cadets at military educational institutions.

Article 4. Individuals to Whom the Force of this Law Applies

The force of this law applies to:

- servicemen serving on Ukrainian territory, and servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens who are performing their military duty beyond the borders of Ukraine;
- family members of servicemen who have been killed, died, missing in action, or have become disabled while performing military service; and,
- those liable to military service who have been called up and members of their families.

Section II.

Servicemen's Rights

Article 5. Guaranteeing Servicemen's Civil Rights and Freedoms

Servicemen—Ukrainian citizens who are serving on Ukrainian territory, participate in All-Ukrainian and local referendums, vote for and may be elected to the Soviet of People's Deputies and other elected state organs in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution. The Law of Ukraine "On Ukrainian Presidential Elections" applies to them.

The commanders (senior commanders) of servicemen who are candidates for people's deputy must create the appropriate conditions to exercise this right.

Servicemen, who have been elected to the Soviet of People's Deputies or appointed to organs formed by these Soviets, remain in the military service and retain the status of servicemen. Servicemen who are people's deputies and who are relieved from performing their military duties as a result of their election to the organs of the appropriate Soviets of People's Deputies and who because of this have not expressed the desire to be released into the reserves, are temporarily assigned to the Soviet for their remaining time in service as prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. The term of service in the Soviets or in its organs is calculated in the total, uninterrupted length of military service. Upon expiration of the term of office in the Soviet of People's Deputies and its organs, the serviceman is sent back to the military formation where he was serving prior to his election for further service in a position no lower than the one he was serving in prior to his election to the elective position in the Soviet of People's Deputies.

Servicemen have the right to create their own social associations in accordance with Ukrainian legislation. Servicemen cannot be members of any political parties, organizations or movements whatsoever. Servicemen are not permitted to organize strikes or to participate in strikes.

Servicemen have the right to lodge complaints in court about the illegal actions of military officials and military administrative organs.

Servicemen have the same right as all Ukrainian citizens to leave the country.

Article 6. Freedom of Conscience

Servicemen have the right to profess any religion or to not profess any, to perform religious rites, and to openly express and freely propagate their religious or atheistic convictions.

No one has the right to prevent servicemen from satisfying their religious needs.

Persons whose religious convictions prevent them from performing their military duties have the right to alternative service in accordance with the Ukrainian law "On Alternative (Labor) Service."

Article 7. Inviolability of Servicemen

Inviolability of the individual is guaranteed to military servicemen. They cannot be arrested except based on a court decision, or with the sanction of the procurator, or by order of the commander that is rendered in accordance with the Ukrainian Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulation.

Article 8. Servicemen's Fundamental Rights that Are Associated with the Performance of Service

1. The utilization of servicemen to perform tasks not associated with military service is prohibited. Servicemen may be enlisted to participate in cleaning up accidents, disasters, natural disasters and other individual incidents only by a decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

The time a Ukrainian citizen is in the military service is calculated as part of his total, uninterrupted length of labor service and also the length of service in his specialty.

Servicemen are guaranteed freedom of scientific, technical and artistic creation.

Servicemen may not engage in entrepreneurial activities.

In the event a serviceman temporarily fills a higher command position, pay will be commensurate with the position filled.

2. Servicemen, other than compulsory service personnel, cannot be released from military service prior to obtaining the right to a pension based on years served, except in the event when service is terminated according to their desires, as a result of the state of their health, termination of term of service or nonfulfillment of contract terms, systematic nonfulfillment of the requirements of military regulations, reductions of personnel strength of servicemen or staff, and also in the event of imprisonment by the sentence of a court.

3. Compulsory service servicemen, who, before being called up, worked at enterprises, establishments, or organizations, regardless of the type of property or ownership, have the right, upon release from military service, of job placement for a three month period at that same enterprise, establishment or organization or their legal

successors in a position not lower than that occupied before being conscripted for military service. They will be granted material assistance in the amount of one month's salary from state budget resources. Other conditions being equal, they take advantage of a priority right to remain at work during worker or staff reductions as a result of changes in the organization of production and labor for two years from the date of release from military service.

Compulsory service personnel, whose families have lost breadwinners and do not have other able-bodied members or family members with independent earnings, will be released from military service early.

4. Guaranteeing employment for persons released from military service without the right to a pension will be conducted in accordance with the Ukrainian law on employment of the population.

5. The state guarantees social and professional adaptation for servicemen who are released as a result of strength or staff reductions of servicemen, for health conditions, and also compulsory service personnel who had not managed to find a job before being conscripted for military service.

Article 9. Material Support of Servicemen

The state guarantees servicemen material and other support in the amount that stimulates the interests of Ukrainian citizens in military service.

Servicemen receive monetary support from the state and also kit and rations or, based on a serviceman's desires, monetary compensation instead of them.

The monetary support is determined depending on position, military rank, skills, degree of training and training rank, and length and conditions of military service.

The procedures and amounts of monetary and material support of servicemen and compensation instead of kit and food rations is prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, while considering the monetary income index coefficient.

Servicemen and their family members who are Chernobyl AES [nuclear power plant] accident victims enjoy all the privileges prescribed in the Law of Ukraine "On the Status and Social Protection of Citizens, Who Were Victims of the Chernobyl Disaster."

Officers who are temporarily assigned to work at state management organs, or at enterprises, establishments, organizations and higher educational institutions retain all forms of material support, guarantees and privileges at the expense of the budget of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Ukrainian National Guard, Ukrainian Border Troops and military formations. A list of positions which officers may occupy is prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 10. Servicemen's Duty and Off-Duty Time. Leaves

1. A 41-hour work week is prescribed for servicemen. The duration and allocation of servicemen's duty and off-duty time is determined in accordance with the military regulations and advisers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

2. Military exercises, ship cruises, combat firing, and alert duty are conducted on any day of the week without restricting the total duration of duty time.

3. Officers, warrant officers, extended service personnel, and female servicemen who are called in to perform military service on days off, holidays and non-work days due to duty requirements, are granted another day off. The appropriate commanders (senior commanders) prescribe days off for compulsory service personnel who perform military duties on designated days off due to duty requirements.

Servicemen's details and duties are performed in accordance with military regulations and advisers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

4. Servicemen, except for compulsory service personnel, are granted routine annual leave with the retention of their material support. The duration of leave for servicemen having up to 10 calendar years of service is 30 days, from 10-20 years is 35 days, from 20-25 years is 40 days and 25 or more calendar years is 45 days, without counting time required for travel to and from the leave location.

For service of a special nature and under harmful working conditions, servicemen are granted additional annual leave with retention of their material support according to the procedures prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

Based on the commander's (senior commander's) decision, servicemen may be granted additional annual leave with retention of material support, due to family circumstances, as a result of study at educational institutions and for other reasons worthy of consideration.

For the entire duration of military service, compulsory service personnel are granted leave as follows: soldiers and sailors get 20 days, sergeants and master sergeants get 25 days, without counting the time necessary to travel to and from the leave location.

Disabled servicemen and also combat veterans and equivalent persons are granted annual leaves of 45 days duration at a time convenient for them regardless of the number of years of service.

Article 11. Health Protection

1. The required health-hygiene and living conditions are created for servicemen while taking into account the specific nature of their duties and the ecological situation. They are provided free skilled medical assistance at military medical institutions. In the absence of a military medical institution at the duty location and also in

emergencies, servicemen are provided medical assistance at Ukrainian Ministry of Public Health medical-treatment institutions at the expense of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ukrainian National Guard, the Ukrainian National Security Service, Ukrainian Border Troops and other military formations.

Servicemen who were victims of the Chernobyl disaster are provided medical assistance in accordance with Ukrainian legislation.

2. Medical assistance is provided to the family members of servicemen on a general basis. In the event that it is impossible to provide assistance at Ukrainian Ministry of Public Health medical-treatment institutions, medical assistance will be provided at the appropriate military medical institution.

3. Officers, warrant officers, extended service personnel and members of their families have the right to use sanatoriums and health resorts, rest homes, holiday hotels, and tourist facilities of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ukrainian National Guard, the Ukrainian National Security Service, the Ukrainian Border Troops and other military formations.

Servicemen working under harmful conditions and also in duties of a special nature and servicemen who have become disabled as a result of combat operations, participants in combat operations, and equivalent persons are granted priority vouchers for sanatorium and health treatment.

Servicemen who have become disabled as a result of combat operations and also participants in combat operations have equal rights to those of disabled persons and participants of the Great Patriotic War.

4. Compulsory service personnel, military educational institution cadets and wives of servicemen are provided free medical-preventative treatment in the presence of medical evidence.

5. Female servicemen enjoy all the benefits prescribed in Ukrainian legislative acts on the issues of social protection of women, and protection for motherhood and childhood. These privileges are extended to fathers among servicemen who are rearing children without mothers (in the event of her death, deprivation of parental rights, during stays at medical institutions and in other cases of the lack of maternal concern for children).

Article 12. Providing Servicemen and Their Family Members with Living Accommodations

1. Servicemen are provided with living accommodations by the state.

Servicemen (except for compulsory service personnel) and members of their families who are living with them

are provided living accommodations which must meet the requirements of Article 50 of the Ukrainian Dwelling Code.

Prior to obtaining permanent living accommodations, as indicated in this paragraph, they are provided official living accommodations. In the event of the absence of such living accommodations, the military unit is obligated to temporarily lease a dwelling for the military serviceman and his family or as the military serviceman desires, to pay monetary compensation to sublet (rent) living accommodations under the terms prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

Upon release from military service into the reserves or retirement for years served, officers, warrant officers, and extended service personnel, and also those released due to personnel and staff reductions, are providing housing according to the procedures prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

2. Warrant officers, extended service personnel and servicemen who have contracted to enlist into the military service, if they are not provided with a place to live at their service location, are provided official accommodations or housing in dormitories for the first five years of service. During this period of time, they retain the right to the housing which they occupied prior to entering military service. They cannot be excluded from lists of citizens registering for apartments. If military service extends beyond the five year period, they are provided with living accommodations at their duty location based on general grounds.

3. Higher military educational institution cadets who have families are provided a place to live at a family hostel. If there are no hostels, they are paid monetary compensation at their duty location for a temporary sublet (rental) of living accommodations in amounts prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

4. Servicemen, who have been released from military service as a result of becoming disabled due to wounds, contusions, serious injury, or sickness received while performing their military duties, are granted priority for living accommodations at their chosen place of habitation, while considering prescribed procedures.

Housing is provided on a priority basis to families of servicemen who were killed or died, or missing in action while performing their duties and when necessary to improve their standard of living.

5. Servicemen, other than compulsory service personnel, who have no less than 20 years service and who are directed to serve outside the borders of Ukraine or who have been transferred to a duty location which has been subjected to intensive radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl disaster, will have the living accommodations which they and their families occupy reserved for the entire period of their stay outside of Ukraine or at the indicated location.

6. Servicemen serving on Ukrainian territory, parents and family members of servicemen who have been killed, died, are missing in action, or have become disabled while performing their military duties are paid 50 percent of the prescribed rate for a place to live and public utilities (water service, gas, electricity, heating and other services) in homes of the available state dwellings.

7. Officers, warrant officers, and extended service personnel who have served not less than 17 years and who have not been provided with a place to live, have the right to priority entry in housing-building (housing) cooperatives, or to receive a piece of land for individual housing construction in populated areas selected by them for residence, while considering prescribed procedures.

Local Soviets of People's Deputies are obliged to issue plots of land and to render assistance in the construction and acquisition of building materials for officers, warrant officers, extended service personnel, and parents of servicemen who were killed or died, or are missing in action and also to servicemen who became disabled while performing their military duties, if they express the desire to build individual homes.

8. Servicemen who do not have permanent living accommodations have the right to receive credits for individual and cooperative dwelling construction or to acquire a single family house for a term of up to 20 years with payment of the debt using the military formation's funds; 50 percent for more than 15 years service, 75 percent for more than 20 years service and 100 percent for more than 25 years service of the loans allotted by banking institutions.

9. Officers, warrant officers and extended service personnel, who have not less than 20 years service and who are released from the service due to their state of health, age, or strength and staff reductions servicemen, who became group I or II disabled persons, the family members of servicemen who were killed, died or are missing in action in the course of military service, have the right to receive their own personal living accommodations without charge which they will occupy in houses of the state housing fund.

Officers, warrant officers and extended service personnel have the right to be first in line to receive living accommodations on the grounds prescribed by the Ukrainian Dwelling Code.

10. Compulsory service personnel are quartered in barracks (on ships) in accordance with the military regulations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The living accommodations which they occupied prior to being conscripted into the military will be maintained for them. They may not be excluded from lists of civilians to receive apartments.

Article 13. Guaranteeing the Right to an Education

Servicemen may study at military educational institutions. Except for compulsory service personnel, they are authorized to study at other higher educational institutions to deepen their professional knowledge and general cultural training without leaving the service.

Compulsory service personnel may attend military educational institutions.

Personnel who were called up for regular service when they were at an educational institution, enter the same educational institution in which they were studying before being called to duty to continue their education upon release from military service.

Article 14. Benefits for Servicemen and their Family Members with Regard to Travel, Transportation of Household Goods, Mail, and also Taxes

1. Servicemen and members of their families are provided free travel on leave and also free transportation of their household goods by rail, air, water and vehicular transportation during a transfer to a new duty location and will be paid monetary allowances as prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministries.

While performing military duties as a result of a temporary duty assignment to another populated area, the military serviceman's expenses are reimbursed as prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministries.

2. Compulsory service personnel enjoy the right to ride free on any type of city transportation (except for taxis) and general use vehicular transportation in rural areas, and also rail and water transportation in the suburban system and buses on suburban routes.

Servicemen who have become disabled as the result of combat operations, participants in combat operations, and equivalent personnel, and also the parents of servicemen who were killed or who died or are missing in action in the course of their service, enjoy the right to free travel on all types of city general use passenger transportation (except for taxis) within the borders of the administrative region to their place of residence, suburban system rail and water transportation and suburban bus routes. They have the right to a 50 percent discount while using inter-city rail, water, air and bus transportation.

3. Servicemen, and also the parents of servicemen who were killed or who died or are missing in the course of their service are released from payment of income tax on all the income they received.

4. Compulsory service personnel have the right to send and receive mail free of charge. The personal clothing of citizens called to regular duty is mailed in postal parcels free of charge.

Article 15. Pension Support and Allowances

Pension support for servicemen after release from the military service is carried out in accordance with the

Ukrainian law "On Pension Support for Servicemen and Workers in the Ukrainian Internal Affairs Organs."

Servicemen, except compulsory service personnel, are paid a monetary allowance in the amount of five-month's salary. Servicemen are paid a monetary allowance for medical treatment, upon the birth of a child, and an allowance for the children of compulsory service personnel and servicemen whose families are below the poverty line in the amount prescribed in Ukrainian legislation.

The military formations of servicemen who are killed or who died while performing military service render aid to their families and parents in carrying out the funeral and reimburse them with material compensation for funeral services and the erection of monuments in the amounts prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministries.

Parents and minor children of servicemen who were killed or who died or are missing while performing their duties, are paid a lump-sum monetary compensation by the government in the amount of the sum of the state insurance for servicemen, taking into account the monetary income coefficient index.

Article 16. State Compulsory Personal Insurance

Servicemen and also men liable for call-up are subject to a compulsory state personal insurance in the event they are killed or die, in the amount of multiples of 100 times the minimum living standard of the population of Ukraine at the time they are killed or die and also in the event they are wounded (contusions, trauma or serious injury), illness received during the conduct of their duties (annual training), in an amount depending on the extent of the lost ability to work, which is determined by a percentage related to the total sum of the insurance in the event they are killed or die.

The terms of the insurance and insurance sum payment procedures to servicemen, to those liable for call-up, and to members of their families is prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministries.

Article 17. Compensation for Injuries

Compensation to servicemen for moral and material damages caused is carried out according to prescribed legislative procedures.

Article 18. Social Guarantees of the Rights of Members of Servicemen's Families

1. Family members of compulsory service personnel have preference in being accepted for work and remaining at work during reductions in the numbers of workers or staff, and also to be first in line for professional training, increasing their skills, and cross-training with absence from work and being paid average wages during the period of education.

2. Wives (husbands) of servicemen, except compulsory service personnel, are paid a monetary allowance,

according to work position, in the amount of the average monthly wage in view of the abrogation of the labor agreement connected with the transfer of the husband (wife) to another duty location. In the event of the temporary, medically certified, loss of the ability to work, wives (husbands) of servicemen are paid the amount of 100 percent of the official rate of pay regardless of the length of the work period.

3. For wives (husbands) of servicemen, except compulsory service personnel, the total length of service required for acquiring an age pension is calculated while considering the period of time they lived with the husband (wife) at locations where it was impossible to work in their specialty, but for no more than 10 years.

4. If they desire, wives (husbands) of servicemen can request their annual vacation at the same time as their husband's (wife's) vacation.

5. Local Soviets of People's Deputies:

—provide priority job placement for the wives of compulsory service personnel in the event they are released as a result of personnel or staff reductions, during the elimination, reorganization or retooling of an enterprise, institution, or organization;

—provide priority placement in children's institutions according to place of residence, to the children of servicemen and the children of servicemen who were killed, or died, or are missing in action while performing military service;

—ensure the resettlement of servicemen who are released into the reserves or into retirement from restricted or remote military garrisons.

6. The widow (widower) of a military serviceman who was killed or who died, and also the wife (husband) of a military serviceman who is missing in action while performing military service, if she (he) has not remarried and her (his) minor children have the right to the benefits prescribed by this law.

7. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministries, local soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, institutions, and organizations may establish other privileges and guarantees for the social protection of servicemen's families.

Section III.

Officials' Responsibilities for Violation of the Law

Article 19. Officials' Responsibility

Officials guilty of violating the legislation on social and legal protection of servicemen and the members of their families bear responsibility in accordance with Ukrainian legislation.

[Signed] Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk
Kiev
December 20, 1991.

Disputed Units Take Ukraine Oath

92UM0574B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Bilan: "The Oath of Loyalty to the People of the Ukraine"]

[Text] The oath of loyalty to the people of the Ukraine is being heard today in garrisons large and small in response to attempts by certain politicians to cast doubts on the Ukraine's right to establish its own armed forces.

Setting aside matters which were not urgent, I visited a number of military units and educational institutions taking the oath of loyalty to the people of the Ukraine. I did this on recent days-off. I cannot refrain from watching over and over again the impressive scene of the formal ceremony, the bearing of beardless 18-year-old soldiers and of 50-year-old generals who have seen the world taking the sacred oath with the same excitement. The political realities of today have given special meaning to the taking of the military oath in the Ukraine. Perhaps never before in our history has it been surrounded by so much controversy, so many disagreements, protests and hints, sometimes bordering on threats.

On the one hand, it should now be clear to everyone that in establishing its own armed forces the Ukraine is exercising its legal right, and in that same legal, civilized way. And all the independent states which made up the Union in the past have given their blessing to that right.

On the other hand, certain ranks both high and low have forgotten their main duty to perform their job in a professional manner and are literally competing in their political fervor, voicing ever more loudly their favorite utterances: "You can't...." "Halt the privatization...." And now the powerful radio waves of the Ostankino transmitters have taken up these voices (I refer to the so-called All-Army Officers' Assembly held in Moscow) and are broadcasting day and night their pathetic imperial ideas about unified and inseparable [forces] or even a single unified and inseparable force, completely unaware that this near-sighted step is being taken against the will of their peoples, which they are committed to serve under the oath, selflessly. And there would be no big danger or problem in the fact that someone says something, but it is not accepted or supported.... The danger (a considerable one), however, lies in the fact that these people who like to talk and gossip are controlled by an invisible but fairly powerful force, which is almost certainly dreaming of new barricades.... Those people vested with the authority to control the extensive military forces should not be blind. They could fall into a skilfully set political trap.

I speak of this with alarm and with optimism.

With alarm, because there are still many such people, and they are joined by just as many who say one thing and do another, those who have taken the oath but

continue in their favorite, do-nothing state. Just what good was the participation by representatives of our Ukrainian districts in the aforementioned officers' assembly? If the purpose was to inform everyone about just what is happening in the Ukraine and its armed forces, we did not see this. We saw harmonious votes for unified and inseparable [forces].

With optimism, because the troops are taking an impressive position today. From Kiev to Odessa and Lvov, in garrisons large and small, enlisted men and officers are coming to attention before their comrades and standing there one-on-one with the oath. They are almost all taking the oath—with awareness and a sense of responsibility. It is being taken by those who just yesterday viewed the trailblazers in the establishment of a Ukrainian military as compromisers and turncoats. God will be the judge of these people if they are abandoning their former views for some sort of mercenary interests.

Regiments, brigades, divisions and armies are taking the oath. District staffs are taking the oath. And this is the best response to all the emotions and questions of those who do not want to accept the realities of earthly life, those who mobilize themselves and others to go to the halls and offices of Moscow in search of the truth.

The navy will also undoubtedly take the oath. We already have an example. Last Saturday the oath of loyalty to the people of the Ukraine was administered to the sailors of a naval training detachment based on Rybalskiy Island in Kiev. Moscow classifies the detachment as a strategic one, and since 26 December it has been listed as directly subordinate to the Main Staff of the Navy (of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]? of Russia?) and sending down through the chain of command the most rigid tseu [not further identified]. The detachment commander is a realist, however. And while the first attempt to take the oath was unsuccessful—Moscow stopped it—this time the commander was unshakable, even when, at the height of the ceremony, he was once again "invited" to the telephone.

The action of the sailors in training is now known to the entire world. On the day they took the oath they were visited by a large group of foreign and Ukrainian journalists—for the first time, by the way. Our colleagues not only looked all they wanted and took pictures with enthusiasm but also spoke to their fill with the sailors, warrant officers and officers, and were able to get a look into the hearts of the seamen. And the petty idea that the latter were being forced to take the oath in the Ukraine burst before their eyes like a soap bubble.

Unfortunately, no one came from Moscow. This was apparently by design, in order to avoid seeing the reality and to make it easier and less embarrassing to insist that we listen to the "demands" put forth at that officers' assembly. And how useful it would have been for them to stand on the parade-ground with those Kiev sailors or to sit in the largest hall at the headquarters of the Kiev Military District and listen to the seamen and generals,

hear the intonation with which they read the military oath of loyalty to the people of the Ukraine.

One other thing. I believe that I have heard a good proposal recently in various military units. It is that the Ukraine hold its own officers' assembly. In order to eliminate all the farce which existed in Moscow and talk seriously about the problems of establishing our own armed forces. In order to demonstrate once and for all our unity with you. This kind of large assembly of the best representatives of our military would indisputably be extremely useful.

When this issue was being readied to go to press, I telephoned Colonel V. Mulyayes, chief of the Social and Psychological Service of the Armed Forces of the Ukraine, and learned with satisfaction that his service had already conducted a quick survey of servicemen on the expediency of holding such an assembly. All of those polled supported the idea.

Ukraine Sets Conversion Goals

92UM0574A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
20 Jan 92 p3

[Report on press-conference by Colonel General K.P. Morozov, minister of defense of the Ukraine]

[Text] "The Ukraine does not need the strategic forces," Colonel General K.P. Morozov, Ukrainian minister of defense, announced at a press-conference for French journalists.

This meeting, in which V.I. Antonov, state minister for the defense complex, and N.I. Mikhachenko, political adviser to the president of the Ukraine, also took part, was conducted in connection with a visit to the Ukraine by Roland Dumas, minister of state for foreign affairs.

The fate of the strategic forces stationed in the Ukraine was the main issue discussed during the hour-long meeting with journalists. Among other things, Colonel General K.P. Morozov stressed the fact that the Ukraine's position on this matter has remained unchanged since the State Independence Act was proclaimed. Furthermore, it was stated unequivocally back in July of 1990 in the Declaration of State Sovereignty that the Ukraine would be a nonnuclear state, would adhere to the three nonnuclear principles.... In October of last year a statement by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine declared the status of nuclear weapons on our territory to be temporary. The Alma-Ata and Minsk agreements brought the Ukraine even closer to its stated goal. The tactical nuclear weapons will be removed from its territory by the middle of this year, the strategic weapons by the end of 1994. Our navy will also be nonnuclear.

And just who is authorized today to make a decision on the use of nuclear weapons? What authority does the Ukraine have with respect to control? In Moscow our French colleagues heard differing statements on the matter.

The truth is that control is in single hands and is exercised, in accordance with the Alma-Ata agreement, by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. At the same time any decision he makes must be coordinated with leaders of the other states of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Today the strategic forces are subordinate to the Commonwealth's main command element. The president of the Ukraine exercises political control over the employment of nuclear weapons and will exercise technical control as well in the near future.

The journalists were provided with abundant information on the Ukraine's military-industrial capability. V.I. Antonov cited figures which were until recently stamped "Secret." Seven hundred plants, design offices and institutes work for defense. They employ no more and no less than 1.2 million people. Their production volume amounts to 32 billion rubles, with military equipment accounting for 38%.

This year 11 billion rubles is being allocated for carrying out the conversion: the retraining of engineers and workers for the production of civilian products and a very slight retooling. The Ukraine hopes to receive help from abroad. Among other things, it would be advantageous for us and French entrepreneurs to set up the production of rail cars and diesel engines for all types of motor vehicles at the production facilities freed.

During the press-conference the French journalists received answers to questions pertaining to the taking of the military oath, the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, the sale of military equipment....

Ukraine Creates Military Counterintelligence

92UM0574C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by A. Volovodenko: "The Military Counterintelligence Directorate of the Ukraine's National Security Service Has Been Established in the Interest of the State"]

[Text] A conference of leaders of the Military Counterintelligence Directorate and representatives of former special departments of the USSR KGB located in the Ukraine and now subordinate to the SNBU [National Security Service of the Ukraine] was held in the National Security Service of the Ukraine. This directorate was established for the first time in the history of the Ukraine for purposes of providing counterintelligence support for the Ukrainian armed forces, the National Guard and Border Troops of the Ukraine, troops which are a part of the Strategic Armed Forces and other military formations stationed in the Ukraine, as well as government communication troops.

During the conference the fact was stressed that military counterintelligence, which, like the armed forces, is an important tool for protecting the sovereignty of our young independent state, is being established on a solid

legal basis in accordance with laws passed by and under the guidance of the Ukrainian parliament.

A report was presented to the conference participants by Colonel General K. Morozov, Ukrainian minister of defense. He discussed the concept underlying the development of the Ukrainian armed forces in detail and expressed his recommendations for ensuring state security, showing himself to be, in the opinion of the specialists, a man with a thorough grasp of this matter. He not only described his vision of the missions which military counterintelligence will have to perform but also touched upon the problem of its special provision with workers. After that he answered a large number of questions troubling the servicemen today.

In his address, Colonel A. Skipalskiy, chief of the Military Counterintelligence Directorate of the SNBU, focused attention on the forthcoming reorganization of existing structures of the former special departments of the USSR KGB stationed in the Ukraine and now subordinate to the new directorate, which will operate to protect our young Ukrainian state. This is not the same counterintelligence which formerly spent half its time and effort carrying out social orders from someone. This is a legal institution, which will operate to strengthen the Ukrainian armed forces and the state, serve the people and protect human rights by performing its specific missions.

During the conference the thought was expressed that someone today is artificially heating up the situation in the forces and the society as a whole concerning the military oath of loyalty to the people of the Ukraine, and rumors and conjectures are being spread.

The objective information frequently does not reach the personnel, nor does a large number of documents and laws pertaining to military organizational development in the Ukraine and social security for the servicemen. Judging from this certain commanders are taking an incomprehensible position, to put it mildly, which borders on the violation of existing national laws, specifically when it has to do with the territorial integrity of the Ukraine.

At this point something should be said about the biased coverage of events in the Ukraine in the central mass media. One need only mention the way the mass-meeting with an alleged 20,000 people on Nakhimov Square in Sevastopol was written up in "poetry and color," when no more than 1,000 people along with passers-by actually took part.

At the conclusion of the conference the participants were assigned tasks for stabilizing the situation locally and performing explanatory work in connection with this.

The military counterintelligence officers were also addressed by Colonel V. Martirosyan, chairman of the newly formed Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine.

Ukrainian Head of Military Commission Interviewed

92UM0503A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA
in Ukrainian 24 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Chairman, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Commission on Problems of Defense and State Security, Lieutenant-General V.V. Durdinets: "From Law to Practical Actions"; the interview was prepared by P. Dotsenko; first paragraph is NARODNAYA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] Not even a year has passed since the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Commission on Problems of Defense and State Security has begun its work, but today one does have a lot to say about results of its work. We asked the Commission Chairman, Lieutenant-General V.V. Durdinets to answer a number of urgent questions of interest to the Ukrainian public.

[Dotsenko] Vasyl Vasylyovych, first of all we would like to learn about the input made by Commission members to preparation of legislative acts of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on problems in the military field that have formed the legal base for creating the Ukrainian Armed Forces and solving other problems of military.

[Durdinets] As you remember, as early as in the 'Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine' of July 16, 1990 it was stated that Ukraine has the right to have its own Armed Forces. Since then, one has been working persistently and steadfastly on approaches to solving this extremely important problem. The life has prompted that there must be a permanent Supreme Soviet Commission that could fully concentrate on this problem. Thus, a Commission on External and Internal Security had been created, and later it acquired a more accurate and clear direction—problems of defense and state security. So, as of April of 1991 27 Ukrainian Deputies formed the Commission and had begun a draft preparatory work on creating a legal base for organization of Ukraine's own Armed Forces, National Guard and Border Guard.

First of all we determined that our approach had to be weighed and reasonable, and that it should be based on comprehensively taking into account existing realities and on the sense of responsibility. In other words, we agreed on which bills had to be prepared at all, which ones could form the first package of laws and which ones would form the second package. We set up working groups, which included highly qualified specialists, for preliminary preparation of the bills. The groups are headed by People's Deputies. All drafts were discussed—repeatedly, fervently and with a high degree of interest—at Commission meetings. The Commission was also taking into account suggestions and wishes of members of other Commissions, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and appropriate Ministries and agencies, as well as media publications, voters' suggestions and numerous letters the Commission is receiving from military personnel and workers. The Commission also had fairly

fruitful contacts with numerous social organizations, particularly with the Ukrainian Officers Union and Committee of the Organization of Ukrainian Soldiers' Mothers. We are grateful to all of them for their participation in the legislative work.

As a result, during a short period in time drafts of six laws and 20 resolutions had been presented to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet for consideration. All of them were passed. In addition, we were also preparing drafts of resolutions and decrees of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the Parliament Chairman orders on guaranteeing defense and state security etc., 70 documents all in all.

[Dotsenko] It would probably be expedient for you to comment, at least in a theses form, on the first package of laws in the military field that have been already passed by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

[Durdinets] First of all, the package includes the Concept of Defense and Organizational Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which was approved at the session on October 11 of last year. In our opinion, the concept takes into account the current sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation and Ukraine's interstate relations, and it envisages steadfast and consistent implementation of one of the most important principles of its state sovereignty, according to which Ukraine is striving to become in the future a neutral non-aligned nuclear-free state that maintains mutually acceptable levels of arms, armed forces and military activity. The concept envisages building the Ukrainian Armed Forces based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency, both in terms of their size and structure and in terms of armaments, and stage-by-stage reduction and steadfast reform of troops located in its territory. In other words, one is not talking about creating parallel, additional forces. Undergoing reforms (aimed at reducing their size) are existing structures. I stress this, because sometimes one encounters, especially in the press, misunderstandings and even fabrications about this matter.

In addition to the concept, the first package of legislative acts on military problems includes six Ukrainian laws - "On Defense of Ukraine", "On the Ukrainian Armed Forces", "On Social and Legal Protection of Service Personnel and Their Families", "On the Ukrainian National Guard", "On the Ukrainian State Border" and "On the Ukrainian Border Guard".

The laws that have been passed determine clearly for what Ukraine needs its own Armed Forces —to protect its independence, territorial integrity and inviolability and the rights and freedoms of our people. Our ideas about the role of the Armed Forces are based on the fact that an army is a dependable guarantor of Ukraine's security and an indispensable tool of any sovereign state.

The Law "On Ukrainian Defense" is an extremely important document. It states with the maximum possible clarity that Ukraine strives for peaceful coexistence with all

states, does not accept war as a means for solving international problems, aspires to neutrality and adhering to nuclear-free principles, does not have territorial claims against any state and does not see any people as its enemy, and that it will never start a military action against any country unless it becomes an object of aggression. The Law "On the Ukrainian Armed Forces" indicates that they are being built and act based on democracy and humanism, the supremacy of law, accountability to constitutional bodies of legislative and executive power, one-man management and collective preparation of decisions, universal military service of Ukrainian citizens, voluntary enrollment for regular military service, adherence to military discipline, and guaranteed social and legal protection of military personnel.

In late December of 1991 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed a Law "On Social and Legal Protection of Military Personnel and Their Families". The Law is a logical extension of the two above mentioned legislative acts. It thoroughly delineates military personnel's rights related to their service and financial provisions, and includes specific details on work time and rest and vacation time, health care, and providing living quarters for military personnel and their families; it also defines privileges in terms of transportation fares, baggage shipment and mail, as well as taxation. An important place is devoted in the Law to problems of pensions, mandatory personal state insurance and social guarantees of rights of military personnel's families.

All in all, not only the Law affirms the privileges servicemen used to have under the legislation of the former Union, but it also goes much further in a number of aspects. It has been published, so all military personnel and all Ukrainian citizens have the opportunity to ascertain this.

Two other Laws, "On the Ukrainian State Border" and "On the Ukrainian Border Guard"—have secured Ukraine's right to its borders and make it possible to directly negotiate border problems with East European States. They have created conditions for considering problems related to legalizing borders with Belarus, Russia, Moldova and giving them the status of state borders. These legislative acts make it possible for the Border Guard to continue protecting the border in accordance with previously existing procedures, while the Supreme Soviet and Cabinet of Ministers are working on creating appropriate legislative normative acts that would regulate border protection and Ukraine's relations with neighboring countries on border problems. But these will be mostly interstate treaties and agreements.

To this I can add that as early as in August of 1991 Ukraine made a decision to take under its jurisdiction the Border Guard located in its territory and stated that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet would determine the optimum size of the Border Guard in a near future. The State Committee on Protection of the Ukrainian State Border was created. It is headed by the Border Guard

Commander Lieutenant General Gubenko. I cannot but note Valeriy Oleksandrovych's active and clear of purpose work in this high-responsibility position.

The Law "On the Ukrainian National Guard" provided a legal basis for creating an armed body on the basis of internal troops. This body is charged with the duty to guard Ukraine's constitutional order, territorial integrity etc. Today the Guard does really exist, its ranks are increasing by the day, and its personnel is being trained.

So, to sum it up, versatile work on preparation of legislative acts has been accomplished; it is aimed at strengthening and building up Ukraine's statehood. Today it switches to a practical plane—from a law to real actions.

[Dotsenko] You have combined the above laws into the first package of legislative acts. One should surmise that there will probably be the second package...

[Durdinets] Yes. The Commission on Problems of Defense and State Security, in cooperation with specialists from interested Ministries and agencies and with social organizations is working in a persistent and focused manner on the second package of legislative acts regarding military problems. The package is practically ready. It includes bills on universal military service, pensions for military personnel and personnel of Ukraine's internal affairs bodies, the status of troops located in Ukrainian territory (I am talking of Strategic Forces), the Ukrainian National Security Service, conversion of the defense industry, and civil defense. Drafts of legislative acts on rights and duties of personnel of the Ukrainian National Guard, the structure and size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Border Guard, on bodies for government and coded communications etc. are being prepared. And the draft of Ukraine's military doctrine is ready.

Even this concise list shows the large number of urgent problems the Commission must solve. By the way, all this must be accomplished within a rigid and extremely short time frame. The thing is, today's tense life demands that both the Commission and Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers members, and particularly the Ministry of Defense and the Border Guard and National Guard High Command respond to daily problems without delay, thoughtfully and in a timely manner.

[Dotsenko] Not only the laws that have passed, as well as future laws, will form the legal foundation for creation and functioning of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military units, but they will also provide the foundation of the military policy. Could you define its main points?

[Durdinets] This is true. First of all, it has been affirmed legislatively that Ukraine will never allow the use of Armed forces, National Guard and other military units against the Ukrainian people or peoples of other sovereign states, nor for solving internal or international conflicts and that it has the only humane goal—to ensure peace and tranquility in its territory. By the way, this is also clearly

reflected in Ukraine's military doctrine, of which I have already talked. It will also be considered in the nearest future by the upcoming session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Second of all, being a sovereign state, Ukraine will now decide independently all problems of its defense and security, including consistent development of the concept of war prevention, and ensure the security of its state by means of nuclear containment and maintaining the optimum size of conventional Armed Forces.

Thirdly, Ukraine has affirmed legislatively and is confirming practically that it is gradually implementing its intention to obtain in the future the status of a neutral nuclear-free state that does not participate in military alliances and adheres to well-known non-nuclear principles.

Fourthly, Ukraine recognizes and respects the territorial integrity of neighboring independent states within the existing borders and considers illegal any attempts to change the borders unilaterally.

[Dotsenko] There were a lot of conjectures in the press on the possible size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces - from 90 thousand to 420 thousand, and some people are even talking about a half-million strong army. This generates various interpretations, especially in the West, and even in the former central press and on TV one can hear and see anything...

[Durdinets] In my opinion, any talk about the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is premature. Why? First of all, because the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has not yet made a decision in this matter, and that is its jurisdiction. Secondly, the process of reforming military units located in Ukraine will proceed stage-by-stage and, of course, in the direction of its reduction. Thirdly, one still has, based on the principle of defense sufficiency, to weigh diligently and thoroughly all factors—available resources, the demand and the situation—and, of course, one should not forget that behind all this is the fate of real people that have linked their lives to military service. I shall also remind you that Ukraine has confirmed its readiness to observe international obligations, particularly those pertaining to conventional armed forces in Europe.

So, we intend to act with consideration and without haste, and clearly and steadfastly adhere to documents adopted by the parliament, taking into account the entire complex of existing problems. And as far as the conjectures are concerned, let them remain on the conscience of those who spread them.

[Dotsenko] One more question. The start of the first stage of practical creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has not been simple. The mood in the military is ambiguous, and former central media have published openly counter-active materials; certain politicians, including the highest ranking ones, have not refrained from sharp statements.

How do you assess the situation that is forming around Ukraine's intention to have its own Armed Forces?

[Durdinets] Your question is extremely topical. Indeed, recently one has been groundlessly building up the tension and misinformation of broad public in regard to Ukraine's implementation of its right to create its own Armed Forces. Special indignation is caused by incorrect and I would say pert tone of statements of certain high-ranking military leaders, Russia's state and public figures and journalists that appear in Moscow's media. One can see from their speeches and statements that they do not know the real situation in Ukraine, nor do they want to know anything about Ukraine's legal approach to solving all military problems.

And as far as the situation is concerned, I would like to stress several moments. An independent Ukraine is now a real historic fact, and painful efforts of people with yesterday's thinking to ignore it are doomed to failure. The process of creating the Ukrainian Armed Forces has now become irreversible. It is backed by the will of the people expressed during the All-Ukrainian referendum, and a broad legal base on problems of military building has been prepared (incidentally, none of the former Republics of the former Union has worked out these problems yet).

So the noise and prejudiced interpretations of Ukraine's position in the media of the former center are absolutely groundless and futile. They cannot stop this cause, and in the end they are not beneficial to future interstate relations that must be developed. Secondly, the problem has its internal social, political, economic, legal and moral aspects. We see them and are solving them steadfastly. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has been created. It is headed by an energetic and persistent Colonel General K.P. Morozov. The Ukrainian Parliament and President made a decision on practical organization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces based on troops of the Kiev, Odessa and Subcarpathian Military Districts, Black Sea Fleet units and other military units located on Ukrainian territory, with the exception of troops that will be included, in accordance with the agreed procedures, in Strategic Forces. This is done perfectly legally, based in particular on agreements on Armed Forces, the Border Guard and Strategic Forces that were signed in Alma-Ata, Minsk and Moscow in meetings of leaders of independent Commonwealth member states.

Taking the military oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people, whose text was approved by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, has begun. It proceeds in accordance with provisional rules on taking the oath of allegiance. Of course, there are certain problems. First of all they are due to the fact that this process has just begun, and a lot of servicemen have not been sufficiently familiarized with Ukraine's legislative acts on military problems and have not clarified for themselves certain everyday problems. In my opinion, all this will fall into place in the nearest future. And one should not overdramatize the

situation. So much the more that the problem was solved on January 16 in Moscow by CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] leaders. Appropriate documents were adopted.

Why am I so optimistic? My optimism is based on the fact that the process of creating a legal basis on military matters is going on actively. Thus, recently new bills were published in the press—"On the Universal Military Service" and "On Pensions for the Military Personnel and Personnel of Ukrainian Internal Affairs Bodies". They will be thoroughly discussed at the next session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. And even a superficial knowledge of these bills answers numerous questions that worry servicemen. Urgent problems are explained clearly in the Ukrainian President's Address to the military personnel serving in and outside Ukrainian territory. He stated unambiguously that the Ukrainian state guarantees servicemen's civil rights and freedoms, their basic rights related to their military service, material and financial support in amounts that encourage the interest of Ukrainian citizens in doing military service.

And the problem has another side too—servicemen's letters, applications and requests that are coming to our Commission and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense from everywhere. There are not dozens and not hundreds, but thousands of them. They express the burning desire of uniformed people to serve the Ukrainian people. This is also attested to by the Appeal of participants of the All-Ukrainian Meeting on Problems of Building the Ukrainian Armed Forces that was approved on January 9. In the first two weeks already about 240 thousand servicemen took the oath of allegiance to the people. The oath of allegiance was taken in an organized and solemn manner in units of the Ukrainian National Guard and Ukrainian Border Guard. So today the Ukrainian Armed Forces are being really born, and nothing can stop this process.

[Dotsenko] And the last question. Recently an All-Army Officer Meeting took place in Moscow. And well-known tunes were heard there again...

[Durdinets] This is true indeed. We are again being called to accept some transitional period and a common defense space, and to wait for the start of a military reform. They suggest that we wait for final decisions by leaders of the Commonwealth member countries, have joint Armed Forces with a joint high command, have the text of a common oath of allegiance for CIS troops, and there are a lot of other suggestions from the well-known old but in a new verbal frame.

With regard to this I want to state authoritatively: the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and President presented Ukraine's position on problems of military building in a reasoned, weighed and consistent manner and they will steadfastly adhere to this position. We have a more than sufficient legal basis on military problems, and we reject any accusations that we lack it, as we reject any attempt to build up tensions around the fact that Ukraine wants

to have its own Armed Forces, National Guard and Border Guard to guard its sovereignty. After all, this is pure interference into internal affairs of a sovereign state. It is time to understand this.

I am appealing to the command personnel and all servicemen of military units located on Ukrainian territory to display during these complicated times their restraint and understanding of processes that are taking place, maintain calmness, order and military discipline, and perform their service honestly and conscientiously. We hope that by joint effort we shall make everything necessary so that the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military units provided for by Ukrainian legislation proceeds in an organized and weighed manner and under normal conditions and that social peace and public harmony will be assured in Ukraine. The Ukrainian people will never forgive us if the normal rhythm of people's life is disturbed and blood is shed in Ukraine.

To sum up our conversation, I would like to stress once more that Ukraine is creating its own Armed Forces without any haste, step-by-step and on a legal basis, based on its needs as an independent sovereign state and a subject of international law. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's Commission on Problems of Defense and State Security makes its contribution to this extremely important cause. Our position is that not only should the Commission work on developing legislation, but it also should directly participate in practical work on its implementation, because at the current stage this is of principle importance for the fastest implementation of its provisions. I am accentuating attention on the fact that Ukraine's public often expresses its dissatisfaction with the situation whereas laws are being adopted but their implementation is not enforced. This is not a substitute for the executive power, but rather the desire to actively help the functioning of legislation during these complicated and crucial times. Incidentally, all strata of the population—working collectives, military personnel, the youth, veterans, fathers and mothers, and social organizations—express interest in Commission's activities. Figuratively speaking, the door does not close. We are trying to give clear explanations to all appeals, requests and applications and want to help and inspire people's trust, because we consider this to be one of our main duties.

This is in a nutshell what our Commission lives by and works on.

Officers Seek Posts in Ukraine

92UM0598A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
30 Jan 92 p 2

[Unattributed letter under rubric "Letters of These Days": "The Officers Travel and Travel..."]

[Text] In the morning as I was taking the trolley-bus to the press service a major of Internal Security Forces, excusing himself, addressed me:

"Can you tell me, please, how to get to the headquarters of the Ukraine National Guard?"

"I am going that way..."

We struck up a conversation. My companion turned out to be an officer who had arrived in Kiev from Western Siberia, where he has served for many years. He is Russian, born in Ternopol Oblast. Learning of the formation of the National Guard in Ukraine, he decided to serve in it although he has a good apartment and a position that satisfies him in Siberia.

Soon, on arriving at the headquarters, my companion joined a large group of officers awaiting reception in the Cadres Department. They had arrived from various places of the former Union. I had occasion to chat with some of them. Here is what Captain 3rd Rank S. Radkevich, an instructor of the Faculty of Physical Training of the Kiev Higher Naval School, said:

"I am waiting for an apartment for the fourth year now. Evidently the school will be disbanded and so I decided to seek a new duty station. I am sure that I will be of much benefit to the Ukraine National Guard if I am entrusted with conducting physical training with personnel..."

Lieutenant Eduard Danilenko, who was born in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, arrived from Baku. In four years he had managed to be in Sumgait and Nagornyy Karabakh and now serves in an armed prisoner escort regiment where all officers are Ukrainians. Many of them submitted requests for entering the National Guard. He said that some decided to remain on duty in Azerbaijan because they do not wish to part with their apartments.

Lieutenant Sergey Panin, a graduate of the Kiev Higher Combined-Arms School, also arrived from Baku, and he also hopes that the cadres people will satisfy his request for assignment to the Ukraine National Guard.

That day dozens of officers were at the reception in the cadres department. Those who were thoroughly trained and capable of performing the difficult, responsible duties with dignity and honor were given the "okay" for service in the Guard.

Ukrainian Military Units Face Energy Crisis

92UM0598B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
30 Jan 92 p 2

[Letter by Senior Sergeant I. Krol, LVIK [expansion not given] student on tour of duty in line unit, under rubric "Letters of These Days": "Dark and Hungry..."]

[Text] Colonel G. Strelnikov, commander of a Ukrainian National Guard unit, has more than enough concerns and troubles. Then recently one more problem fell on his shoulders: the Kiev tank farm stopped delivering fuel and motor transport was laid up, as they say. But without it, how is it possible to perform missions of protecting public order?

Then came one more "surprise"—the Kiyevenergo [expansion not given] administration demanded a 30-percent reduction in electric power consumption. While the problem of gasoline had a negative effect on patrol activities, this other problem substantially affected conditions of the servicemen's life and routine. It became half-dark in the barracks.

The picture is especially miserable at the regimental training facility, where enlisted men recently called up for service are located. The supply of electricity is switched off for two hours each day at 1900 hours. As a result there is total darkness in the sleeping spaces and soldiers are forced to take meals in the mess hall by the light of kerosene lamps and candles. Is it worth mentioning about holding classes under those conditions or viewing television broadcasts? And a letter cannot be written without light.

And this is not all. For more than a month now the guardsmen have not been receiving allowances of fish authorized under the standard ration for their already meager board although, as it became known, there is sufficient fish in the depots. The question turns on payment.

It is also something similar with the meat supply. It comes from the Darnitskiy Meat Combine with interruptions, and prices also are at fault for this.

In short, it is not easy for the guardsmen to serve in the presence of those and certain other problems. Aware of their honorable duty, however, they are performing their obligations conscientiously. One would like to believe that the leadership of the capital of Ukraine will heed the guardsmen's objective requests and will respond to them with specific measures.

Ukraine Railroad Troops Commander Interviewed
92UM0600A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
30 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Major-General Valentin Vladimirovich Mikhaylichenko, chief of Railroad Troops, chief of Railroad Troops Directorate, Ukraine Ministry of Defense, on occasion of assuming new position; date and place not specified; by Major A. Korchinskiy under rubric "First Interview in New Position": "Steel Lads on the Steel Lines"]

[Text] Since early January the Railroad Troops have been part of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. How necessary are they to our state? What will they be doing? Our conversation with Major-General V. Mikhaylichenko, chief of Railroad Troops, chief of Railroad Troops Directorate, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, began with these questions.

[Mikhaylichenko] Such troops unquestionably are necessary to Ukraine. People in the Supreme Council, Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry of Defense realize this well and so they give us comprehensive help in establishing

appropriate structures. Of course, our troops are not being built on an empty spot. Units and subunits of the former Union's Railroad Troops comprise their basis.

Soldiers of the steel lines stationed on Republic territory brought the Ukraine no small amount of benefit for many years. Construction and installation work worth almost a billion rubles was performed and more than 4,500 km of various railroads were placed in operation in the postwar period. More than once the soldiers came to the help of the populace under emergency conditions, such as during floods in Lvov Oblast and Khmelnitskiy Oblast. Many took an active part in mopping up in the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Subunits began working in the danger zone on 16 May 1986. Fifty three kilometers of railroad tracks were built by the efforts of almost 3,000 persons, of whom 425 worked right next to the demolished reactor.

But those are all past affairs. Today both the structure and, most important, the missions of the troops are changing substantially. Previously they basically performed so-called practical training work or, simply speaking, they built various installations. They engaged in combat training only two months a year. The rest of the time they erected bridges and buildings and laid tracks. It was believed that the soldiers thereby were strengthening their specialized skills. There was of course a rational kernel in this, but one saw a clear skew to the detriment of combat as well as professional training. Now we will work in a full-fledged manner all the winter period, and only in summer will we go into the field to reinforce knowledge in practice. In so doing we naturally will not build "Potemkin villages," but installations needed by Ukraine. And in upgrading the troop structure subsequently we intend to place even greater emphasis specifically on the soldiers' combat training.

[Korchinskiy] Valentin Vladimirovich, what does combat training in the Railroad Troops mean? It is no secret that at times they are identified with construction units, where there are no weapons. What do they do in training hours?

[Mikhaylichenko] In fact our soldiers are armed, and that is one distinction, but not the most essential one between railroad and construction units. The important thing is determined by the troops' purpose itself, which is restoration, obstruction, route and facility repair, security and defense of railroad installations in a theater of combat operations. New construction of course also is not excluded. Like any others, our troops are established in peacetime for operations under combat conditions. Ukraine is a peaceable state, but one must keep the powder dry... In addition to combined-arms disciplines, combat training of railroad soldiers also includes activities in one of the specialties. We have dozens of them: railway engineers, bridgebuilders, communicators, drivers, pontonmen. Training in well equipped classrooms with subsequent reinforcement of what has been covered in specialized tactical drills is a good school for military railroaders.

Specialized training involves certain difficulties, and not just because we have begun to give it more attention. The fact is that training subunits located outside Ukraine previously trained a number of specialists for us. The situation has changed, and now we ourselves are putting together the instructor personnel and establishing a training facility. So the time is not far off when we ourselves will teach young men the trades of diesel locomotive engineer, track machine operator, ponton-bridgeman and others.

[Korchinskiy] What other difficulties will military rail-roaders of Ukraine encounter? Knowing the state of the economy, I will anticipate the answer: it will be difficult with financing and providing everything necessary...

[Mikhaylichenko] With respect to financing, nothing generates concern here. The government of Ukraine allocated a sufficient amount to us through the Ministry of Defense budget, and a portion of it already has been received. True, prices on everything are going up... But providing supplies to troops for organizing the training process and for practical work leaves much to be desired for now, to put it mildly. We did succeed in placing some requisitions through the Ministry of Economics, but this is little. They have a benevolent attitude toward us and are trying to help, but... Economic ties are destroyed and previous economic mechanisms are not functioning. For example, Ukraine's requirement for ties consists of 2.5 million, but it is possible to receive only a million for now, and it is that way for many situations.

The question is especially acute with supplying repair enterprises of Railroad Troops situated on the territory of Ukraine. Some time ago they were directly subordinate to Moscow. Today they are in a difficult spot, since they are not being supplied either from Kiev or from the former center. We are working on solving this problem, but not everything depends on us.

There also are examples of another sort indicating creative business cooperation of railroad specialists of Ukraine and Russia as well as of western firms. For example, an original technical idea originated at a Ukrainian military enterprise which caught the interest of the Russian Transportnyy stroitel Corporation and French engineers. Each will do his bit for the cause and we hope that a multipurpose railroad machine of a new design will be ready in the not-too-distant future. There is no question that our troops also will begin to be outfitted with such equipment...

[Korchinskiy] Who serves in them today? And in connection with this, how is the oath of allegiance taken to people of Ukraine?

[Mikhaylichenko] I will begin by answering the second question. The oath was taken in an organized manner by the overwhelming majority of personnel. I will say for example that except for those being discharged to the reserve, only six officers in one of the large garrisons did not wish to swear an oath of allegiance to Ukraine, since

they are natives of other places and wish to be transferred to serve there. Their position is fully explainable. It is the very same picture among first-term soldiers. True, several believers, Baptists, refused to take the military oath. Evidently it is necessary for the Law on Alternative Service to begin to function as quickly as possible.

Young people from various regions are in our Troops, but the majority nevertheless are from Ukraine. Questions about the oath naturally did not arise for them. And new replacements were called up only by Republic military commissariats. They all took an oath to their state but, knowing little about the Railroad Troops, they picture future service with some apprehension. Taking advantage of the occasion, I wish to address them and those yet to be called up: service in Ukraine's Railroad Troops not only is honorable and responsible, but also will be of personal benefit to you. In addition to Army conditioning you will acquire one or even several specialties needed everywhere, you will be able to become a welder or driver, truck crane operator or diesel locomotive engineer, and you will learn to build tracks and bridges... There is a rather wide choice, and professional officers will help you make it. In gaining knowledge and skills, you will reinforce them by performing practical tasks on Ukraine's railroads. This is needed by our Motherland.

Ukraine Troops to Remove Insignia

92UM0537A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel S. Dneprov, under the rubric: "From Lvov": "Before Removing the Letters 'SA' from your Shoulder Boards, You need to Moisten them with Acetone..."]

[Text] Officials from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense have developed a special technology for removing the letters 'SA' from the shoulder boards of compulsory service personnel. Special instructions have been sent to each Ukrainian army subunit. This technology is simple and accessible to servicemen. Essentially, it consists of the following: before removing the letters, you need to moisten them with acetone beforehand. You can remove the letters using a mechanical process 3-4 minutes after the treatment. After this, loosen up the shoulder boards with a needle or wire brush and iron them.

Let no one be surprised if the pungent odor of acetone is noticeable at military units deployed on the territory of Ukraine in the near future.

BELARUS

Belarus President Meets with MD Officers

92UM0580A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA Parliamentary Correspondent S. Ivanova: "The Army... How Do We Divide It?"]

[Text] And there is no end to these critical problems. One does not have time to "ripen," then another one pops up that is even more critical than the previous one.

Not unlike last year, if we did not give in, we at least learned to live with the fact that we are being strewn around like bank notes in a purse and, in the morning we approach the store shelves with their new prices and we discover that we are no longer carrying any money—kopeks.

Against our will, "we have become accustomed" to both geography, history and the study of place names; for the second year we learn anew the borders and names of new states on the map of a former great power, one sixth of the earth, which our forefathers zealously assembled over the centuries. It was and is no longer a power. There was the history of a centuries-old state and its peoples. Now each of them is once again writing in its mother tongue and is primarily concerned with its own national interests... Can this history be better or more truthful than the previous history? All the same, we really cannot cross ourselves against the past; it is impossible to either forget or redo it...

Now the stormy whirlwind of change has seized the once united Soviet Army of a once united Union. How do we divide it—that is the main question which the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States are currently deciding. How to divide a "man with a rifle" or, in the more modern sense, a "man near the nuclear button"? According to what principle do we do this, according to territorial, i.e., according to troop deployment locations, according to the serviceman's nationality, or according to the principle of parity of military potentials of each independent state of the Commonwealth? Who will now maintain the "invincible and legendary," feed, clothe, provide boots, equip, and socially protect servicemen and their families, and care for those who have retired?

There they are, the far from fully outlined borders of the "military" question which today has moved other issues into the background. Especially after Ukraine decided to administer a loyalty oath to the republic's yellow-azure flag to all Soviet Army troop formations on their territory, including the Black Sea Fleet which has been Russian since time immemorial.

That is why Belarussian Supreme Soviet Chairman S.S. Shushkevich's meetings at Marinaya Gorka with the officers from a Belarussian Military District directorate and the Minsk garrison, and with the soldiers of the celebrated Irkutsk-Pinsk Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet were so urgent. As I now understand it, S.S. Shushkevich needed to feel the pulse of army life these days, catch the nuances in the moods of the soldiers, officers and warrant officers and find out what worries them and their families most of all in the current unusual situation.

On January 8, after his morning meeting with the officers at the Belarussian Military District Staff, S.S.

Shushkevich and Military District Commander General Kostenko arrived at the Division which had already been located on Belarussian soil for a year.

The words that S.S. Shushkevich addressed to the troops now serving in this celebrated Soviet Army division were hardly an exaggeration—that here he had met true army intellectuals, people who were tempered, well-educated, and who, having once sworn loyalty to the fatherland and to the people, honorably perform their military duties. While answering the main question that troubles the division's troops—will it be disbanded—the Supreme Soviet chairman answered firmly, "No. You will not be disbanded. Or you will have another Supreme Soviet Chairman." Many questions were asked both in the soldier's barracks and in the officer's club. For example, like these. Will the term of service in the army in Belarus be changed (to 18 months, S.I.)? When and to whom will the young compulsory service soldiers swear? What steps is the Belarussian Republic planning to take for the social protection of servicemen's families? What will the Belarus Army and National Guard be like? What can they expect from the draft military reform that is being prepared? What will be the amount of the military pension? Soldiers serving in Belarus will be considered citizens of which state?

It seemed to me that tension left the hall, mistrust melted away, hope was renewed and the circle of questions under discussion was expanded as S.S. Shushkevich spoke frankly and thoughtfully with the audience, while answering all direct questions and while inviting a comparison of the soldiers' situation with the difficulties in the republic's economy, with the civil population's destitution and with the clump of unresolved problems that were inherited from the former Union. And here already in the hall, the talk was about grand policy and the "ailing" economy. On how to structure the republic's economy to make it less vulnerable and less dependent on the outside monopoly, on why Belarus does not want to introduce its own currency for the time being, and how to protect the population, including the military, from price liberalization and from today's "market" where speculators are currently feeding. "Your adversary will not be greater than that of the civilian population," S.S. Shushkevich assured the soldiers. "We will revive the economy and we will also solve your problems."

It seemed to me that the soldiers related with understanding to the Belarussian Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman's opinion on the future of the army formations that are located on republic territory. "We inherited everything that we have today in Belarus," Stanislav Stanislavovich stressed. "They did not ask us when they deployed strategic and border troops and conventional weapons near the western border of the USSR. As a result, there are more than twice as many servicemen in the Belarussian republic as compared to any other republic of the former Union. The Belarussian Republic State does not need this enormous army," S.S. Shushkevich noted. "In the Belarussian Republic's declaration of sovereignty, we proclaimed that we wish to become a

neutral state, a nuclear-free zone, and a zone of stability in Eastern Europe. That means that we will have to reduce the army, but how? To simply drive it away, as it is already being rumored? And who will be driven away? Those who have been true to the oath and to the people?" The Supreme Soviet chairman assured the soldiers that only foolish and shortsighted politicians could think of such "solutions" to the military question and that already today the leaders of the Belarussian and Russian states, working together, must find an acceptable and rational alternative to maintain the army's combat capabilities, its phased and gradual reduction in the future, and its adequate technical and logistics support. The business of soldiers is to perform their duties and the business of politicians and states is to provide them with everything necessary and to resolve questions in favor of the people—that is approximately how one can summarize the leitmotif of S.S. Shushkevich's speech at Marinaya Gorka and at the Military District Staff.

I do not rule out that S.S. Shushkevich proposed placing an additional question, the military question, on the agenda while opening the Belarussian Republic Supreme Soviet session on January 9, largely due to the influence of these two meetings with the soldiers. The deputies supported their chairman. And hearings on that theme were announced in the Supreme Soviet yesterday. The highest organ of the state authority is faced with developing a military doctrine, deciding what kind of army the Belarussian army will be, and determining the republic's military policy in the future.

We will find out what these decisions will be a little later. But for the time being soldiers who are serving on the territory of the Belarussian Republic can be calm: the Supreme Soviet and its chairman will not offend the army. They will undertake everything so that the people's army remains true to its people and steadfastly defends their interests.

Belarus OSTO Lacks Training Funds

91UM0553A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 4 Feb 92 p 2

[ITAR-TASS article from Minsk: "People Are Working for Nothing..."]

[Text] Authorized personnel of Republic of Belarus Defense Society schools which train specialists for the Armed Forces essentially were left without pay in January. This was announced by OSTO [Defense Sports-Technical Organization] Chairman Major-General Petr Maksimov during a meeting with journalists. Financing ceased with the abolishment of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was paying for training cadres for Union needs, although former DOSAAF centers continue to train military drivers and other specialists in accordance with previously agreed upon plans and allocations. A solution still is being found for now in transferring funds at the expense of other Society subunits, but their

capacities are not unlimited. An ideal version of a solution to this and other problems is seen here in establishing unified Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, but for now the politicians have not arrived at a common opinion. Effective methods for entering into market structures are being worked out urgently in organizations of the Belarussian OSTO.

Land in Belarus Transferred From Military for Housing Construction

92UM0553B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Feb 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "We Will Beat the Swords Into Plowshares, With Which We Will Plow the Test Ranges"]

[Text] The taboo which protected lands belonging to the military department on the territory of Belarus for long years has been removed. Sections of land with an overall area of almost 20,000 hectares used by the former USSR Ministry of Defense have been transferred to local authorities. The latter have been charged with using this land for housing construction and personal subsidiary farms.

BALTIC STATES

Poor Health of Lithuanian Troops Noted

92UM0543A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Feb 92 p 2

[Article from Vilnius by Captain 2d Rank V. Ivanov: "Every Other Person in the Lithuanian Special Forces Is Ill; It Remains To Sympathize With Their Commanders"]

[Text] A rapid reaction brigade which has been named "Gelezinis Vilkas" has been established in the Lithuanian Ministry of Territorial Security. Judging from a recent item in the newspaper LETUVOS RITAS, there are no problems with the professional commanders in the brigade. For example, prior to this 2d Company Commander Pranas Kastiatskas served in the Soviet Airborne Troops five years and is a rather well-known athlete. But here is what Kastiatskas says about his subordinates: only 70-80 out of 300 young men strive to become worthy soldiers; the others are not beyond shirking duty.

"Have you ever heard of such a thing where, after exercising a bit, a soldier declares on the spot that he is tired?" These words belong to Kastiatskas's deputy, 22-year-old Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School graduate Renatas Krimlys. Then came a quite unexpected statement from 3d Company Deputy Commander and Vladikavkaz Higher Combined-Arms Command School graduate Gintaras Lukosius: every other one of his subordinates is suffering from some kind of

ailment; these soldiers are not up to physical loads and have to be relieved. For now, noted Lukosius, strong lads suitable for "Gelezinis Vilkas" are a rarity.

Lithuanian Claims On Army Equipment Refuted

92UM0581A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Feb 92 p 2

[Letter by Colonel F. Bychikhin, retired, candidate of military sciences, to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the rubric "Letter to the Editors"; place and date not given: "Allow Me to Disagree With Mr. Vidrinskas"]

[Text] In December, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article entitled "Lithuanian Doesn't Want to Pay Twice" that quoted the following statement by N. Vidrinskas, chief of the Territorial Guard Ministry Main Staff: "When the Red Army occupied Lithuania, the equipment of three divisions and individual units—weapons, supplies, ammunition, and fuel stocks—passed over to it. This, I think, offers every reason to not just say but to demand the transfer, without compensation, to Lithuania of the weapons located here."

I would like to clarify certain events of 50 years ago, events that I witnessed. In the summer of 1940, our 110th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of BM RKGs [expansion not given] entered Lithuania and was stationed at Novovileyke (a suburb of Vilnius); at the time I was serving as commanding officer of a weapons platoon.

Everyone knows that the stationing of Red Army units and combined units was carried out on the basis of the peace agreement between the governments of Lithuania and the Soviet Union. Under the agreement concluded at that time, combined units and units of Lithuania as well as our own troops were stationed on Lithuanian territory simultaneously.

In the summer of 1941, the 110th Howitzer Artillery Regiment left its winter barracks for its summer camp (Pozheymyane), while the Lithuanian units left for their camps; we were separated only by a small river. Our supply depots remained at the permanent stationing sites. We took guns, trailers, and only small reserves of food, fuel, and ammunition to the camp.

Early in the morning of June 22, German aviation began bombing our artillery and tent compound. The Lithuanian units stationed on the other side of the river were not bombed. Major Botinov, the commander of our regiment, took the decision to take the regiment out from under the German aviation strike and to quickly move small groups of servicemen to the permanent stationing area in order to destroy the regiment's supply depots. Unfortunately, the order was never carried out because our teams of soldiers lacked the training for that mission.

As subsequent events showed, the Lithuanian units went over to the side of the fascist army en masse, along with their weapons, equipment, and military hardware. The question arises: Just when did the weapons, equipment,

ammunition, and fuel stocks of "three divisions and individual units" of the Lithuanian Army pass to the Red Army, as Mr. Vidrinskas asserts?

We were unable to remove the enormous stockpiles of materiel that had been amassed in the Baltics for the Red Army in the course of the proceeding year. All these things went to Germany. So Russia, then, should demand the return, without compensation, of the weapons that were seized by Lithuania in conjunction in fascist Germany.

[Signed] Colonel F. Bychikhin, retired, candidate of military sciences

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijan Pay, Benefits to Attract Troops

92UM0552A Moscow MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS
in Russian No 3, 16 Jan 92 p 20

[Article by Mekhman Gafarly: "Azerbaijan: We Are Peaceable People, But the Armored Train is Ours"]

[Text] The military theme again became the chief question in the Republic after the signing of military agreements in Minsk, where Azerbaijan came out for establishing its own army and demanded that the bulk of the military arsenal of the former Soviet Army stationed on its territory be transferred to its jurisdiction. Leaders who themselves were unable to confiscate military units evidently decided to take their share from the center peacefully through the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], but Azerbaijan came up against the opposition of servicemen on its territory. This shows that, in contrast to Ukraine, it will be enormously more difficult to subordinate them to oneself here and force them to swear allegiance to the Republic, because only a small part (around 12,000 persons) in these military units are Azerbaijanis. No agreement was reached between the CIS and Baku on this question.

The most powerful military contingent in the Transcaucasus, 60,000 persons under arms, is stationed in Azerbaijan. The 4th Army is stationed here; it includes four divisions of ground troops, air defense troops, Strategic Missile Troops, and the Air Force, including 130 combat aircraft, missile attack warning systems, defensive Strategic Deterrence Forces and, near the city of Gyandzha, airborne troops. In addition, there is a powerful city garrison and the Higher Military School in Baku. The Caspian Fleet is stationed on the coast and an enormous naval base is situated not far away on Nyargin Island. According to data of foreign sources, more than 6,000 persons serve in this flotilla. In the opinion of military experts, all forces except for 4th Army and some military units are categorized as strategic, but Azerbaijan insists the airborne troops and the Caspian Fleet should not be included in the list of strategic forces. Not laying claim to the airborne troops and Caspian Fleet for now, Azerbaijan plans to establish its own naval brigade separately.

Today Azerbaijan mainly lays claim to 4th Army. It is on the basis of this army that its own troops will be established.

Meanwhile, this strong army is breaking up with each passing day, since the main combat arsenal—tanks, APC's and IFV's—are being removed from the Republic or are being cut into pieces and sent off as scrap metal by the military themselves. Ammunition is being destroyed, sometimes even together with military depots, so that nothing ends up with the Azerbaijani Army.

But Republic Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Rza Kyazimov said: "For now, Azerbaijan is choosing a path with no conflict. But if we do not reach peaceful understandings on the transfer of 4th Army to our jurisdiction, then... We will have to use Ukraine's example."

By the way, the Azerbaijani leadership is promising much to its future soldiers. They are guaranteed full social protection, housing, two-month leaves and a pension after leaving service, and all this according to a professional contract. Even pay in the Azerbaijani Army will be higher than in "CIS Army" ranks. Enlisted men will receive R1,000 and officers a minimum of R2,000.

Army's Situation In Georgia Viewed

92UM0483A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Special Correspondents Captain First Rank A. Pilipchuk and Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin: "Army and Region: The Georgian Situation—Dramatic Neutrality"]

[Text] When Russians kill Russians, Americans kill Americans, or Salvadorans kill Salvadorans, it's called civil war. The nation, regardless of the causes of its internal discord, is like a man who undergoes castration of his own accord. In unleashing war against itself, it castrates itself—destroying its gene pool not only physically, but also morally, and introducing the genes of hatred and vengeance in it. There are always ideological banners over the warring sides, at least they both know why they are dying. The sad thing is when a third party is keeping its standards sheathed but is nonetheless sustaining losses in somebody else's fight.

When we flew into Georgia, the wind had not yet carried away the smell of gunpowder from Shota Rustaveli Prospekt, and the material losses had not yet been calculated. We very quickly got the impression that the number of fatalities on each side could not be tallied precisely. The latest figure being cited is 107 people, but it's too early to consider even that number final. The third party—the army, which has maintained strict neutrality and refused to take up arms even when directly attacked—always counts its casualties by name, as if at an evening roll-call. Between December 1988 and the recent past, a total of 78 soldiers were killed in the Transcaucasus and 710 wounded and injured.

They had moved several hundred kilometers from southern Georgia to Tbilisi: Their orders were to transfer a small column of vehicles and equipment into the hands of another military unit. These days, such a transfer can without exaggeration be compared to a combat operation. On Georgia's roads, attacks on soldiers are a common occurrence. The purpose of the attacks is to seize their equipment and weapons, and to do so the attackers often simply hide in the bushes and spray a round of automatic-weapon fire through the windows of the jeep or truck cabin.

We stopped in to see them the next day—the next evening, to be more precise. Since electricity had disappeared long ago, the barracks was illuminated with the "unsure flame of a candle." About 10 officers, each with an inseparable assault rifle, sat around us, though not right away and not with any particular desire to do so. During our trip here to the Transcaucasus, we had already become accustomed to the rather gruff way the local officers treated their colleagues who had come here from Moscow to gather news. These fatigued and irritable men were no exception.

Among the men, who had been made equal by the semidarkness and their role as listeners, Major Vladimir Meshcheryakov, the former deputy commander for political affairs, stood out. From time to time he was joined by other voices that cited incidents from personal experience. And at equal intervals, someone would comment, "Why are you telling about all this? As if your stories are going to change anything!" But for the most part, the major was supported.

The hardships that the regiment is experiencing are little different from the things we had already heard here in the Transcaucasian Military District. The officers and warrant officers hadn't been paid for three months in a row, and the sergeants and rank and file men hadn't been paid since August.

"No one in the regiment has any savings to speak of," said Major Meshcheryakov, "so what are people to do? When they get off duty, the officers go home, change clothes, and go look for ways to earn temporary wages among the local population. Our town is small, but the people are for the most part well off. You can unload slate for one guy, or dig ditches for somebody else. In general, you can earn something for milk and bread in the evenings. And an officer is a desirable laborer—he works hard and doesn't know how to haggle over wages."

"I'm a company commander," one voice volunteered. "I can tell you honestly that as soon as my subordinates are finally paid, half the company is going to run off. And I can understand them."

We, too, could understand the men we were speaking with. The regiment has not received its promised food ration. The military commissaries are empty. The wives of the regiment's 78 officers are unemployed. Their homes lack lights, heat (and this is high in the mountains), and hot water. In the barracks, the soldiers sleep

in drying rooms—naturally, without taking off their outer clothes. Anyone who is able to send his family away has done so. But not everybody can. Only three people in the regiment have apartments, as they put it, "in the Union." Where can the rest go?

"We feel like hostages here," said Major Meshcheryakov. "Moscow need only say the wrong thing and we'll be surrounded and can expect an attack. In Georgia people can shoot at us with impunity. Take the most recent incident. Some soldiers were going to the laundry to pick up underclothes. A Zhiguli came up behind them and someone in it fired a round at them as the car sped past. One soldier was killed on the spot, and another is in the field hospital. They fire on our posts and stop vehicles and beat up officers, warrant officers, and soldiers. The commanders, instead of explicit instructions and clear orders, mumble something about restraint and neutrality."

"Everybody has forgotten about us," said Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Polyanskiy, joining in. "If anything happens, we can only rely on ourselves. Throw your wife and kids in an infantry fighting vehicle and break through to Russia."

"Who cares about us in Russia? Who is waiting for us there and where? We'd be better off going to Turkey."

The men laughed at the joke, but reluctantly somehow. The question, "who cares about them?" is much too serious for them.

A few days earlier they were all acquainted with the Russian oath. None of the men with whom we spoke planned to take it. Their position is simple, but if you think about, there's a lot of drama in it: "We have already sworn an oath of loyalty to the motherland and to our people. An officer doesn't swear an oath twice."

The regiment has quite a few Afghanistan war veterans and officers with combat experience. And most of them have one desire—to get discharged and move to some Russian city where they can have a normal job and a normal life. This is a more or less exact copy of the state of mind of specific officers in a specific regiment. We do not claim to generalize and we do not want to tone down what we heard. Service conditions are harder in some places, easier in others. But one of the Transcaucasus officers we met probably put it very aptly: Military service is always hard, but when you don't know who cares about your military service, it becomes intolerable.

But Guards Major Anatoliy Shablovskiy, a battalion chief of staff in one of the units stationed in Tbilisi, isn't thinking about civilian life yet. We met with him shortly after his return from a battle. One night a military installation was attacked (incidentally, Guards Colonel Mukhazid Zakuyev, the unit commander, told us that the unit currently guards 22 installations).

After supper I was just getting ready to take a nap," Shablovskiy recounted, "when a messenger ran up and sounded the alarm. We assembled within one minute—

we carry all our equipment with us. I assigned officer crews to the infantry fighting vehicles (we'll interrupt the speaker once more: After the spring discharge to the reserves, the unit will be left with just 12 privates and sergeants, and no reinforcements from Russia are foreseen.) We arrived at the installation, which was being fired on from five points. We dispersed the attackers and returned to the unit, but that night we had to go to the installation again, when it was shelled a second time."

The major spoke about this as though it happened every day. But it occurred to us: There's a curfew in effect in the city. How can there be so many armed people on the streets? The next morning we went to the city commandant's office for comment: Nothing was known about the skirmish.

No, Guards Major Shablovskiy, a graduate of the Suvorov Academy, doesn't plan to leave the army. But serving in an army in which anybody can take potshots at you—there's also a limit to how much of that a person can take.

The easiest thing to do is to attribute the situation to the extraordinarily "irresponsible" policy of the "legitimately elected and legitimately expelled" Georgian President, which local commentators call a policy of seeking out enemies, a kind of persecution mania at the state level. And Gamsakhurdia declared the army to be one of the "enemies" of the nation. Nevertheless, the full truth here is closer to the truth of life itself: The outright battles waged by the two sides in December and January attest to the fact that each of them had amassed sizable arsenals of weapons, ammunition, combat vehicles, and equipment, and the sources of all these things cannot be said to have been legal ones. The events in Tbilisi graphically demonstrated once again what a yawning gap there is between evolutionary change and revolutionary upheaval. The latter, regardless of what anyone might want, is inevitably accompanied by violence, lawlessness, and crime that rages with impunity.

One can only shudder on learning the circumstances surrounding the death, for example, of Colonel Anatoliy Shchepionikov, a department head at the Tbilisi Higher Artillery Command School (now disbanded). After graduating from the Leningrad Artillery School, he served as a deputy battery commander. After graduating from the academy, he commanded a regiment in the Carpathian Military District. He attended classes in an adjunct school run by the academy and taught. Captain Aleksey Zelepuhin graduated from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School and commanded a tank platoon and a company. He served in the Volga Military District and had come to the Transcaucasus only recently. On December 29 he was on his way to a training center when his vehicle was blocked in the area of Rustavi by several automobiles from which shots were fired. The driver was wounded, but the officer joined the battle and was fatally wounded. His six-year-old daughter lost her father. On January 13, in Sukhumi, a military unit bus in which

warrant officer Nikolay Beremeyenko was riding was fired on. He was due to become a father in three months. The number of widows and orphaned children continues to mount, and the army itself is being orphaned as it pays its last respects to real soldiers who remained loyal to their oath.

We never managed to learn a single thing that might indicate an investigation or effort to punish the criminals. The army finds itself in a kind of legal dead zone.

After our return from Tbilisi, decisions were taken that introduced at least some clarity into these painful issues—the status of the “ownerless” army in the Transcaucasus, and in Georgia in particular. At the All-Army Officers Council, the Russian President assured officer corps representatives that troops stationed on the territory of the sovereign republics that are not joining the CIS are being taken under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and will swear an oath to it. This means that now there’s someone to take responsibility for supplying the troops and for the servicemen’s future.

But for the Transcaucasus officers, this question is not as simple as it might seem from this side of the Caucasus Range. Our memories are still too fresh, for example, of the decision taken by the officers council of the Guards unit commanded by Guards Colonel M. Zakuyev: To take no oath to Russia as long as the unit remains in Georgia. Apparently, political decisions have crossed the mountain range before any mechanism for implementing them has. There is no doubt but what concrete agreements are needed with the republic’s authorities on the status of the troops on its territory, and unconditional observance of such agreements. Only then will military service in the Transcaucasus become normal service.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Tajikistan Halts Call-Up

92UM0472C Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian
No 24, Dec 91 p 2

[Unattributed report: The Call-Up Is Halted in Tajikistan“]

[Text] “Sovereign Tajikistan upholds the principles of unity of the country’s Armed Forces, but within the republic the spring call-up of our young men for service in the Armed Forces of the USSR has been temporarily halted.” This was stated by the republic’s military commissar, Major-General M. Mamadzhanov. This decision of the parliament of Tajikistan was reached before the signing of the treaty between competent bodies of the republic and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

The Military Commissar noted that the agreement to complete the call-up and for citizens of the republic to do their compulsory military service signed in October between the republic government and the General Staff

of the USSR Armed Forces requires certain amendment in connection with the changed situation in the country. For the time being young Tajik men will do their service in military units of the Soviet Army, and also border and internal troops, deployed on republic territory, in accordance with the decree adopted in the republic on 5 October. Under this decree young men whose brothers had died carrying out their international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan or during the course of other local conflicts, and also during the fulfillment of their military duties in peacetime, would be released from their military service. Citizens who are the sons of widows, and shepherds of draft age, and men with families, and also students enrolled in full-time courses in the departments of higher educational establishments, were released early.

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MOLDOVA

Moldovan Official on Army, Military Budget

92UM0584A Kishinev NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 19 Dec 92 p 3

[Interview with T. Samoylenko, chief of the military department of the State Department for Military Questions, by Yelena Khoroshikh; date and place not given: “What Kind of Army Will There Be in Moldova?”]

[Text] The situation of the military structures in our country continues to be disquieting. Are their problems being resolved? Are they not spreading like a disease throughout the body? This is subject of an interview with T. Samoylenko, chief of the military department of the State Department for Military Questions.

[Khoroshikh] What is the military-political situation in the republic, and at what level are military affairs in Moldova decided?

[Samoylenko] On the whole the military-political situation in our republic is rather difficult, as it is in all other regions of the Union. Numerous problems have piled up, whose resolution is entrusted to the republic State Department for Military Questions. The difficulty is that not only has the future of the Army not been determined, but also to whom it actually belongs and whom is it serving at the present time. Thus, the Army is becoming ownerless. This is fostered most of all by the fact that the General Staff, where the concepts and principles of force generation of the Army are worked on, is not assessing those real events and phenomena that are taking place in the former Union and each individual republic. For example, for the sake of maintaining the principle of unified armed forces, the Ministry of Defense of the former center made concessions, proposing that each republic establish its own ministry of defense and the resubordination of military commissariats, civil defense, DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the

Army, Aviation, and Navy], and other semimilitary structures to republic authorities. Now, even the creation of a national guard is allowed. But, alas. What was acceptable a year and even a year and a half ago is now a belated measure. Many of the prominent military commanders, by virtue of the conservatism and inertia of their thinking, cannot "keep in step" with the dynamically developing processes in society and the Army, they cannot evaluate them and begin to manage them. They also cannot do this because a majority of them are already provided with the necessary creature comforts and do not much want to change anything. Therefore, decisions on leading the Army out of the crisis that has developed are implemented in truncated form, are delayed, or are not applied at all. This occurs, apparently, out of a desire to delay until there is an explanation or stabilization of the situation in the country. But every military person knows that delay may mean death.

[Khoroshikh] You have in mind a military coup, as is being predicted?

[Samoylenko] Yes. What the world and central press is writing about now, the possibility of a military coup in the near future, is a somewhat valid forecast. In addition, the strike force of such a coup most likely will be the intermediate mass of officers whose mood, we will say frankly, puts one on guard. The situation is really explosive now. This is also admitted by many generals who say that if, for example, one division absconds from subordination to the Ministry of Defense tomorrow, others will join it.

[Khoroshikh] Is it possible to avoid this?

[Samoylenko] I think so. This is exactly what the State Department for Military Questions is engaged in. Its activity is directed at a resolution of the whole complex of military questions, taking sociopolitical realities into account. This can be achieved only in stages by means of joint determination of military policy with the other republics, the adoption by the president and the parliament of the Republic of Moldova of decrees and legislative acts, the preparation and conclusion of appropriate treaties and agreements, the holding of consultations, including with the USSR Ministry of Defense, relating to the development and conduct of the work of the mechanism of all-Union armed forces. As you can understand, there is a lot of work to do, but no time to spare.

[Khoroshikh] How does the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR and the parliament of the Republic of Moldova treat the work of your department? Who helps you more, and who cooperates with you more?

[Samoylenko] However paradoxical this is, we coordinate most frequently with the Ministry of Defense of the country and with representatives of organs of other republics. We have continuous contact with some of them (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and the Baltics). This happens, first of all, because the authority is greater beyond the borders of the republic, but, second, because we adhere to a clear, exactly formulated, and well

thought out position. In parliament, our views are perceived by many deputies with apprehension. However, one would like to hope that an end has been put to the policy of adopting halfway and late measures on military questions. It is enough to mention how many times in one year our parliament adopted and annulled and, afterwards, again adopted various decisions on military questions.

Our department has now prepared a number of draft laws, such as, "On the Defense of the Republic of Moldova," "On Compulsory Military Training and Military Service of the Citizens of the Republic of Moldova," and "On the Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova and Members of their Families and Citizens Who Have Completed Military Training."

The adoption by the parliament of Moldova of these laws will make it possible to create not only a legal basis for the resolution of military questions but will also lower the tensions in the military sphere that we talked about at the beginning of this interview.

[Khoroshikh] Can you be more specific: In what way do you want to achieve this?

[Samoylenko] You see, it is easier for each republic to decide what kind of army it should have and how to maintain its personnel. After all, in establishing its own armed forces Moldova, for example, is assuming a corresponding obligation to ensure the social and legal protection of all servicemen and members of their families, regardless of nationality.

Literally the other day I met with servicemen of Military Unit 33456 of Kagul. They agreed in principle to fulfill the ukase of the president of the Republic of Moldova "On the Declaration that Weapons, Military Equipment, and Other Military Property Belonging to Military Units of the Soviet Army Deployed on the Territory of the Republic Are the Property of the Republic of Moldova." Moreover, many of them agree to continue to serve in a given unit if a bilateral agreement is signed at a high level and the republic assumes the resolution of financial questions. But, in addition, they want guarantees for the social protection of officers, warrant officers, and members of their families.

At the present time the leadership of the city, in violation of existing normative acts, is not granting servicemen the right of registration, is not issuing orders for residency, and is not authorizing apartment exchanges. These actions can be assessed as activity to destabilize the situation in the republic. They can interfere with the signing of the aforementioned agreements and the conduct of negotiations on the resolution of an entire complex of military questions. I believe that it is now necessary to meet with servicemen in different garrisons, to explain the situation that is developing in the republic, to find mutual compromises, and, through a civilized procedure, to resolve questions that arise. We do not think the commanders are behaving properly in those

units where the personnel are not allowed to meet with officers of our department. This is an old and unjustified method of restraining people from the opportunity to receive and compare various information.

[Khoroshikh] What monetary resources are being spent today in Moldova on the upkeep of the Army?

[Samoylenko] In the last five years we spent a sum on weapons of the Soviet Army equal to our annual national income. At the conference of committees of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet on questions of security and defense and representatives of the sovereign and independent states, held in Moscow on 28-29 November, Moldova was asked for 1.8 billion rubles. But for the establishment of a republic army in 1992 we plan to spend a total of about 200 million rubles. There is a difference, is there not?

[Khoroshikh] What kind of army is it planned to establish in Moldova?

[Samoylenko] About 12,000 professionals broken down into brigades will be the so-called nucleus. In addition, several training centers for the preparation of the reserves.

Citizens of Moldova will be able to go through service in the Army as they desire, regardless of nationality and religious belief, on the basis of a signed contract, at the same time receiving pay (no lower than service in internal affairs organs). Those who do not desire to undergo military service are obliged to have a medical checkup to determine their condition of health, with their further transfer to the reserve category. In turn, reservists will be obligated to go through basic military training for several months in training centers, with subsequent additional training.

So. As we see, work in the State Department for Military Questions is in full swing. It is to be hoped that it will be able to prevent an impending military rebellion.

Moldova to Form Three-Division Army

*92UM0551A Moscow MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS
in Russian No 3, 16 Jan 92 p 21*

[Article by Yelena Pestrukhina and Yevgeniy Strigunov: "Moldova: A Choice of Five Oaths"]

[Text] At the end of last year the President of Moldova issued a decree under which the property of units stationed on Republic territory was declared Republic property. Those in Kishinev do not conceal intentions to establish their own army. Nevertheless, Nikolay Kirtoake, general director of the Moldovan Department (Ministry) of Military Affairs, regards the Ukrainian version of accelerated "nationalization" of personnel and oath-taking as "window-dressing" and "folly." "We wish to act in a civilized manner within the scope of the Minsk meeting, at which Marshal Shaposhnikov was

charged with working out a military concept of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] within a two-month period," he said, and added: "Moldova is being urged on by the Ukrainian events and the position of people in the Dnestr area, who are preparing an Ulster."

The Moldovan Parliament must consider a package of laws on a Republic Army at the very next session in January. There are no great differences of opinion between supporters of the president and the opposition, the People's Front. The basic idea is to gradually replace present motley officer and enlisted personnel (where Russians and Ukrainians predominate) with citizens (natives) of Moldova in one-and-a-half to two years. A data bank on "our own" draftees is being set up under the military department: around 4,500 Moldovan officers serve in CIS forces. The Moldovan leadership and the opposition come together in the opinion that the Republic does not need a large army; two to three divisions are enough.

Around 30,000 persons are stationed in Moldova, basically units of the 14th Army, the headquarters of which is based in Tiraspol. Moldova cannot and does not wish to maintain such an army: it has neither finances nor its own military schools. At a recent meeting with the military, President Snegur did not exclude training cadres abroad, although he did not clarify where—in CIS countries or Romania. Some combat arms such as the Air Forces are simply not needed by the Republic. The territory of Moldova is so small that a modern fighter will be in someone else's space—Romanian or Ukrainian—a few minutes after takeoff. Therefore, in contrast to Kravchuk, Snegur is ready to categorize as many units as possible as "strategic" and give them up to overall CIS command. But there also will be problems with the Ground Troops, which the Republic is ready to take in hand. There seemingly is much equipment—an entire motorized rifle division is mothballed on Republic territory—but repair bases, arsenals and even many firing ranges are outside the Republic in the Ukraine. Until recently 14th Army was part of Odessa Military District, but the Ukrainian leadership clarified that it lays claim only to those military units stationed on its territory. As a result, the Moldovan piece of the former Union's army ended up "ownerless" and soldiers were left to their own devices.

Sixty percent of 14th Army units are located in the "mutinous" Levoberezhye, in the Dnestr Republic. Chief of Staff Sitnikov officially is Acting Army Commander, but the leadership essentially remained in the hands of General Gennadiy Yakovlev, who was removed from his position a month ago by the Odessa District leadership because he agreed to hold the post of Minister of Defense of the Dnestr Republic "pluralistically." Officers and soldiers are in a difficult spot today. The Union, to which they swore allegiance, is gone. They can swear allegiance to the Ukraine or Dnestr, an oath to Russia is ready, and the text of oaths of Moldova and the CIS is expected. Even if an order should come from

Odessa, Kiev or Moscow about withdrawal of troops, it most likely will not be carried out. The majority of officers lean toward the opinion that it is impossible to leave Moldova. There is nowhere to go: no one is expecting them anywhere.

The army will serve the one who agrees to maintain and feed it. A package of military laws was first to be considered at the last Dnestr Supreme Soviet session. Dnestr people do not believe the peaceful plans of Kishinev. Therefore they are happily ready to receive an army equipped with everything necessary, especially as there already are units of this nature here—these are

rather well equipped units of the Republic Guard and the Dnester Battalion. But as Dnestr President Smirnov admitted, even the rich Dnestr area is incapable of maintaining the very powerful chemical, pontoon and missile units formed at one time as the offensive advance guard of a Soviet war machine aimed at the West.

The military are in confusion: they are accustomed to executing orders, but do not know whose to execute. They are observing neutrality for now. This also explains the army position during the recent Dubossary armed conflict. But officer meetings today are clearly sympathetic to the unacknowledged Dnestr Republic.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Prospects for Joint EC 'Nuclear Button' Viewed
*924P0054A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 92
Morning Edition p 7*

[Correspondent Yuriy Kovalenko report: "Common Nuclear Button for the EC"]

[Text] Paris—France has proposed to its European Community partners the elaboration of a European nuclear doctrine, which would be a most important aspect of a common policy in the defense sphere.

This presupposes that Paris and London subsequently put at the disposal of the "12" their nuclear forces, which, by all accounts, would be under a common command. The elaboration of such a doctrine will very soon be a principal task for the EC, Francois Mitterrand declared, addressing a national meeting on problems of European integration which was being held in Paris. He observed that, following the achievement of agreements on political and currency and economic unions of the EC at the recent meeting in Maastricht, the way was open to the creation of common European defenses. In this connection the "12" had to resolve a number of problems, including the problem of the use of nuclear weapons.

This viewpoint is supported by many convinced supporters of European integration. Thus Jacques Delors, chairman of the European Communities Commission, recently declared that the French nuclear forces should ultimately be at the disposal of the EC. If the European Community one day becomes a strong political union, he said, why not transfer the nuclear weapons to this political authority?

The mere formulation of the question of the French nuclear arsenals being put at the disposal of the "12" signifies Paris' possible radical revision of its defense concept. For the past 30 years France has made paramount the sovereignty of its own armed forces and quit NATO's military organization for this reason.

But now, when Paris, together with Bonn, is acting as a principal pioneer of the creation of European defenses independent of NATO, such an initiative on the part of President F. Mitterrand would seem logical. It is impossible to propose the formulation of a common military policy within the framework of the EC and uphold the sovereign nature of one's own nuclear forces here. European solidarity, former French Foreign Minister J. Francois-Poncet observed, implies nuclear solidarity also.

Paris is having to revise the doctrine of deterrence by virtue of geopolitical factors also. The former Soviet Union, against which this doctrine was directed, is no longer a source of direct danger to France. And its tactical nuclear forces could strike only at the territory of its allies. Under these conditions "sovereign" nuclear

weapons, which in the past served the "grandeur" of France, threaten to become an anachronism.

Who would have his hand on the common nuclear button? The transfer of nuclear forces to a unified European command, the newspaper LE FIGARO believes, presupposes the existence of the institution of an all-European presidency disposing of the same authority as the presidency in the United States. This is still a long way off, of course.

The more so in that Great Britain—the other nuclear European power—has a very reserved attitude toward the mere idea of the building of European defenses, which would lead to a weakening of the role of NATO. London would like its nuclear forces to remain at the disposal of the North Atlantic alliance, which could use them if this were not contrary to British interests.

Together with the nuclear doctrine F. Mitterrand also touched in his program speech devoted to European integration on the question of France's ratification of the agreements on political and currency and economic unions reached in Maastricht. These agreements will, if this is what the French people want, usher in, according to the president, a new era and be a decisive moment in France's history.

F. Mitterrand acknowledged that they provide for a partial renunciation of sovereignty for France, but rejection of the agreements on the political and currency and economic unions in Europe would mean a "national tragedy" and lead to profound crisis. The president has not yet decided in what way he will propose their ratification—either by way of referendum or by way of parliamentary decision.

He returned once again to his idea of a European confederation of East and West uniting all the continent's democratic forces. At the present time, the EC believes, there can be no question of admitting the East European states as new members to the Community for economic and political reasons.

Nonetheless, the EC cannot, in the president's opinion, egotistically withdraw into itself. It is essential to build a Europe whose cornerstone is the Community. It is necessary to aspire everywhere to the creation of permanent all-European structures, within which each country, whatever its dimensions, feels itself to be on a par with others.

Russia Asks Germany for Additional Funds for Withdrawal

92UM0592A Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The German Wave"]

[Text] Russian Minister of Defense Grachev has demanded an additional seven billion marks for the withdrawal of Soviet soldiers from Eastern Germany, basing his demand for additional expenditures on the

fact that Russia must build a significantly larger number of apartments than initially proposed, and due to the fact that other republics have refused to take the contingent of troops which had been foreseen onto their territory. In addition, the transit costs have grown, since the soldiers,

upon returning, travel through a larger number of states. (Editor's note. According to information from the Reuters news agency, Germany has refused the Russian request to increase compensation for the withdrawal of troops from the FRG.)

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